## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

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COPYRIGHT OFFICE SECTION 1201

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RULEMAKING HEARING: EXEMPTIONS FROM PROHIBITIONS ON CIRCUMVENTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES THAT CONTROL ACCESS TO COPYRIGHTED WORKS

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Wednesday, May 14, 2003

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The hearing was held at 9:00 a.m. in the 2002-4C, UCLA Law School Moot Courtroom, Los Angeles, CA, Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, presiding.

## PRESENT:

MARYBETH PETERS
DAVID CARSON
CHARLOTTE DOUGLASS
ROBERT KASUNIC
STEVEN TEPP

Register of Copyrights General Counsel of Copyright Principal Legal Advisor Senior Attorney of Copyright Policy Planning Advisor

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## P-R-O-C-E-D-I-N-G-S

9:10 a.m.

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MS. PETERS: Good morning. I'm Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights. And I would like to welcome everyone to the first day of hearings in Los Angles in this Section 1201 anticircumvention rulemaking.

The purpose of this rulemaking proceeding is to determine whether there are particular classes of works as to which users are or likely to be adversely effected in their ability to make noninfringing uses if they are prohibited from circumventing technological measures that control access. That's quite a sentence.

Today we have several sessions. And the first one will deal with filtering software. The second will deal with malfunctioning, damaged and obsolete technological protection measures, as well as research security in the public domain. And the afternoon session will deal with copy protected CDs.

You should know that comments, the reply comments and the hearing testimonies will form the basis of evidence in this rulemaking which, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of

1 Commerce will result in my recommendation to the 2 Librarian of Congress. The Librarian must make a determination before October 28, 2003 on whether or 3 4 not there will be any exemptions to the prohibition 5 during the next three year period. The entire record of this, as well as 6 7 the last 1201 rulemaking, are on our website. We 8 will be posting the transcripts of all hearings 9 approximately one week after each hearing. 10 The transcripts as posted are 11 uncorrected, but each witness does have an 12 opportunity to correct the transcripts. Let me take this moment to introduce the 13 14 rest of Copyright Office panel. To my immediate 15 left is David Carson, who is our general counsel. To 16 my immediate right is Rob Kasunic, who is senior attorney and advisor in the Office of the General 17 18 Counsel. To his right is Charlotte Douglass, who is 19 a principal legal advisor to the General Counsel. 20 I'm going to try to change this. Last 21 time I said to the far was Steve Tepp. That's the far left. And he said I've never been characterized 22 23 that way, Marybeth. So, to the left of the General 24 Counsel is Steve Tepp

That's even worse.

MR. TEPP:

MS. PETERS: Whatever. Policy planning advisor in the Office of Policy and International Affairs.

The format of each hearing is that each panel has 3 parts. First, the witnesses present their testimony, and obviously this is your chance to make your case and your chance to rebut his case. Then we get to ask questions and, hopefully, they will be equally tough for each side. You should not take any of our questioning as an indication of what we think. This is just the exercise by which we dig out information. Even our facial expressions should not in anyway be taken to reflect what we think. Because the truth is at this moment we have made no decision, and we haven't even sat down amongst ourselves to talk about any particular exemption or what the evidence is. So it's all totally wide open.

If in fact this hasn't happened there's an opportunity to the panel for each of you to question happen. Mostly it's happened that during our questioning you sort of question each other.

Obviously, because we have some time constraints here, we do reserve the right to ask each person who testifies to answer any additional

1 questions. And, obviously, those questions will be 2 made and the answers will be made available to 3 everybody. 4 I want to at this point thank David 5 Nimmer of USCLA who was instrumental in getting 6 these very nice facilities for us, and actually 7 thank UCLA for all the work in making this possible. 8 So without further ado, I should mention 9 that Jeff Joiner has joined us, and he's an attorney with NTIA, National Telecommunications and 10 Information Administration. So he's representing the 11 Assistant Secretary that I referred to as having a 12 consultation involving in this process. 13 14 The first panel is dealing with 15 filtering software. And the witnesses are James Tyre from Censorware Project and Steve Metalitz, who 16 17 filed on behalf of many copyright owners a very 18 extensive statement. 19 So we start with the proponent of an 20 exemption and then we go to the other side. So we 21 will start with you, Mr. Tyre. 22 The microphones. MR. CARSON: 23 Oh, yes, the microphones. MS. PETERS: 24 The microphones are actually not to project the 25 sound to everybody who is here. The microphones are

solely to assist the recorder. So, when you speak as when we speak, you need to really speak out so that everybody in the room can, in fact, hear you. Okay? Thank you.

MR. TYRE: Thank you. My name is James Tyre, as you indicated. I'm here on behalf of the Censorware Project.

I'm probably at least a little bit of a mystery both to you on the panel and to Mr. Metalitz because, unlike the people who spoke in Washington all of whom I know fairly well and also unlike Mr. Metalitz, I was unable to submit written comments. So I come here as a bit of a blank slate. And that being the case, I want to tell you just a little bit about myself and what the Censorware Project is to put the testimony I'm going to give in perspective.

I am a lawyer here in the Los Angeles area. I have been in practice since 1978. Much of my practice, though not all of it, has been devoted to First Amendment issues. And it was the First Amendment aspect of Censorware that brought me into this particular field that got me interested in it: First, really as something interesting just to explore, then working really with it. Then starting to think about the legal ramifications of it.

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The Censorware Project is a group currently consisting of four people, myself,

Jonathan Wallace, Jamie McCarthy, Bennett Haselton.

Originally there were two others, including Seth

Finkelstein from whom you heard a great deal when you had a session in Washington. Seth has not been a part of the group since about 1998/1999, somewhere in that area. But certainly he was essential when we started the group.

What happened is that it was around 1995 when the issue of Censorware began to become an Seth was telling you that he had been on the Internet since 1985. He had been seeing a lot of changes in it. I cannot tell you that I'm that much of an Internet veteran. But fairly shortly after I did get onto the Internet, I happened upon an email discussion group that had to do generally with issues of censorship regarding the Internet, and specifically censorware. And I got interested in it, not so much in the sense that I was immediately thinking about filing a legal case or anything of that sort, but I got interested in the implications, specifically First Amendment implications, at some point other possible theories that might be available for use with censorware. And, obviously

the First Amendment implications would apply only if the censorware was being used in a public institution.

We have never taken the position, I don't know anyone that's ever taken the position, that if a family chooses to use censorware in the home or if a private corporation chooses to use it at the workplace, that there are any First Amendment issues there. We may criticize it because we don't like censorware does, but we make no claims that there's any particular legal significance to it.

In any event, it was in 1995/1996 when this was really a hot topic, and it became quickly apparent that there was a group of us that had a fairly common interest. And I should also indicate that one of the other witnesses from whom you heard a lot in Washington, David Burt, was a part of these discussions. I believe I first encountered him on the Internet in 1996 or possibly 1997.

So many of us who have been working in this field, regardless of which side we're on, are old acquaintances. Whether we're friends or not is a different story, but we've known each other for quite a long time.

But what happened was, and I know you've

heard a little bit about the <u>Mainstream Loudoun</u> case in Virginia. That case, actually, was essential to how the Censorware Project came into being. And it's actually a good illustration of the kind of work we do and what the effect has.

Jonathan Wallace, one of the founding members of the Censorware Project, like myself, is also an attorney. And he had done some writing on his own site, "The Ethical Spectacle," spectacle.org about what he viewed as some of the legal issues involving censorware. And it was a very good essay he wrote. This would have been probably in 1996/1997. And it was about that time when in Loudoun County, Virginia the public library was considering putting in censorware, and specifically a particular version of X-Stop called the Felony And a lot of censorware companies and censorware products have changed names, so I just indicate that the product that then was known by X-Stop then was manufactured by a company called Log-On Data Corporation. That product actually is the product of one of the three companies that signed on to David Burt's comments, that being 8e6 Technologies. At some point the company changed its name. So we're talking about a product of that

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company.

But there was a group in Loudoun County called Mainstream Loudoun. It was extremely concerned with the implications of censorware being used in their libraries. So the head of that group sent an email to Jonathan Wallace and said we really like what you've written in your essay, but can you help us? Can you give us something more tangible. And, again, this was before the Censorware Project as a group existed. But Jonathan contacted two people: Myself, Seth Finkelstein, said can we do something to help these people. The answer was yes.

You've heard about some of the decryption work that Seth Finkelstein did. At that time he decrypted the X-Stop blacklist. He and I together poured through that list looking for the flaws in it and we fed the results from that, from our work there to Jonathan Wallace who wrote a scathing article about X-Stop.

One of the interesting things was that X-Stop was a fairly new product on the market at the time. And it had gotten a number of glowing endorsements from quite a number of people, including specially David Burt, who at that time was still a librarian not working for N2H2.

And we put out that report. And
everybody went, in effect, "Oh, my God." And
everybody who endorsed that product, including David
Burt, ran away from it as fast as they could.
Everyone except the Loudoun County Public Library
system.

So, the lawsuit was filed with a lawyer by the name of Bob Corn-Revere representing the plaintiffs, who were library patrons. Shortly thereafter a group of website owners whose content was being blocked in the libraries represented by Ann Beeson of the ACLU intervened on the plaintiff's side in that case. The lawsuit went forward.

David Burt makes a technically correct statement but very misleading statement in his joint chilling reply to the effect of there's nothing in the court record to indicate that the Censorware Project in general or Seth in particular had anything to do with developing the evidence in the case. That statement is 100 percent correct and 100 percent misleading. Because what happened was Seth decrypted the list not just once, but on many, many, many different occasions because you want to see what happens as they find out about new bad blocks, whether they unblocked them, what new they've added

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to the black list, things like that. Through the Censorware Project we were analyzing the lists, we were going through the lists. We were feeding the list bad blocks to the appropriate people involved in the case.

So it may well be that the court record says that library patron X has a declaration that says "I found these 6 bad blocks using the library terminals and, thus, using X-Stop as installed in the libraries." Guess where he found out where to look at those websites?

That was the impetus of how the Censorware Project was formed. The three of us working on that and then we added in three other people as we went on to other projects.

The first project we did as a group was a dissection, also based on decryption of CyberPatrol, which you've heard a good deal about, specifically in the context of the Microsystems lawsuit. A lot of these products, as I said, have changed names over the years and CyberPatrol along with another product SurfWatch now have been merged into a product called SurfControl, which I'll be talking about a little bit today. So I want to sort of keep the players straight.

It's interesting one of the things
that's said in the joint reply comment; and for this
purpose, when I'm talking about joint reply,
hopefully you will just assume that I'm focusing on
the joint reply filed by Mr. Burt. I have no
intention of slighting or ignoring Mr. Metalitz'
comment, and I will address some of the things you
have. But I'm sure he would agree that there's a
great deal more detail, and properly so, in the
joint reply of the censorware companies than in that
which Mr. Metalitz put together.

Mr. Burt said, and I believe this was actually in his testimony as opposed to in the joint reply, he said have reports based upon decryption ever really helped at all? And he said "No, they don't help us at all." And, of course, I'm paraphrasing. I don't have an exact quote in front of me. Because they just talk about a few sites here and there. They're really not of any use to us.

Well, there's this interesting little
phenomenon because every time we have done a report,
regardless of what the software it is, and we have
done major reports upon CyberPatrol, X-Stop,
SmartFilter, WebSense and -- I'm missing one.
There's one other, I'm temporarily blanking on it.

But five of them. Every time we've done a report, within 2 days the appropriate censorware company has gone through our reports, whether they were based on decryption or some other techniques, and guess what? The sites that we said were bad blocks suddenly are off the list. It's folly to say that the censorware companies do not pay attention to what we do and that they put little credence into the reports that are based upon decryption or other techniques.

We started the Censorware Project in 1997. We've been doing this since then. We're strictly a volunteer group. We all have real jobs, other things to do.

These kinds of reports, frankly, are a great deal more difficult to do than they used to be. I remember the good old says when a censorware black list might have 10,000 or 15,000 items on it. It was big news in the industry when the first censorware black list had 100,000 items. Now, according to David Burt's testimony a month ago, and I believe him, the N2H2 black list has 4 million items on it. It's hard work to go through these lists. So it's not as easy to do these kinds of reports as it used to be. But, every report that we have done based upon decryption and based upon other

techniques we have used, has been taken very seriously by the censorware companies and by other people.

My primary purpose today is to go
through and counter some of the statements that Mr.
Burt made, both in his written comments and in his
oral testimony. And really focus on one broader
issue.

You've heard testimony that, in essence, there are three types of ways of doing this sort of work. The first way is to start off by decrypting the encrypted database and having decrypted it, analyze it by whatever means one does, drawing whatever conclusions and making whatever report one wants to make based upon that. That's what's at issue here today.

But what's relevant to whether this exemption should be extended for another 3 years isn't just that question. I think one thing that's unique about this particular class, both as the exemption was granted 3 years ago and if it should be granted again for the next 3 years, is nobody disputes that the study of censorware is an incredibly important, very legitimate course of study. There is nothing silly about it. There is

nothing frivolous about it. It is socially important. It is legally important. No one has ever disputed those contentions. Certainly David Burt never has, and I don't think that Mr. Metalitz will, though I certainly do not presume to be able to read his mind.

The only question here is whether the importance of being able to continue decryption based studies as opposed to other techniques is sufficient to justify the continuation of the exemption. So when I get into my testimony, and I realize you want to keep the opening statement short and I've spent a fair amount of time just giving you some of my background so I'll hold off on this until we get into the question period, but I do want to spend a fair amount of time focusing on the specific issue of the benefits of doing decryption study versus doing what is called either database querying or sampling versus what has been called log file analysis. And in some cases log file analysis really is nothing more than a subset of database querying or sampling. In some cases it's a little bit different.

One project we as the Censorware Project did is a little bit different. We've done them all,

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1	so I'm in a position that not many are in to speak
2	to the benefits and detriments of all of them. And
3	I'd like to spend the bulk of my time, hopefully
4	once we get into the questions, talking about the
5	differences, specifically talking about the
6	weaknesses with database querying. And as a subset
7	of that, very much talking about the weaknesses of
8	the URL checkers, which you've heard a lot about by
9	N2H2 and some, but by no means, all of the other
10	censorware companies offer.
11	And with that, I suspect, I've talked
12	more than enough for what you want to hear as an
13	opening statement, so I will defer to Mr. Metalitz
14	and then get to questions later.
15	MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you very much,
16	Mr. Tyre.
17	Mr. Metalitz?
18	MR. METALITZ: Thank you very much. It's
19	a pleasure to be back here.
20	I was thinking back to the last time
21	that I was in this position before this panel, which
22	was 3 years ago in Palo Alto. And much has changed
23	since then. We live in a different world, some might
24	say, than we did in the summer of 2000.
25	And on a less consequential scale,

things have changed in the nature of this proceeding as well. And if I might, if I could just take a minute for some general observations before I turn to the subject of filtering software.

I really want to talk about three things that have changed that are quite relevant to this proceeding and that I hope will be reflected in the decision that ultimately results from this proceeding.

The first change, of course, is that the prohibition that we're talking about 1201(a)(1) is now in force, and it wasn't three years ago. So, you know, I think this proceeding can now turn to what Congress said should be its main focus, which is determining whether a substantial adverse impact on the availability of works for noninfringing uses is actually occurring rather than focusing as was inevitable in the 2000 proceeding on speculation or prediction about what would occur once the prohibition went into effect.

So I think that the burden that the proponents of exemptions must carry in this proceeding, as they did in 2000, they had the burden of persuading you to recommend to the Librarian that an exemption be granted for a particular class of

works, but they also needed to come forward with concrete evidence of the substantial adverse impact that is actually occurring and that is caused by the presence of 1201(a)(1).

Similarly, if they challenge the interpretations that you have made of the statute, whether these be procedural ground rules for the proceeding or the substantive conclusions that you reached in 2000, that is also a burden of persuasion that they must undertake and they would need to persuade you why you were wrong in some of the conclusions that you reached last time.

The second thing that has changed is that we now have some court decisions that have really vindicated the interpretations that you recommended to the Librarian in 2000 and that he adopted them on some key aspects of Section 1201.

Of course, there haven't been any court decisions directly on Section 1201(a)(1), but the decisions on other aspects of the statute have clearly established a point that is consistent with your conclusions three years ago, and that is that fair use, one of the noninfringing uses we're talking about here, does not encompass a guarantee of access to copyrighted material by a preferred method or in

a preferred format. That's stated very clearly in the <u>Corley</u> decision in the <u>Second Circuit</u>, echoed in the <u>ElCom</u> decision in the District Court here in California. And I think it's quite consistent with the conclusion that you reached 3 years ago.

The third change that has occurred over the last 3 years, and one that I will come back to later on today and tomorrow, is that there has been a huge expansion of availability of all kinds of works in digital formats for noninfringing uses.

Really we can speak of a digital cornucopia that is now available to the American public to a much greater degree than was the case 3 years ago. And much of this is attributable to the use of formats and distribution methods that rely upon technological protection measures, and particularly upon access controls. And we've given some examples in our reply comments.

We'll talk more about the DVD tomorrow.

We'll talk about online music distribution this afternoon as well in the software field, entertainment software, business applications, digital and online delivery of text and database.

The fact is that today measured against 3 years ago, we have far more availability by far more people to

far more material in digital form than we did 3 years ago.

And the significance of this is really twofold. One, your mission is to determine whether the availability of these materials for noninfringing uses has been substantially adversely affected by Section 1201(a)(1). And this includes the availability through licenses, through permitted uses and other types of noninfringing use. So if those have increased, then the availability of these works has also increased and you need to take that into account.

Second, I want to emphasize that as you recognized in your conclusions in 2000, you are really performing here not a one sided calculation, but a net calculation. And even in instances where you find some adverse impact on the availability of works for noninfringing uses, you also have to look at the degree to which technological protection measures have facilitated this use. It is a net calculation, and I think Congress was correct when it said the question here is whether on balance there has been an adverse impact on the availability for noninfringing use that is substantial enough to justify an exemption.

So this is a question I'm going to come back to, not really as a promotion for what the 17 organizations that I represent here have done in terms of making material available to the public, but simply as a way to shed light on the balance that you need to strike in the proceeding that we're engaged in.

Well, let me turn now to the question of filtering software and just briefly summarize our position on this.

First of all, the exemption that's been proposed is verbatim the same or almost the same as the one that is in existence now. So it presents squarely the question of how you should proceed in judging whether the exemption should be recognized for an additional 3 years. And I think nothing is clearer from the legislative history and also from your prior conclusions that this is a de novo determination. The burden remains on the proponents. And the fact hat there has been an exemption in effect for the current 3 years does not weigh in the balance as to whether there should be a new exemption recognized for an additional 3 years.

I think with regard to filtering software, unlike the other exemption that we'll talk

about later on today, I think at least some of the proponents of the exemption have made an effort to shoulder that burden and tried to present to you with information to demonstrate how the exemption has operated in practice and why it is needed, why it is still needed or why it should be renewed. I think Mr. Tyre's presentation also was along that line. But I did want to underscore the de novo nature of the determination and the fact that the burden remains on the proponents to bring forward, again, concrete evidence about what is actually occurring.

Now, in the 2000 rule recommendations that was adopted by the Librarian, you essentially had an uncontested proceeding. I think the conclusion virtually states that, and there are several conclusions that were drawn there. For example, people who wanted to make fair use of the type of comment and criticism use that Mr. Tyre's talked about of these lists of websites had no alternative but to decrypt them. That there was no other legitimate way to obtain access to this information. And you also had no other evidence before you at that point, according to your conclusion, that these technological protection

measures were at all use facilitating or that granting an exemption for decrypting them would decrease their availability in anyway.

I think all of those points are now very hotly contested in the proceeding before you. You have an extensive submission from several of the companies, and you had testimony April 11th. And I know Mr. Tyre will be rebutting some of that testimony as well. My point is simply that you now have the issue joined before you, and I think you're in a position to determine whether the proponents of the exemption can carry the day. But certainly the record before you raises a question about whether you can, in fact, find out without decryption whether any given site is blocked by one of these programs. And you also have evidence, which I'm sure Mr. Tyre will comment on, that there has been a great deal of research and comment and criticism that's been undertaken of these programs by methods that do not involve circumvention of technological controls.

Now, one other factor that I think is extremely relevant here, which is what use has been made of this exemption during the period since it came into force in October of 2000 up until today, I

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think that as least as of the beginning of this hearing the record was quite murky about that, as I read the transcript of the April 11th hearing. It wasn't clear what the witness testifying there actually had done.

Now Mr. Tyre's testimony that describes a little bit of what he did and perhaps he will pursue that further to find out whether those acts of decryption took place before or after the exemption came into force. But as we pointed out in our reply comments, it is relevant what use is being made of this, how often it's being used, how many people are using it. And I hope you can develop the record on that before you reach a conclusion about this exemption.

Now, I'm not sure that the organizations that filed our joint reply comments really have much light to shed on how some of these contested issues should be resolved. But I do want to just refer to three aspects of the evidence as it stands now that I think are relevant.

First, I think you have to determine whether what the proponents are seeking is the preferential or optimal means of obtaining access of this information for their fair use purposes or by

contrast, do they have sufficient access to it now, is it sufficiently available for them to carry out these types of activities without circumventing? And this, of course, has to be gauged in the light of the conclusion that you reached in 2000 and that the courts reenforced in the ensuing two years that fair use does not necessarily mean fair use in the preferred or optimal format. Just noting access to material in a preferred or optimal format.

The second issue is the scope of the adverse impact. Is it de minimis or widespread? And, again, this gets to the question of what actually is being done under the shelter of this exemption today.

And the third point which I hope that
the record will be developed on is whatever adverse
impact there is can be ameliorated or even
eliminated in other ways such as through private
agreements. And I thought there were some
tantalizing hints of this in the testimony you heard
on April 11th about the potential availability of
these lists to bona fide researchers under agreement
with the proprietors, the people that compiled them
and that have the copyright interest in them.

I think it's Mr. Tyre's right that some

of these reports have been taken very seriously, and there may be a very active interest on the part of some of these companies in cooperating with researchers, which might correspondingly reduce the need for any exemption in this area.

Now, finally, I just want to come to our main concern about this exemption. And I hope I don't get too deeply into the arcane and metophyiscal question that I'm sure we will grapple with today and tomorrow, which is what is a particular class of works in terms of the statute. I think this is actually a simpler question as to whether this class that you recognized in 2000 is too broad. I'm going to assume for now that the class you recognized fits the criteria of the statute. In other words, it describes a particular class of works.

And I want to emphasize this point, because we do live in a different world today than we lived in in the year 2000. And I think our concerns about computer security and about protection of the safety and security of our computer networks is heightened today contrasted to where we might have been in the year 2000.

We know that filtering software that may

fit the description that appears in the exemption that exists now is one of the key tools in keeping our network safe and secure. And many of those filtering software packages may include lists of websites that either are the sources of viruses or the source of SPAM, which is of course is a scourge that we're all having to deal with increasingly now.

In other words, that programs that really I don't think anyone in Mr. Tyre's would consider censorware may be swept within the ambit of this exception with potentially very serious consequences in terms of compromising the security and safety of computer networks.

Now, of course, there's no evidence in this record whatsoever that there has been any substantial adverse impact on the availability of copyrighted materials for noninfringing uses or that were would be any of the action of circumventing access to those types of security software lists were to be prohibited. So there's really no basis for extending or maintaining such a broad definition of this particular class of works with the breadth that would include those kinds of security programs.

And I think one thing that I hope that the panel will is, and I think Mr. Tyre and his

1	group could probably make a very important
2	contribution here, is to more narrowly focus this
3	exemption if you conclude based on the testimony
4	that you hear and the contested issues that are
5	before you, that it is justified and that the
6	proponents have met their burden with respect to
7	censorware, then I think the exemption needs a
8	definition of censorware. The exemption needs that
9	in order to more tightly focus it on the area where
10	the need for it has been shown.
11	And, again, because of the name of this
12	project, I'm sure Mr. Tire can provide you with a
13	proposed definition of censorware that might be
14	useful to you and that might fit better within the
15	definition of a particular class of works that
16	Congress urged you to look at.
17	So, I will conclude there and be glad to
18	try to answer any questions you may have either
19	about my general remarks or about the filtering
20	software exemption. Thank you.
21	MS. PETERS: Thank you.
22	Let me start the questioning, and
23	actually you asked the questions that I sort of had
24	identified.

Mr. Tyre, you talked about the three

ways in which people try to deal with what's in the
fire of CyberPatrol or whatever. And you mentioned
decrypting and analyzing, and then reporting
database inquiry log file analysis. Could you tell
us why the database inquiry and the log file
analysis is not sufficient and why the decryption
method is not only the preferred, but the only way
that you can do what you want if you can do that?
And comment a little bit about Mr. Metalitz' issue
with regard to wouldn't special agreements work?
MR. TYRE: Okay. I'd be perfectly glad
to talk about that. I think that's the main reason
why I'm here today, as a matter of fact. And this
actually does go both to what Mr. Metalitz has said
today and what he has in his joint reply, and also
what happened in the Washington testimony.
I'm going to break it down into
segments. And let me refine one thing that you just
said.
We have never contended that the other
methods based upon any technique other than
decryption for doing this kind of work are
completely inadequate. We've done studies using log
file analysis and database querying ourselves.
There's lots of things you cannot find out using

1 those methods. They are not nearly as good as 2 decryption and analysis based upon description. But 3 we are not saying, and I want the record to be clear 4 on this, that they are useless. 5 MS. PETERS: So you think they're too 6 limited? 7 MR. TYRE: Yes. 8 MS. PETERS: Okay. 9 MR. TYRE: Yes. Now, I want to start off with database 10 11 querying or sampling, and I want to start even more focused on that with the specific question of so-12 called URL checkers because Mr. Burt told you and he 13 14 gave screen shots in his joint reply comments of the 15 URL checkers of four censorware companies, his own, N2H2, WebSense, SmartFilter and SurfControl, which 16 17 is what used to be CyberPatrol have. They're web 18 interfaces. You can go to them. You can type in a 19 URL and it'll tell you it's not blocked, it's 20 blocked in this category, it's blocked in that 21 category. Great. What's the problem? 22 Problem number one: Mr. Burt used very 23 careful language to tell you about those four and no 24 If you want to take a look at my Exhibit 2 others.

in your booklets, this is just a little survey I did

on Monday just confirming results I already knew.

I checked the nine major censorware copies. How many of those censorware companies even offer URL checkers? Exactly the four that Mr. Burt mentioned and not one more. Four out of nine offer them.

And I should note that two of the three who signed onto Mr. Burt's joint reply companies, 8e6 Technologies and BSafe Online do not offer them. So we've got nine major censorware companies, five don't even have them. So let's completely throw them out for purposes of talking about URL checkers. That's half the industry right there.

Now, there are other players than just these nine, but I choose the nine major players because I didn't want to make this list too extensive. And between these nine we have most of the field covered.

Then I want to talk specifically about one particular URL checker, that being the URL checker of WebSense. And I ask you to flip over quickly to Exhibit 3. WebSense's URL checker is different from that of all the others. Because with all the others, N2H2, SurfControl, you just go there, you type in to your heart's content, you get

whatever results they give you. Not WebSense.

WebSense as you can see from the form here they make you register using a real email address, you can't even use a webmail address such a yahoo.com or hotmail.com, or something like that. You also can't use an AOL.com address or an earthlink.net address, or something of those sorts because they consider those to be addresses for home users, not for serious business Internet uses. That's an interesting assumption on their part, but that's the assumption they offer. And it's spelled out right here in this little exhibit. It's one of the reasons why I printed it out.

So as long as you have a good enough email address to satisfy their criteria, then they will email you a password and if they email you the password, then and only then can you access their URL checker.

And if you look at the very bottom of page 1 of Exhibit 3 going over to page 2, you'll find their terms of service. And their terms of service say, in a nutshell, you can use this if you are a customer or you're seriously considering becoming a customer of WebSense.

So the minute I clicked on that, I

1 violated their agreement. They can sue me if they 2 want. I'm saying it openly. I have no intention of ever becoming a WebSense customer, but that's what I 3 4 had to do to get access to their URL checker. 5 Then here's the real flaw in WebSense. 6 Let's go to Exhibit 4. It's a big exhibit, you do 7 not have to look at all pages. 8 The first URL I called up on their URL 9 checker just because it might amuse you was 10 something called www.copyright.gov/1201. And you'll 11 be happy to know that you are classified as a 12 government site in their web checker. It might have made for a good joke if you were classified as a 13 14 porn site, but they got this one right. 15 MR. CARSON: There's a lot of scurrilous 16 information in there. 17 MR. TYRE: Now, if you want at your 18 leisure, you can go through the next 21 pages. I 19 don't really care. What I want you to do right now, 20 this is a test I ran going through this just 21 manually entering URLs at random. For the purposes 22 of this test I don't care whether their 23 classification of any particular website was right 24 or wrong. What I do care about, and I've replicated

this experiment more than several time; this was not

an anomaly, is that after running 21 pages, what you see in the first 21 pages of this exhibit. You get to page 22, and please forgive me if I have to squint a lot when I'm reading things, but I don't have a whole lot of eyesight.

But on page 22 WebSense site look up
tool. "Your organization has exceeded the maximum
number of lookups for a single day. Please try again
tomorrow. WebSense has implemented a limit to ensure
the use of the master database for WebSense
customers and prospects only. Thank you for your
understanding." Twenty-one a day. That's very
helpful. I hope the record reflects I was being
highly sarcastic in saying that.

I think we can pretty well discount the WebSense URL checker as a valuable research tool. So now we're down to only three companies out of nine that have even potentially valuable URL checkers.

The next exhibit, Exhibit 5, all of these were done from N2H2's URL checker. These were not done to show any particular problem with N2H2's URL checker. It has had problems in the past. Those problems apparently do not exist anymore, so I'm not going to talk about those problems.

I created these exhibits to illustrate in a fairly tangible fashion what some of the problems with database querying are. And for the purposes of this, it does not matter whether in this particular case I happened to be using a URL checker, as I did for this exhibit, or whether I happened to have a running copy of N2H2 and I'm doing more extensive database querying. The problem is the same.

In the CIPA trial, CIPA being the Children's Internet Protection Act the formal case being American Library Association v. United States

There was expert testimony, and this necessarily was very rough, that there are approximately 2 billion webpages out there. That was a year ago. We don't need an expert to sit here today and tell us that same expert would give us a much larger number today. And it wasn't actually 2 billion webpages, it was 2 billion indexable webpages. Only those pages that can be found and indexed by search engines, which is a subset of the entire web.

I could explain that if you want, but I think the figure of 2 billion by itself is big enough to make one of my points.

Then you have something like N2H2, which

has a database of 4 million entries, according to David Burt. That doesn't necessarily mean that they block 4 million websites. Those 4 million entries could block, for all we know, 7 or 8 million websites. For example, as all of the censorware companies do, they have blocks in certain of their blocking categories on the free web page services. All of them block Geocities or what used to be geocities. Now it's pages.yahoo.com in at least one of their blocking categories. That's only one entry in their database, but that entry in their database puts a block on however many tens of thousands or maybe even hundreds of thousands pages there are on Geocities, as I still prefer to call it because I'm just used to saying that.

You think about those numbers, 4 million entries in the database, 2 billion webpages. Not websites, webpages. How is one going to devise a statistical sampling for a database query that it's going to find truly meaningful ways of discovering what the problems in the database are?

And this next set of exhibits is intended to illustrate for any database querying method, not just for N2H2 URL checkers, that there are problems with that which can be solved by

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1 decrypting, looking at the list, but that cannot be 2 solved effectively simply by database querying. 3 Now you'll see on the first page of 4 Exhibit 5 I called up the site peacefire.org to see 5 how it was classified. And it's classified not 6 currently categorized in the N2H2 database. 7 Peacefire's clean. Don't have to worry about it. Move on to the next domain name, right? 8 9 Turn to the next page. Go to a 10 subdirectory in peacefire.org, peacefire.org/bypass. 11 That subdirectory is blocked by N2H2 as a loophole 12 And I believe you heard just a little bit about what a loophole site is, so I'm not going to 13 14 further burden the record with that. I just chose 15 that one because I happened to know that it was 16 there, not because I want to further burden the 17 record talking about what false sites is. 18 So, what do you do when you build a 19 database for the purpose of doing a database 20 inquiry? Do you do it just with domain names? 21 you do with directories? Do you do it with 22 subdirectories? How do you build that database and 23 how do you even know what subdirectories that you 24 are to include in the database? This is a problem.

Another example, the same problem.

I'm glad they're sitting behind me, because I
wouldn't want to be talking their back. But the next
page of Exhibit 5 I called up eff.org. They're
clean. Not categorized. Wrong. Turn to the next
page, their Blue Ribbon Campaign, which they've been
running since perhaps 1993/1994 is in the world
according to N2H2 a drug site. And I thought it was
important that you know N2H2 thinks it's a drug
site, because later today and tomorrow you're going
to be hearing a lot from EFF personnel, and you
really ought to know the quality and caliber, at
last according to N2H2 of who you're dealing with.
Who in this right mind who has ever looked at the
EFF Blue Ribbon site could possibly think it's a
drug site? How could one imagine searching that
particular subdirectory, and yet there it is in the
N2H2 database, it's a drug site. So I have a bunch
of druggies sitting behind me according to N2H2.
Now, I told them I was going to tell a
joke at their expense. I can't see behind me to see
if they're laughing or they're staring at me.
Now, we turn to the next one and we get
to a very interesting example. The next page in the
exhibit is snark.freeserve.co.uk. UK being the

country code for the United Kingdom. That's the

basic root domain. And we see that N2H2 blocks in the games category.

So suppose I want to find out how that website is blocked or it's because I happen to be the owner of that website, which I'm not, I type in the website address. I see, okay, it's games. don't care if it's blocked in games. I only care if it's blocked in the categories that a public library likely would use. So I won't do anymore searching because I'm not concerned with the games category. Once again, please turn to the next page we start going down to a subdirectory level. We've got snark.freeserve.co.uk/ -- uh-oh censorware. quess what. That's illegal. So depending upon where we are on that site, we have N2H2 taking the same site, categorizing it under two completely different categories. If I was just setting up a random database, how would I know, particularly if I didn't have the knowledge and experience that I had, to know that gosh, they may classify part of the site one way, they may classify another part of the site a different way?

And then I want to turn to the final example where I'm going to walk you through a series of 4 pages to show just how far you have to dig to

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1	find some of these.
2	This next site is danny.oz.au, AU being
3	the country code for Australia. The Root domain name
4	free bill of health from N2H2.
5	Let's go down one directory to the next
6	page, danny.oz.au/freedom. Clean bill of health.
7	No problem.
8	Let's go to the next page, down one more
9	subdirectory level, danny.oz.au/freedom/censorware.
10	Well, that censorware site's okay. No problem.
11	Let's go to the last page of the exhibit
12	going really deep into that site,
13	danny.oz.au/freedom/censorware/ifilter.html. Uh-oh,
14	we've got profanity there.
15	Now, how far have we had to dig into
16	that site to find something N2H2 blocked? How could
17	anybody in the real world as opposed to in some
18	completely theoretically world even think to go down
19	that far in the directory structure of that website
20	to look to see if there's a block or not. Maybe
21	Danny yee the owner of this site, might think of
22	that. But I have no clue who else would think of
23	that.
24	And if you're wondering, well, how did I

know this if nobody else would think of that?

There

was some dispute about whether Seth Finkelstein had decrypted the N2H2 black list. I asked Seth to find me examples to prove a point I wanted to make here today. He did not give me the entire decrypted black I do not have it. I have never asked for it. list. But I specified to him what I wanted, find examples. He sent me examples. These examples that I just gave to you came from Seth's decrypted black list which Mr. Burt claims Seth never decrypted. That's how I know about these examples, and it's unlikely I ever could have found them without Seth having decrypted the black list and given me these examples. MS. PETERS: So you're basically saying that decryption is the only way to have gotten this? MR. TYRE: Sure. For this purpose, yes. MS. PETERS: Okay. MR. TYRE: Suppose hypothetically I had a list of every domain name in every top level directory, whether it be the big three .com, .org, .net, whether it include the sponsored TLDs, whether it be yours, .gov, .mil, whether we get into country

codes such as a .au or a .uk; suppose I had the list

of every single one of those, could I write a script

that would feed every single one of those through

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N2H2 or SurfControl or so forth? I personally couldn't, but I know many people who could.

Let me very quickly say that I

personally do not do decryption because I do not

have the technical skills for it. It is a very, very

skilled thing to do. And I do not have those

skills, but I know a lot about the results of it

because I've worked with people who do it.

But let's get back to what I was saying. I feed through every single domain name in the world regardless of what TLD is, it's going to give me a picture. It's not going to tell me everything because it's not going to tell me whether a particular site instead of being blocked at the domain level is going to be blocked at a directory level or a 3 level below subdirectory level. It's not going to tell me with that snark.freeserve. site whether it's going to have one kind of block at the Root or main level and another kind of block at the lower level. These are the reasons why database querying is not as effective as decrypting the entire black list and going through it.

One uses tools to go through it. One can't simply read the black list or else one would go crazy. And by the time one finished reading it,

1 it would be completely out of date in any event. But 2 the only way to find blocks at this level of 3 granularity is by doing decryption. 4 Give you another example, this is an example from the past but it's a good example of why 5 6 database querying is not good. 7 Most of the studies we do at Censorware Project we look for so-called overblocking or blocks 8 9 are wrong or they're bad blocks. Occasionally we've 10 done the other side where we look at underblocking where they don't block what they were supposed to 11 do. We did a study with N2H2 where we did both. But 12 that's one of the few times we've done both sides of 13 14 But there's a very famous example that we did 15 with CyberPatrol. 16 A site called maplesoccer.org. 17 youth soccer league in Massachusetts. You all know 18 what youth soccer leagues are. You can all pretty 19 well imagine what would be on the website of a youth 20 soccer league. Here are the teams, here are the 21 standings, here's the schedule, here's the age 22 groups, all that. Who would think to put that into 23 a database query as part of a sampling? 24 CyberPatrol blocked it. Why did

CyberPatrol block it? Because it talked about teens

age 13 to 15. Uh-oh, that could be sexual. Could be child pornography. Could be a variety of other things. It wasn't.

And the funny thing about that was we exposed that block, CyberPatrol, as did all of the other companies, went back and unblocked. Then they went back and they reblocked it. We exposed the fact that they're stupid, they reblocked this site. They unblocked it. Went back and reblocked it. Not because they're malicious, but because they do most of this by computer robots, not by human review, and the computer robots are stupid. Computers are not smart for this kind of work. They never have been. Some day they may will be, but they surely are not today.

So we did that a second time. They unblocked it, they reblocked it. I won't tell you exactly how many times we went through this cycle, but eventually I decided to have some fun with this.

I wrote an open letter, you know, from the President of CyberPatrol: From the President of Cyberpatrol to the PR Director for CyberPatrol, who was actually on one of these discussion lists I was telling you about, and was very active in the discussion. At that time people from all sides

really were talking about this. Her name was Susan Getgood. And the memo said something to the effect of "Susan, they're killing me. You've got to find a way that we can't keep reblocking this site. Those Censorware Project guys are just driving us nuts. Fix our program. Do something."

They kept reblocking it. They kept unblocking it. Eventually they fixed the problem. And that story is not just a fun little story, but it's an answer to a question that was raised in the first hearing. You know that during the first hearing Seth Finkelstein did have on one or two occasions access to the N2H2 encrypted black list. But then N2H2 stopped letting him have it, not surprisingly, but they stopped. Was it enough for him to have it once? To analyze it once, yes. it enough for him to determine how many new mistakes they kept making, whether the mistakes are isolated instances, whether they're a problem at the system The only way you can do that is if you keep doing this over and over and over again.

In the <u>Mainstream Loudoun</u> case we went through probably 8 or 9 different iterations of X-Stop because it was important to see not only whether in the course of discovery the bad blocks

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that were being revealed were being unblocked, which for the most part they were, but what new bad blocks were being added. It's like the old Jay Leno commercial for Doritos, "we make more." It's quaranteed every time censorware companies add more to their black list, there's going to be more mistakes on them. You have to have continuous access to the list to find out what's on it. all fine and good to know what was blocked two months ago, but that doesn't tell you what's blocked today and how systemic the problems are. Now, that's why combining those factors together, doing database querying although it has its uses, is not as effective as doing decryption and having the ability to do the decryption as frequently as possible. MS. PETERS: I asked about private agreements, and you just basically cited and said that Mr. Finkelstein basically had the list but no Is that a comment on what agreements longer did. might be reached that maybe you can get an agreement to get it once, but having continuous access is a problem?

from company-to-company. But the normal practice is

MR. TYRE:

The practices vary somewhat

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that you fill out a form, you give them your information. Anytime I've ever done this, I've used truthful information, no fictitious identity. And I believe that the same is true for Seth and other people I know who have done this. You fill out the form, they don't do any particular checking on it, you just enter your information. As soon as it's entered, you can download the 30 day trial.

The only time I've known of when that was not the case was with a product called SmartFilter when their sales person after I registered actually called me. And before he called me, he did a search on me and he saw I was a member of the Censorware Project and saw what the Censorware Project did. And he still let me have a sample. It's the only time I know of that's ever happened when a company has agreed to let someone like the various members of the Censorware Project — I think I'll pass on defining whether we're reputable or not. That's for others to decide. Has actually let any of us have something like that with knowledge of who we are.

David Burt's testimony in Washington was very specific with a reputable lab, such as Consumer Reports or something along those lines, we've talked

about this within N2H2, but we've not really decided. Maybe if they let us be present while they do their testing, maybe if they sign a nondisclosure agreement, then maybe we'd let them have the information and we'd give it to them in a decrypted form. We wouldn't even make them go through the trouble of figuring out how to decrypt it. So if that was maybe, he was in no position to say that, yes, faced with a request like that, that the company would agree to that.

And if you're talking about folks like us, folks who are not a reputable lab such as

Consumer Reports, even though what we do is far more in depth than what Consumer Reports does, there's many maxims of jurisprudence. One of those maxims of jurisprudence here in California, which is in our civil code, is that the law does not require idle acts. I can tell you, that if I were to go to a censorware company today or if Seth were to go to a censorware company today or if certain other people were and say this is who I am, this is why I want it, it would be the ultimate idle act. They would never agree.

MS. PETERS: So your answer is no?

MR. TYRE: If I remember the question,

yes.

MS. PETERS: Can this problem be ameliorated through private agreements?

MR. TYRE: In my opinion, no. First of all, I don't think the censorware companies ever would agree. And second, if part of the agreement was an NDA, then what would be the point? Our purpose is to expose the flaws.

MS. PETERS: Okay. One last question, I don't want to hog it all. Mr. Metalitz said even if the case is proved, the class is too broad and the focus is on censorware and can you come up with a definition. Is it possible to come up with a definition for censorware that distinguishes it from the broader class of filtering software that would deal with security and other things?

MR. TYRE: Well, I'm going to turn that around a little bit. And I'm doing this not just as a lawyer's trick, but because from the first moment I read Mr. Metalitz' comment, I had an idea of what he was talking about but I wasn't sure. I've asked a lot of people, not just other censorware people, but computer security people who are among my client list. And no one has been able to figure out exactly what is meant by what Mr. Metalitz wrote and exactly

1 what definition, if any, would satisfy his request. 2 So I'm going to suggest to this panel 3 that the burden should not be on me or any other 4 proponent of censorware of this exemption to limit 5 the proposed exemption. The burden should be on Mr. 6 Metalitz as the one who proposed this amendment or 7 limitation, or whatever you want to call it, to specify in writing that can be analyzed as opposed 8 to being just a theoretical construct exactly what 9 10 it is that he does or does not want. And vour 11 having indicated at the beginning that there will be 12 a chance for supplemental comments after this is over, I think that's the appropriate forum to do 13 14 that in. I don't think it's appropriate today. 15 Again, not because I'm playing games, 16 but seriously because no one, including computer 17 security experts who are clients of mine, really 18 understands it. I'm very uncomfortable taking on 19 the burden of trying to deal with it at all before I 20 see something more tangible from Mr. Metalitz. 21 MS. PETERS: Okay. Do you want to 22 comment at all? 23 MR. METALITZ: Yes. Sure. We have put 24 something in writing to say we think the filtering

software that was covered by the evidence that's

been presented here, and it's on page 13 of our joint reply comments. "Filtering software used to prevent access to Internet sits containing material deemed objectionable to children or otherwise inappropriate for some segment of the public or for display in a public setting."

Now, that may not be a very good definition, and I would think that people who have the word "censorware" in their name would have probably a sharper definition of what kinds of material they're talking about. But the burden, of course, is on the proponent throughout this proceeding and this panel can't recommend an exemption unless there's evidence to support it that shows a substantial adverse impact on the availability of something, some copyrighted work or noninfringing purposes. So I would suggest that, you know, we've taken a stab at it and I'm sure Mr. Tyre can do a lot better. But we just think that whatever finding is made here ought to conform to the evidence and not extend much more broadly to get into areas that aren't covered by the evidence.

MS. PETERS: We may do a question. The way the supplemental come in is if we actually come up with questions that we believe we need further

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1 input from. So, we'll handle it that way. 2 MR. TYRE: May I quickly respond to that? 3 4 MS. PETERS: Yes. Sure. 5 MR. TYRE: Certainly we can provide a 6 more precise definition of censorware. I don't have 7 one in writing in front of me, but that can be done. That's not the problem. 8 9 The problem is dealing with the other 10 aspects of what Mr. Metalitz proposes, and that 11 these things other than what would be defined as 12 And one of the specific reasons why censorware. that's a problem, is because there's been so much 13 14 consolidation in the industry, the relevance 15 industry segment, that it's not a surprise that you 16 have companies such as Symantec which are offering 17 integrated products which consist both of 18 traditional censorware and of firewall protection, 19 antivirus protection things of that nature. 20 And what I'm asking for, I don't know 21 whether I'll get it, but what I'm asking for is 22 something from Mr. Metalitz that tells us how we 23 deal with something like that, how we deal with an 24 integrated product. And further, how we deal with

what I would call a pure censorware company such as

1	N2H2 not suddenly grasping onto this newly limited
2	category and by making a few minor changes into its
3	database, suddenly turning itself into a company
4	that in addition to doing censorware has some minor
5	security functions, some minor virus protection.
6	And all of a sudden because of however this
7	definition may work, finds itself because of
8	imprecise wording or any other reasons no longer
9	subject to an exemption, assuming of course that
10	there's going to be an exemption at all.
11	So I'm really troubled by how all of
12	this will play out. And that's why, though I may
13	not get my wish, I am wishing that you will put the
14	burden on Mr. Metalitz to give us something far more
15	concrete to consider than what has been given.
16	MS. PETERS: I've basically hogged the
17	questions. So, David, how about you.
18	MR. CARSON: Let me just suggest to you,
19	don't assume we're going to put a burden on you or
20	Mr. Metalitz. But it would be in your interest to
21	provide a more precisely defined class and what you
22	would like to see if we were to go in that
23	direction.
24	I assume you're not saying that there is
25	a reason why people should be able to have access to

1	lists of what a virus swapping software blocks? Is
2	that true or is that of interest to you?
3	MR. TYRE: Speaking for myself and for
4	the Censorware Project, that is not of interest to
5	us. Whether it would be of interest to other
6	security researchers, I have no knowledge or
7	comment.
8	MR. CARSON: Right. But they haven't
9	come forward in any event, so that's not really
10	before us, I don't think.
11	I'm not sure I've heard a precise answer
12	to this question, and I think it's perhaps an
13	important one. Can you tell us how people have
14	since October 28, 2000 been taking advantage of the
15	exempted class for compilations of consisting of
16	websites blocks by filtering software applications?
17	MR. TYRE: That's an easy question to
18	answer and it's a difficult question to answer
19	because there's not really a whole lot that I can
20	say about that that wasn't already said in
21	Washington.
22	MR. CARSON: Well, not a whole lot was
23	said, unfortunately, in Washington.
24	MR. TYRE: I'm quite well aware of that.
25	I have gone through that transcript more than once.

Mr. Burt contends that Mr. Finkelstein hasn't even done the work that he says he's done. I personally got a rather large chuckle about Mr. Band's comment about the Iraqi Information Minister. I sincerely hope that this panel does believe that Mr. Finkelstein has, in fact, done what he says he has done. And I've told you straight out that some of what I've presented to you today is based upon the work that Mr. Finkelstein has done, that specifically decryption work of N2H2, not other work that has been done.

There really isn't a great deal that I personally know of that has been done in the last 3 years, but I think there are a couple of reasons for that. And I think there's also a quick response I want to make that's related to that to one of the remarks that Mr. Metalitz made in the beginning.

And that is that I believe he has incorrectly stated what the appropriate considerations are for the Copyright Office and for the Librarian of Congress.

There's no doubt that what has or has not been done in the last 3 years is a relevant factor. You'll never hear me say otherwise. But Mr. Metalitz indicated in his opening statement today that that's the only relevant factor. I believe

1	that's incorrect, both from reading the statute and
2	from reading your notice of inquiry, I believe that
3	regardless of whether it's an exemption that never
4	has existed or it's a request to in effect renew an
5	exemption that already has requested, such as this
6	one, the focus is the same. The focus is "either/or"
7	it's an either/or not an "and". Either what has
8	happened before or what is likely to happen in the
9	future.
10	MR. CARSON: Could I stop you for a
11	second? Do you dispute that, Mr. Metalitz?
12	MR. METALITZ: If I understand what Mr.
13	Tyre is saying, no I would not say that what is
14	actually occurring now is the only relevant factor.
15	But Congress said that should be the main focus of
16	this proceeding.
17	MR. CARSON: So you don't dispute I'm
18	sorry. Go ahead.
19	MR. METALITZ: And now that the
20	prohibition is in effect, I think it's highly
21	relevant what use is being made of it.
22	MR. CARSON: But you don't dispute that
23	at least in theory, even if nothing were happening
24	now, if we could predict that it's more likely than
25	not that in the next 3 years it's going to happen,

it's perfectly relevant for us to come up with an 1 2 exemption if that's where it takes us? Yes. If it meets the 3 MR. METALITZ: 4 criteria that are in the statute and legislative And I think you've spelled them out in the 5 history. 6 conclusion in 2000 what the burden would be in that 7 situation. 8 MR. CARSON: Okay. 9 Sorry for interrupting you. I just 10 wanted to clear it up. Please go ahead with your --11 MR. TYRE: That's quite all right. It 12 was useful. Now, let's get back to that. 13 I cannot 14 cite to you any specific examples that are not 15 already in the record. I'd love to be able to, but 16 I'm not going to make up facts that don't exist. 17 What I can tell you is that there's sort of a unique 18 dynamic that's at play here, and this was not really 19 discussed at the Washington hearing. 20 This whole exemption has many unique 21 qualities about it, not the least of which it's one 22 of the two exemptions that you granted 2½ years ago. 23 Most of the proposed exemptions that were requested 24 then were rejected. And so this is one that at least

to some extent has had the opportunity to be field

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But you've heard a great deal of testimony already about how hard this work is. I'm not talking about what's been said about the legal risks involved. I'm talking about that this is extremely difficult work to figure out how to decrypt these programs in the first place. This is not work for an amateur. This is work for trained professionals who focus specifically on knowledge of There aren't a whole lot of people cryptography. who are capable of doing this kind of work, and it's a continuing arms race as one version of the program gets decrypted, then the censorware companies respond as you would expect them to. They make better encryption so then you need more skill to decrypt it. It's hard work. It's time consuming work.

I cannot say this of my own personal knowledge, but having gone through this with people who have figured out how to decrypt this - Seth being one of them, not the only one - I have pretty solid knowledge of how much is involved in doing this.

Given how hard the work is, there's another factor that comes into play here. Sure,

it's true that this exemption has been on the books since October of 2000. But 2 months later or 3 months later in December 2000 CIPA was passed, the Children's Internet Protection Act. And with, I believe -- I'm not even sure if it was the day after the legislation was signed. It may have even been the day before it was signed. I don't recall, I don't care. The twin lawsuits by the American Library Association and the ACLU were filed challenging the constitutionality of CIPA. those lawsuits were on a fairly fast track. You know they went to trial. You know they were decided. Approximately a year ago the three judge trial court found that CIPA was unconstitutional as applied to public libraries. The matter since has been argued in the Supreme Court. And at some point before you make your final rulemaking, the Supreme Court presumably will decide that case.

I make no prediction on what that decision will be. But I think it plays an important psychological dynamic here because everyone has said on both sides - Mr. Burt said I think, I know Mr. Band said it, I know Mr. Finkelstein said it - that what does or does not happen in the CIPA case will have an impact on how this work is done in the

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future. And by that I mean specifically decryption work where you can get into some of the in depth things such as the loophole sites that you cannot get into simply by doing database querying or log file analysis.

The people who do this do this in their spare time. They put in an awful lot of time to do And there has been a feeling on the part of those people, myself included, that is it really worth investing a lot of time now when this major court case is out there and this major court case may have a huge impact on what the relative value of this work is in the future. That's a psychological issue. That may or may not resonate with you, but it's a real issue. That issue that CIPA became law and was challenged in the court within a few months of when this exemption came to effect is one of the reasons why there hasn't been a lot of this work done in the last 2½ years. But by the same token, knowing that the Supreme Court will be deciding the case within the next month or at least in theory it should be - I'm certainly not going to tell them what to do - that there is a good likelihood, which is the standard, that once the CIPA case is decided and we know again where the landscape is that those

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Т	who have been in the field, those who may be
2	interested in getting into the field will resume
3	their work.
4	MR. CARSON: I'm going to follow up on a
5	question that the Registrar asked you with respect
6	to the experience of getting access voluntarily from
7	the censorware suppliers to those lists. Have there
8	been cases where the Censorware Project or people in
9	a similar situation have tried to get access to
10	those lists and it's been flat out refused?
11	MR. TYRE: I'm sorry. I did not hear the
12	last part.
13	MR. CARSON: Have there been cases where
14	the Censorware Project or people in similar
15	situations have requested access to lists of blocked
16	websites and that access has been refused?
17	MR. TYRE: Yes.
18	MR. CARSON: Okay. Give me some idea of
19	the nature and quantity of those attempts?
20	MR. TYRE: Well, you already have in the
21	record that N2H2 flat out turned down Seth
22	Finkelstein once.
23	MR. CARSON: Yes, that's once.
24	MR. TYRE: Once.
25	MR. CARSON: I'm trying to get a sense

1 of quantity of the problem, the nature of the 2 problem. There was a time when I tried 3 MR. TYRE: 4 to get one and, honestly, I'm blanking on which 5 product it was. There are so many of them, they 6 sometimes blend together. And they turned me down. 7 A lot of times you can get it the first time because a lot of times you can get it the first 8 9 time because their system is automated. You give them legitimate information, 2 minutes later you're 10 11 eligible to download it, you download it. It's the second time that's the problem. 12 You do it the first time, then we go out 13 14 and we do a report. You do it a second time, no. 15 They'll not give it to you. Sometimes there are 16 other ways of getting a hold of it. But if you ask 17 for it, will they give it to you? No. MR. CARSON: And you're telling us that 18 19 based upon a single experience of Mr. Finkelstein 20 and a single experience by you, is that correct? 21 Two experiences plus having MR. TYRE: 22 dealt with all these companies and knowing that 23 particularly after we've done a particularly 24 scathing reporting on them that if we asked for it

again, they'd just laugh at us.

1	MR. CARSON: And the two specific
2	experiences were both with a single company, N2H2,
3	is that correct?
4	MR. TYRE: No.
5	MR. CARSON: Oh, I'm sorry. Mr.
6	Finkelstein was with N2H2 and yours was with?
7	MR. TYRE: Yes. I apologize for not
8	remembering which mine was with. There's been a lot
9	of consolidation in the industry and I'm not
10	specifically remembering what it was. But I will
11	state for a fact that it was not N2H2. I have never
12	made that request of N2H2.
13	So we have two instances, two companies
14	and I'd be willing to make a rather substantial
15	wager that that doesn't answer your question. But if
16	I were to go ask the other companies, I'd know what
17	the answer would be.
18	MR. CARSON: So you're asking us to make
19	judgments based upon your prediction, based upon
20	your experience?
21	MR. TYRE: Oh, no. I know to a moral
22	certainty what the responses will be. I'm not
23	asking you to
24	MR. CARSON: You think you've shown us
25	two moral

MR. TYRE: 1 I'm not asking you to take 2 that as evidence. 3 MR. CARSON: Okay. All right. 4 you. 5 How about going to Steve. MS. PETERS: 6 MR. TEPP: Okay. Thank you. 7 Just sort of following on what we've already been talking about, Mr. Tyre, when we were 8 9 in Washington Mr. Finkelstein was asked about how 10 many people take advantage of this exemption. 11 notwithstanding your comments about the CIPA case and whatever chilling effect you think that has, you 12 made a comment about the limited number of people 13 14 who have the technical skills to do this given the level of detail of knowledge that's required. 15 16 Mr. Finkelstein told us he thought about 17 6 people were using this exception. Do you think 18 that the number -- needless to say, that's an 19 extremely small number given the population of the 20 United States. What it in your estimation is the 21 number of people who are capable and interested in 22 doing this so that, for example, if the CIPA 23 decision goes the way you and your colleagues would 24 like what should we expect to see in the next 3

years should this exemption be renewed?

MR. TYRE: I'll give you somewhat of an anecdotal example to that. I've been involved in a number of the DMCA lawsuits, including the 2600 cases in Amicus and the Felten case as one of the attorneys for Ed Felten and his researchers at Princeton and Rice. I've done a lot of speaking on DMCA. And it's reasonable to conclude that my views on the DMCA do not coincide with those of Mr. Metalitz. But we're not here to talk about that today.

What I think is absolutely fascinating is that I believe there's a conference called Crypto which takes place on an annual basis in Santa Barbara. It is considered by many to be the leading conference of cryptographers in the world. People come from all over the word to that conference. Of course, one of the reasons why is it's in late summer in Santa Barbara and it's hard to find a better place to be at that time of year, but still the talent that is assembled there is extraordinary. That's your class of the people who could get into this field if they wanted to get into this field.

When I was there speaking one of the persons there, a nationally known expert on computer security, Matt Blaze came up to me afterwards and

said to me "Wow, Jim, you're my hero." Not because of anything I had done because of the DMCA, but because of my Censorware Project work. I didn't have the heart to tell him that I wasn't the person who was actually doing the decryption. I do not have those technical skills, as I've said before. But he found, and quite a number of people at that conference, were more interested in talking with me about censorware decryption work than they were about talking with me about DMCA. Because DMCA is just lawyers and cryptographers don't want to talk to lawyers. They want to talk to people who are doing work. And I've got these cryptographers who are world famous cryptographers coming up to me and saying tell me about censorware. What can we do? How can we help? Is this something that we can get into?

will any of them actually do it if the exemption is renewed for another 3 years? I don't know. If it is, oh, I can put together a very long list of people who I would want to talk to if I wanted to expand the field of people who have the appropriate skill set to learn how to do this and to get involved in this. Because we could use more than those we have.

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1 MR. TEPP: Okay. Well, just to get a 2 sense of the value of your anecdote, how many people come to this conference in Santa Barbara on average? 3 MR. TYRE: Several hundred minimum, 4 5 When I did my speaking gig there we 6 were in an auditorium that I would quesstimate sat 7 about 200. The house was packed, standing room only. 8 They hadn't come to listen to me talk about 9 They came to listen to me talk about censorware. 10 the DMCA at this particular session. That was the 11 sole purpose of that session. So there had to be at least 250 to 300 people in that room, and they were 12 maybe not from every single continent on the world, 13 14 but most of them. 1.5 Okay. Thanks. MR. TEPP: 16 One other thing in a similar sort of 17 vein, you referred earlier to how the reports that have been done almost invariably result in one of 18 19 the companies whose product is being analyzed making 20 corrections in line with the critique in the 21 reports. Can you give us a sense of how many reports 22 have been done in the last 3 years, or more 23 precisely since October 29, 2000. 24 Okay. Yes. Zero. If that's MR. TYRE: 25 precise enough for you.

We haven't done it, in large part, for
the reason that I mentioned. Seth is not the only
member of the Censorware Project and as I've
indicated he is a former member, he has not been a
member since before October 2000 or anytime in 2000,
who is capable of doing this kind of work but for
the reason that I mentioned that there has been a
feeling that given the focus on the CIPA case that
there is maybe not the energy level that there was
to continue doing these kinds of reports. Given the
energy that's involved in them, given the time
consumption that's involved in them we haven't done
any.
Will that change once <u>CIPA</u> is decided
and if the exemption is renewed? I think it will. I
believe strongly that it will. But our last report,
which happened to be on Mr. Burt's company N2H2 was
in 2000 but probably it was in 2000. I'm not
certain when in 2000 it was. It may or may not have
been after October 2000. But with that one
qualification we have not done any.
MR. TEPP: Okay. Thank you.
One last question, this one for Mr.
Metalitz. Looking at the opposite side of the

equation, the potential harm done to right holders

over the past 3 years and should the exemption be
renewed perspectively in the coming 3 years, when we
look at the situation that's been described you
talked about the burgeoning number of copyrighted
works available on the Internet; Mr. Tyre's talked
to us about the explosion of the number of sites on
filtering lists and there appear to be several
filtering companies, it doesn't appear to be at
first blush to be an industry in distress. Can you
comment for us about what, if any, harm there might
be should this exemption be renewed for the coming 3
years?
MR. METALITZ: In terms of the health of
the censorware industry, I'm not sure I can add
anything to what Mr. Burt has submitted in his
testimony. He's much more knowledgeable about that
than I am. I'm not sure that the balance sheets of
the particular companies or whether they've
consolidated or not is necessarily the right test.
But I don't have any information really that would
shed much light on that with regard to the
censorware companies.
MR. TEPP: Or does it have any effect on
the 17 entities that you're representing today?
MR. METALITZ: I'm not sure if any of

1 the companies that are involved here are members of 2 any the associations that I represent. To my 3 knowledge, they are not. So I don't know that it 4 has any direct impact on them. And I think I'm not 5 really the person to ask about that. 6 MR. TEPP: Well, you're the closest 7 we've got today, so I thought I'd give it a try. 8 Thank you. 9 Okay. Thank you. MS. PETERS: 10 Rob? 11 MR. KASUNIC: Okay. I have just a 12 couple of questions, mostly for Mr. Metalitz. Mostly we haven't heard him talk as much. And in the 13 14 interest of time I'm going to sensor myself today. 15 MR. TYRE: You can't do that. You have 16 to speak freely. 17 MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Metalitz, you had mentioned that this is a net calculation and we do 18 19 have to look at the overall balance. And in line 20 with that last question just so we're absolutely 21 clear, if we do find any evidence of more than de 22 minimis harm that then we would looking to what the 23 adverse effect on the industry would be. And one 24 thing we do have in the record that was in N2H2's

annual report was that this exemption final rule

73 will not effect the value of lists of blocked websites. So that there's a statement that this would have seemingly no adverse effect on the value of these sites. There's nothing else to add in terms of what harm the exemption has had or is likely to have in the next 3 years? Well, I think you're MR. METALITZ: using harm to the industry as a shorthand for the statutory standard, really, which has there been any adverse impact on the availability of this copyrighted material for noninfringing purposes. And I think the record shows that a lot of this material is available for the noninfringing purpose that Mr. Tyre wants to promote or at least a close cousin of

Now, I don't say that it's possible there could be more of that criticism, comment of that noninfringing use that we're talking about if the exemption were extended. But this really gets into the question of to what extent has the exemption contributed to that availability.

that purpose. Because the record shows that a lot

of evaluations, criticism and comment about these

products has taken place.

Obviously, the health of whether the extension of the exemption or the renewal of the

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74 exemption would have a specific impact on the bottom line of a particular company is a somewhat different They obviously could be related, and I don't really know what significance to ascribe to the statement that you just read that came from one of their securities filings. That partly would have to do with how diversified their business is, and I just frankly don't know the answer to that question. MR. KASUNIC: Okay. Well, in line with that then in your reply comment you state that we should be looking at -- and this is a follow up on what Mr. Tepp was asking - how many members of the public, how often and how frequently and how much they expect to utilize this in the next 3 years. But given the limits that may be placed on harm and probably the very small number of people who could accomplish or make use of any recommendation we make

to continue the exemption, what possibility of adverse effect would you foresee in the next 3 years that we haven't seen in the last 3 years?

MR. METALITZ: Well, I think you maybe -- if I can suggest, you might be looking at this through the wrong end of the telescope. I think the question is if the exemption is allowed to come into force -- excuse me. If the prohibition is allowed

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1 to come into force for these products, for these 2 works, which it has never done because the Librarian 3 issued an exemption on October 28, 2000; if the 4 exemption comes into force, will it have a substantial adverse impact on the availability of 5 6 this material for noninfringing uses? 7 that's the question that's before you. And only if you find that it will have a substantial adverse 8 impact, can you justifiably extend the exemption. 9 10 Now, the number of people who can do it 11 and how often they do it, and what use they make of 12 the exemption is relevant because Congress said if you find that the adverse impact is de minimis, then 13 14 you should not recommend an exemption. It doesn't 15 necessarily mean that if only six people can do it, 16 is necessarily de minimis. But I think it's a 17 factor that you would want to take into account. 18 MR. KASUNIC: But isn't the question 19 there whether the adverse effect is causing an 20 adverse effect on noninfringing uses? 21 MR. METALITZ: Yes. 22 MR. KASUNIC: Not on whether people if 23 there is an exemption they will be able to 24 accomplish it? If this is a theoretical exemption

anyway in some instances, if so many people will not

be able to accomplish, take advantage of the exemption because of the technological savvy that would be required to effect the exemption, can we use that technological hurdle as a barrier to finding the exemption in the next 3 years?

MR. METALITZ: Well, I think the problem with that reasoning is that it seems to say that the stronger the encryption, the lower the bar to recognizing an exemption. If you had an encryption that only two cryptographers in the world were competent to break, does that necessarily mean that the harm of recognizing an exemption be de minimis? So I don't think it really correlates necessarily with the number of people who are able to do it.

I think the focus has to be on what substantial diminution of the public's access to or the availability of this material for noninfringing uses is attributable to 1201(a)(1) as a causation element in here as well. And if in fact it only impedes a very few people from taking an action that, according to the testimony today, hasn't resulted in any reports that would fall within this category of noninfringing during the past 3 years, then I think that's a relevant issue for you to look at in deciding whether the statutory standard has

been met.

MR. KASUNIC: Well, the last thing I just want to clarify, I raised this in Washington but since it was in your reply comment, I just wanted some clarification.

What authority do you believe that we have that -- at one point of your reply comment you mentioned that if we do find an exemption, it should be limited in some way. And where do you find that we have authority either placing conditions on an exemption such as requesting permission from the company beforehand, how would that be possible in terms of designating a particular class of work that we could fashion such conditions or such limitations on the exemption?

MR. METALITZ: That's a big question that I'm sure we'll be returning to during the day and tomorrow. I think the primary way in which this exemption if you decide to recognize it, ought to be limited is by shaving down the category of works to which is applies so that it only applies to censorware, whatever the right definition of that is and I'm sure Mr. Tyre can do a better job than I can of giving you one, and that it not apply to all these other types of security related and other

lists of websites that would appear in filtering software.

Now the reply comment does mention this issue of consent or whether there's a likelihood that access to this information would be granted or whether there's in effect an exhaustion requirement that someone using the exemption would have to first ask for permission. I think that's probably better looked at in terms of trying to decide whether there's a basis for an exemption at all. testimony I heard, and I don't know that this is correct, that basically it's very easy for someone to get at least one free bite at this database without going through decryption. It seems to relevant to me and it indicates that perhaps means other than an exemption would help to cure whatever adverse impact you find in this area. obviously, that's a contested issue before you and people's views are going to differ on it. think that that's where that evaluation would best fit.

MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you.

Charlotte, do you have a few questions.

MS. DOUGLASS: I do.

MS. PETERS: Okay.

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1 MS. DOUGLASS: I have one question here, 2 Mr. Tyre, and one to Mr. Metalitz. We talked a little bit, a lot actually, 3 4 about whether or not it would make any sense to 5 request permission from different companies because 6 you wouldn't be able to get it. It seems to me that 7 when we met in April there was talk from Mr. Burt of 8 probably maybe an industry wide agreement or an 9 industry wide consensus that there might be a 10 possibility that they would be in a position to give 11 you the lists. But you've read the testimony as 12 well. Is it your sense that an industry wide agreement would be also as useless as asking company 13 14 by company. If for example, Mr. Burt represents a 15 number of say the nine big -- did that make any 16 sense to you? 17 MR. TYRE: I do understand the question. 18 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. Okay. 19 MR. TYRE: And with respect, I think it 20 slightly misstates what he said. 21 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. 22 And I actually can't see if MR. TYRE: 23 he's sitting here behind me or not, but I almost 24 hope that he is. 25 MS. DOUGLASS: I don't see him.

1 MR. TYRE: But first off, he made it 2 very clear that in this context he was speaking only about his own company, N2H2. 3 He was not speaking 4 about either of the two companies that joined him in 5 the joint reply, 8e6 Technologies and BSafe Online. 6 And he certainly was not speaking on behalf of any 7 of the various other censorware companies such as 8 WebSense, SmartFilter, SurfControl. WE've all heard 9 the list beforehand. 10 What he said, as I understand it, is 11 that they've had some internal discussions, never 12 resolved, within N2H2 that maybe if a reputable research organization such as Consumer Reports came 13 14 to them and maybe if they agreed to an NDA, and 15 maybe if they agreed to certain other factors, then 16 they would let them have it. 17 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. There is zero chance on the 18 MR. TYRE: 19 face of the work on this earth that regardless of 20 how reputable I might be in your eyes or in anybody 21 else's eyes, that Mr. Burt would consider me to be

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to sign an NDA. Because what's the point of it if I

sign an NDA? That's a nonstarter.

MS. DOUGLASS:

There is zero chance that I would agree

Okay.

reputable.

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Thank you for

clarifying that.

Now, Mr. Metalitz, if an entire community of users consisted of a group, say, of about ten people all of whom sought to do what was more or less clearly noninfringing work and they all experienced the say problem, would you say in your estimation that this ten person group is an insignificant number by definition or could this be in light of the importance of the indispensability of the research that they're doing and the entireness of the community, could be that be considered?

MR. METALITZ: I don't think there's any litmus test or any magic number below which it's automatically de minimis. I think you have to look at the type of noninfringing use that they're talking about. And my impression, anyway, is that they're really talking about criticism and comment, the types of reports whether they're formal reports or not or critiques of these various products. And I think that output is probably what you should be looking more than the number of people that have contributed to the output. But, again, this type of fair use, and I'm assuming this is fair use, like any type of fair use for purposes of this proceeding

1 is not necessarily the case that the goal needs to 2 be the preferred or optimal means of access in order 3 to make fair use of the material. So you have to 4 consider whether this is sufficiently available 5 through other means that don't require conduct 6 that's covered by 1201(a)(1) in order to justify the 7 I don't think there's any magic number exemption. 8 or any per se rule that would flow from that. 9 MS. DOUGLASS: Sure. I was just getting at the sort of numerical calculus. 10 11 Thank you very much. 12 MS. PETERS: Okay. Comment? 13 MR. CARSON: Yes. Just wanted to 14 clarify something. 15 I didn't mean to be unfair to you, Mr. So the comment I made about how you perhaps 16 17 ought to think about and get back to us with a more strict definition of what censorware is or what it 18 19 is that you want us to exempt aside from the current 20 one, which is this list of websites that are blocked 21 by filtering software. But the same goes for you, 22 You're the one who is proposing we Mr. Metalitz. 23 narrow it down. I think it would serve your 24 interests if you come up with the best definition

you can come up with with what you think we ought to

be narrowing it down with, understanding that when
you're doing that you're not necessarily asking us
to exempt anything at all, but if we're going in
that direction what is it you want. We'll look at
what you've both given us and we'll decide whether
to do anything, and if so how to narrow it down, if
at all.
MR. METALITZ: We'll certainly do that.
MS. PETERS: Thank you very much.
The first panel is concluded. We'll
take a 10 minute break and be back starting at
11:15. We're already significantly behind.
(Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m. a recess until
11:23 a.m.)
MS. PETERS:
The second panel is looking at literary
works, malfunctioning, damage, obsolete
technological protection measures and issues related
to research and security.
And the panel is Brewster Kahle
representing the Internet Archive, Barbara Simons
representing the Association of Computer Machinery,
George Ziemann representing
MR. ZIEMANN: I would this time say that
I'm just representing myself.

1 MS. PETERS: Okay. All right. 2 And Steve Metalitz who was on the last panel representing the Joint Reply Commenters of a 3 4 large number of copyright owners. 5 And we're going to go in that order. And 6 because of time difficulties, I'm going to say for 7 the beginning round -- try. I'm not saying you 8 Try to restrict your comments to 10 minutes 9 in the opening round. Okay. 10 Let's start with you. 11 MR. KAHLE: Thank you for inviting us down. Appreciate the opportunity to be here. 12 13 My name is Brewster Kahle, I'm the 14 digital librarian and Chairman of the Board of the 15 Internet Archive. It's a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 16 library located in San Francisco. We really 17 concentrate on digital works. So the issue is about 18 preserving digital works. We're open to academics, 19 researchers, scholars and the general public. of our collections are available over the World Wide 20 21 Web, but at least all of our collections are 22 available for those that come to our facilities and 23 our libraries to do things in-house that often 24 cannot be shown over the World Wide Web.

All of our services are available for

free. There's no fee for anybody to use this. And 1 2 we're open to the general public. We maintain a broad collection, 3 4 including websites, website movies, books and digitized books both, musical holdings and a growing 5 6 collection of software, which is the subject of the 7 conversation today. 8 Researchers come from all over the world to learn about digital archiving, so we have sort of 9 a research focus in that way, but also doing the 10 11 real work and people come to use the collections in our facilities. 12 We're supported by foundations Sloan, 13 14 Markel, Kale Austin Foundation, government, Library 15 of Congress, National Science Foundation in kind 16 donations HP, Amazon. So in some of the replies and 17 back and forth, there's a little sort of who are 18 you, and so I hope that that sort of gives you an 19 idea. 20 This is what we look like, our building 21 in San Francisco, some of the people that are 22 working on preserving the materials, and this is a 23 fellow doing work at one of the public access 24 terminals.

The problem that this is all about, is

basically media is degrading. Formats become obsolete and the platforms change. It makes our job as librarians to record our digital cultural heritage extremely difficult. And we're doing our best to adapt our profession, our field to be able to take the materials that are not just digitized materials that are now in our holdings, but also things that were born digital and born to not necessarily last the ages. They're born for a particular commercial exploitation and then they go into our hands. And that's the sorts of works that we mainly try to deal with.

Preserving these things are really important. I got somebody last week, the staff, so what, who cares about this stuff? And I think it's critically important. Tens of thousands of people spend 20 years, so since the PC came out there's been a proliferation of commercial packaged software in games, CD-ROMs that really sort of bring software and content together and it's been a new expressive media, but also really great stuff is in. So it's not just to look at history, it's actually pretty nifty material.

We've been learning a lot about how to preserve these, and it's a fairly new field the

whole digital preservation area. In fact, the
Library of Congress thing is really to push this
thing forward. We've found that it's critical to
both copy the materials and to gain access to the
materials to be able to do preservation. Without
copying and creating access, even if it's in-house
access for researchers, historians and scholars,
we're out of luck. Many of us probably had
experiences going and backing up software and
thinking that we're all safe. And then when you turn
back to it, it turns that it wasn't there in the
first place. So we think it's important.

what I'm here to talk about two exemptions on the 1201(a)(1). The first is a literary and audiovisual works embodied in software whose access control systems prohibit access to replicas. So that was our first major one. We think of it as a very narrow exemption, it's these sort of software titles on a very specific project.

The other exemption is literary works including computer programs, databases protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage and obsolescence.

This is a much broader exemption which is starting to become useful in certain circumstances. And so

I'd like to speak on both of those areas.

I thought a quick sort of overview, and quick is the operative word here, of some of the titles that we have here. So this is Apple Writer II. If you remember floppies that look like this. When was the last time you tried to read a floppy like this, though? They're non-trivial. This is Apple Writer 1.1. The National Archives are starting to get digital materials from the White House, for instance. And if we don't go and save things like Writer Apple 1.1, then we may have troubles in the future.

DOS. It's IBM original DOS. These are some of the early programs that were done by amateurs. This is an interesting title because it's when the convergence of the personal computer and the film industry happened; when Ephemeral Films is a seminal title off the Voyager CD-ROM collection.

Lotus 123 that really propelled the whole personal computer.

Just slipping through just some of the materials that we have. This is when we tried to get text on computers. This is "Shogun" is one of the first trying to do books and computers together.

Kind of clunky, but important for people seeing the

1 progress. If we can't have access to the actual 2 software and just the packaging, that would be tragic. 3 4 Early Quicken. 5 VisiCalc came before 123 and was the 6 first spreadsheet program. I feel quite honored to 7 be able to even hold one of these packages into my 8 It's a sealed package, never opened of 9 VisiCalc. 10 Tetris, the original Tetris. Soviet 11 Challenge, original works. Simms City, when we first started to 12 have simulation in the educational environment. Now 13 simulation is a basis of a lot of work in high 14 school and junior high school. But this work is 15 16 absolutely seminal in its worth. 17 One of the questions is, is do we do in 18 terms of being able to support these and be able to 19 use them. 20 Robocop 3 is interesting because its 21 content is a 3D immersive, but it's also got that 22 famous dongle problem. This is, I quess, the access 23 control that was really talked about a lot 3 years 24 ago of making it so that we have bypass those access

controls to be able to make these available.

And this is sort of a chart of just 16 of these titles. And what it is we're advised by our lawyers we're not going to be able to save. We can save one of these 16, all the rest of them have access control that make it so that as we understand it we would be violating the law if we were to circumvent the access controls to be able to preserve these titles by making copies, which is relatively easy, and to be able to access them and play them, make sure that we have them in accurate form. So, I find this tragic. These materials are entrusted to us. These aren't easy to come by.

And they're rotting in our hands.

I'd like to hit a couple of comments that were done by an esteemed colleague Steve and some of the other comments and sort of try to answer a few of these.

First, preservation requires both copying and access. If we do just one -- it's not like books. You know, it used to be that you kind of put a book in a basement and go back in 50 years and you'd still have a book in the basement and you'd be able to read it. That's not the case with these I mean, trying to get technology to work in things.

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the current day is hard enough. Trying to get technology that worked in the past is extremely difficult.

The reply seen no evidence of damage.

They spoke in hypothetical issues that maybe if original access controls could be circumvented that there might be problems. I think we've got concrete areas where damage is happening and I think we could move forward from that.

The uses that were talked about in some of the briefs actually were done before 1201, so they were doing just fine before 1201 so why do we think that things are happening worse or better since 1201?

The use is still protected under the Copyright law. We're regulated just like everybody else within the sort of 108 work. We are a library. So the use is protected. While we have done some copying of these materials, it's been with signed, written permission from the copyright owners. And those are a couple of the offerings that we had on our website. All the rest we have not touched. And, actually, I'm kind of scared of touching these. I don't know if we're ever going to be able to read them.

The last point is what we're trying to do is difficult. We're trying to go and resurrect these old platforms based on emulation and other mechanisms. It's non-trivial, so it's not for the light of heart. If this exemption were out there, I don't think that we're going to have a flood of hundreds of thousands of people going and doing this. But by having these organizations, these libraries and archives do this, it can effect hundreds of thousands in the educational and research domain that are trying to learn from our past without damaging the market for those.

So we need both of these exemptions to further our chance of preserving these, the narrower class, which is the software embedded type materials and circumventing that we think of as critical for these sorts of materials.

There were arguments about actually what we need these are copy controls as opposed to access controls. Well, there might be copy controls, but there seem to always be access controls. And as I understand the law, it's very straightforward. If we circumvent the access controls, we lose. It's not that it's a fair use, there's not Section 108. We just lose. And that means that we cannot

preserve these materials, and we're about to lose PC 1 2 software and games. This makes no sense. Time is not on our 3 4 side. These things are rotting. Stanford, the 5 Internet Archive; a lot of these materials came from 6 Stanford, the Charles Babidge Institute, the 7 Computer History Museum; we all have collections 8 that are rotting in our hands. 9 We believe we know technologically how 10 to perform our job function. What it is is we need 11 to be allowed to do our job function and preserve these materials before it's too late for future 12 13 generations. 14 Thank you. 15 MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you. 16 Ms. Simons? I think that I was seated 17 DR. SIMONS: with Brewster so that I would be made to feel at 18 19 home. This is what my desk usually looks like. 20 Good morning, Mr. Peters and 21 distinguished representatives of the Copyright 22 Thank you for the opportunity to testify at 23 this important hearing as part of the Copyright 24 Office's anticircumvention rulemaking proceedings. 25 I'm Barbara Simons. I co-chair USACM,

the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery.

and scientific computing society of nearly 75,000 computer scientists, educators and other information technology professionals committed to the open interchange of information concerning computing and related disciplines.

And I should also add, ACM is also a publisher. We have a large digital library which is online.

USACM, which I founded in 1993, serves
the ACM membership and community by providing
policymakers, courts and the public with a deeper
understanding of computer and Internet issues and
their convergence with legislative and regulatory
initiatives. I'm a fellow of ACM and of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science,
and formerly served as President of ACM and
Secretary of the Council of Scientific Society
Presidents. I earned my Ph.D in computer science
from a school up the road there, UC Berkeley.
Worked at IBM Research for many years. And have
authored numerous technical papers. I have been a
consulting professor at the University of California

Santa Cruz and Stanford University.

My statement today represents the views of the USACM to underscore the importance of this rulemaking proceeding to the computing community.

My statement has also been endorsed by the Computing Research Association, an association of more than 180 North American academic departments of computer science and computer engineering, industrial academic laboratories and affiliated professional societies.

USACM has found Section 1201 of the DMCA to have substantial negative impacts on the conduct of basic research in the U.S., particularly in cryptography and other computer security areas. The section interferes with many legal, noninfringing uses of digital computing and prevent scientists and technologists from circumventing access technologies in order to recognize shortcomings in security systems, to defend patents and copyrights, to discover and fix dangerous bugs in codes and to conduct forms of desired educational activities.

The following are just a few illustrations of legitimate activities currently prohibited by Section 1201.

A financial institution receives a

digital object protected by code obfuscation using means other than encryption. Employees of the firm suspect it contains a highly destructive computer virus or worm. The only way to find out if these suspicions are valid is to circumvent the obfuscation techniques to see what the code actually does. Because the code including the possible virus qualifies as an original work of authorship, the act of circumvention is prohibited.

A contractor employs software technology from a third party in a system widely used by law enforcement. In the course of use the serious flaw or bug is discovered that makes the system fail unexpectedly. The third party could be unresponsive or, worse yet, suspected of being a front for a crime organization not trusted to fix the software. Whatever the case, because the software is protected as an original work of authorship, no reverse engineering or circumvention is allowed to fix the flaw in a trusted manner.

A firm wants to test a computer system before purchasing it to ensure that it is trustworthy and secure or to check for patent and license violations in the code itself.

Circumventing a technical measure without the

product's producer's permission is prohibited.

Scientists and educators are prohibited from teaching many of the standard security techniques to investigate security risks because these same techniques can be employed to circumvent copyright protection mechanisms.

A copyright owner might suspect that a user is infringing his code. The only way to test his assumption is to bypass the encryption scheme of a suspected work to access the material. Bypassing the encryption scheme is prohibited.

ACM submitted a declaration in the <u>Felton</u> case, and I'd like to quote from part of that declaration because those concerns remain all too relevant. This was written in 2001, so some of it refers to an event which has already occurred but hadn't occurred them.

"Research and analysis, i.e. the
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of
computer systems, is essential to the development of
effective security both for works protected by
Copyright law and for information in general. Such
research can progress only through the open
publication and exchange of complete scientific
results. ACM is concerned that Sections 1201

through 1204 of the DMCA will have a chilling effect on analysis, research and publication as the results of litigation itself or of the threat or concern about potential litigation.

ACM is also concerned that application of the DMCA to the presentation of publication of scientific papers could result in the departure from the U.S. of the information security community for conferences and publications. If conference organizers cannot afford to take the risk of publishing papers, such as the papers ACM expects to be submitted for it's November 5, 2001 workshop as described below, those conferences may be held in other countries where the risk of liability is lowered. Such a result would have a negative impact on this country's leadership in research in that area.

ACM's particularly concerned about the potential implications of the DMCA for its then upcoming November 5, 2001 workshop on security and privacy and digital rights management, the DRM workshop. Part of the description of that workshop states: "This workshop will consider technical problems facing by rights holders who seek to protect their intellectual property rights and

consumers who seek to protect their privacy and to preserve access they now enjoy in traditional media under existing Copyright law."

Like many other ACM workshops, ACM plans to publish the papers accepted for the DOM Workshop as proceedings. ACM is concerned that the publication and presentation of technical papers on many of these topics, especially papers on watermarks, encryption, authentication, access control systems and threat and vulnerability assessment could raise problems under the DMCA. We are concerned that ACM along with its conference workshop organizers and member authors will be open to the same threats and run the same risks of legal liability as will Professor Felton, his coauthors and organizers of the Information Hiding Workshop.

ACM is also likely to sponsor other conferences that may be effected by the DMCA. Virtually all conferences that discuss the security of digital information may be subject to threats under the DMCA because such conferences consider the strength and weaknesses of various technological protection measures that could be applied or are actually being applied to protect copyrighted works.

ACM has earned the reputation of

choosing strong scientific papers through a peer review process without regard to political or commercial pressure. It's reputation as a leading scientific and technical organization could be substantially damaged within the scientific and technical community if it failed to publish a properly submitted and peer reviewed paper because of commercial pressure or the fear of litigation. Any restriction that the DMCA may impose upon the publication of the scientific research will keep foreign researchers from attending our conferences in the United States with a potential loss of ACM members and of revenue for membership, conference participation and publication.

We are concerned that some of our members, intentionally or not, may censor their submissions to avoid potential DMCA problems. If that were to happen, the quality of the ACM papers and presentations would be hurt and the scientific community as a whole could suffer substantial damage.

Beyond the possibility of DMCA problems at the November DRM workshop, ACM may continue to face potential problems in the future. ACM has long published papers in fields addressing the

circumvention of security and technical protection measures. Unbiased, objective research in the fields of computer and data security has always included research into the weaknesses, as well as strengths of security measures. ACM could adopt a policy of steering clear of papers that could subject it to liability under the DMCA, but that could only be done at the risk of sacrificing its mission and damaging its reputation as a scientific organization.

In sum, as long as Sections 1201 to 1204 of the DMCA could be interpreted to reach scientific and technical publications, ACM and its members are concerned they will face a continued risk of litigation and liability."

That's the end of the quote from the declaration.

Unfortunately, the concerns ACM expressed in the Felton declaration are no longer hypothetical. A few days ago in preparation for this testimony I posted a note to USACM requesting personal experiences from people who have had problems with the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA. I received 3 responses, all of which are quoted below with permission.

One of the people with whom I communicated is Dutch computer scientist Niels

Ferguson. Ferguson withdrew a paper detailing weaknesses in the HDCP content protection system from the very ACM DRM workshop referred to in the declaration, and instead wrote a paper entitled

"Censorship in Action, Why I Don't Publish My HDCP Results Which Is Included In Your Packet."

He also made the following comment to me "Since my experiences with my HDCP paper, in email. I have stopped doing research on the security of cryptographic systems that protect copyrights. There is no point in doing research if I cannot publish my results. I've spoken to several other experienced cryptographers and many have come to a similar conclusion. Of course, this lack of research almost quarantees that the copyright protection techniques will be easy to break and that works will be pirated for years to come. We know from experience that systems designed without public review are almost always week. Without public review there is no security and without security the pirates will thrive."

A second communication was from Professor Dr. Andreas Pfitzmann of -- I can't

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pronounce this -- Technische Universität in Dresden. Professor Pfitzmann was on the program committee of the Information Hiding Workshop at which Professor Pfitzmann was supposed to have presented his paper initially. I now quote, and the English is because I think he's a German speaker, so it's a little bit not quite correct.

"I do not know how much inside knowledge you have about the Felton which started the Information Hiding Workshop which accepted that paper for a presentation where not only Felton and his coworkers, but also program committee chair Ira Moskowitz and general chair John McHugh has been threatened personally. In a later case, the employer was willing to take the legal risk. Finally it was mostly the European members of the program committee who voted to not exercise any influence whether to present or not to present that accepted paper, but to leave that decision completely to the authors. And it was the decision to let no American share the scheduled section for the Felton paper, but a European citizen, me.

For the workshop it worked out very well in the end by a lot of publicity and probably this paper got even during the workshop so many readers

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as no other paper. But when accepting to chair that session, which I did not know whether the paper would be presented or not, it was quite clear to me that this could mean staying in the U.S. for quite a while. Since I am working as an advisor for the German government concerning privacy and security, I was quite optimistic that it would work out well in any case for me personally, since I expected so much help by Germany in the EUS could be, but it somehow looked strange that mainly the Europeans were in charge of helping to maintain basic liberties, e.g., to speak about the freedom to discuss research in the U.S.

After experiencing the threat to the Information Hiding Workshop mentioned above, I would argue to exempt the organizers, program committees and session chairs as well as publishers assigned to the conferences and workshops. As long as this is not done, we decided to avoid the U.S. for Information Hiding Workshop, and I personally successfully argued to hold the successor of PET 2003 not in the U.S., but in Canada.

In addition, it caused me to argue to stay with Springer Valic, a German publisher as the publisher and not to switch to ACM with regard to

1 PET 2004 as we wanted to stay as far away from U.S. 2 jurisdiction as possible." The third communication was from 3 4 Professor David Wagner who was in the computer 5 science department at UC Berkeley. 6 "We looked at the HDCP, a copy 7 protection system designed for us in, I am told, 8 high definition TV sets. We very quickly found it 9 had serious security flaws. We wrote a paper and 10 submitted it to a scientific workshop. Then we 11 realized that we were running right down the same 12 path the Felton group did and, hey, we'd better be 13 careful. 14 I then spent the next 2 months on 15 conferring with our university lawyers checking out 16 whether it would be safe to publish our paper. As it 17 happened, we got lucky this time on 2 counts. First, 18 the university agreed to indemnify those of us at 19 Berkeley against any civil liability if we were 20 Kudos for the administration. I can't say 21 enough good things about them for their support of 22 us. 23 Of course, the DMCA also comes with 24 felony prohibitions on certain violations, and we

were on our own in that respect. The university

can't help with this criminal liability. But civil liability was probably the more likely risk.

Second, we talked with the engineers at Intel who designed the HDCP and they turned out to have very enlightened attitude about the whole mess. They thanked us for our work and told us they would not sue us. Had this in any other company, though, things might have turned out differently.

Based on these two positive signs, we felt comfortable enough to publish and our paper appeared in the very same ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy and Digital Rights Management 2001. We were very fortunate. Nevertheless, it was not a good experience. I spent more time talking to lawyers than I did doing the actual research. We changed the way we wrote our paper. We changed the way we interacted with our researchers before our paper was published. And we wasted a lot of time on the legal aspects.

The DMCA is troubling. After spending many hours with lawyers examining the implications of the DMCA, I personally have stopped doing work on copyright protected systems due to the legal overhead and uncertainties. For instance, the encryption research exemption doesn't cover 1201(b)

activities along with all sorts of other oddities, with which I'm sure you're very familiar. I cannot in good faith ask students I advise to take on uncertain risks at this time. I consider this a perhaps caution, but not irrational response to the DMCA.

Yes, you may mention my name and all the situations at the hearing. This is public information. In fact, it was featured as a cover story in the SIAM News."

The fundamentally flawed approach of Section 1201 criminalizes multiuse technologies rather than penalizing infringing behavior. During the current rulemaking proceeding we urge that a distinction be made between circumvention for the purpose of obtaining infringing access to a work and circumventing for the purpose of developing new techniques to protect computer systems and networks against attacks, negligence, malfeasance and vandalism or to advance the continued innovation of software and digital computing.

USACM recommends that the Library of Congress provide an exemption to Section 1201 that permits access to and dissemination of information about computer programs and databases that are

1	protected by CTP access control mechanisms in order
2	to recognize shortcomings in security systems, to
3	defend patents and copyrights, to discover and fix
4	dangerous bugs in code and to conduct forms of
5	desired educational activities.
6	I would like to request permission to
7	submit additional material to my testimony later.
8	And I thank you for the opportunity of
9	appearing before you today.
10	MS. PETERS: Thank you.
11	Mr. Ziemann?
12	MR. ZIEMANN: Okay. First of all, I
13	would like to read if I send an email to the
14	Copyright Office, what I get back on the screen says
15	"The mission of the Copyright Office is to promote
16	creativity by administering and sustaining an
17	effective national copyright system." And yet today
18	we are here to talk about how closely we are going
19	to define the scenario at the beginning of
20	"Fahrenheit 451." We already have the music police.
21	We might just give firemen the flame throwers,
22	because that's what is happening.
23	As a copyright owner I want him to have
24	my copyrighted material. I don't understand why

anyone would not. Then if so, why did they create

it in the first place.

I would also bring up just the issue of what an oxymoron the phrase "intellectual property owner" is. No one owns intellectual property. They may the right to commercially sell it. But once an idea is a book, that intellectual property belongs to the world. E-MC<sup>2</sup> may have been Einstein's theory, but we all own it now. John Lennon's "Day Tripper" song, he wrote it, somebody owns the copyright. But if the public didn't accept it as something that they wanted, it would be worthless. It wouldn't matter.

And taking even just that example, a couple of years ago I went to the Rock and Rock Hall of Fame and saw the original lyrics to "Day Tripper." That is the copyrighted work, I believe. That and the original sound master recording. Not my copy of it, which I have one, is worth maybe \$5. It worthless. But that piece of paper that it was originally written on, even if it's in public domain now, is valuable. It's worth more than any of the copies. Okay.

Mr. Metalitz is here to represent the intellectual property owners. I would question: (a) how they came into possession of so much

intellectual property. They certainly didn't create it all. They contractually took possession of it. In the music business alone you cannot get a recording contract without relinquishing copyrights. You may be able to if you're powerful and have some influence and can get a special contract, but talk to any of the big people. They don't own their music anymore. This does nothing for the creators. It does nothing to promote creativity.

And then the next point I would like to make is that the Copyright Office is on the verge of becoming as irrelevant as the record industry. Okay. I can make my own CDs now and sell them. I've done it. I don't need a record company to do it or to promote it. Okay. They're no longer necessary.

I've sent in a copyright, filled it out wrong. And so I have to fill it out correct again. If I don't, you won't register the copyright, but you'll still put a copy in the Library of Congress. So that's all I wanted in the first place. And so do I even need a copyright now? And if I do get a copyright, I'm going to sell it for \$1 to Leonard Lessing's Creative Comments Foundation so that no one else can become the intellectual property owner of my copyright.

1 I don't see how the DMCA is doing 2 anything for any creativity anywhere. And if that's what the purpose of the Copyright Office is, you're 3 4 certainly not promoting creativity any longer. 5 if you don't adapt, you too will become irrelevant. 6 My next question is if this gentleman 7 decides to go ahead and bypass copy protection, what 8 are you going to do to stop him? Nothing? You have 9 no authority. 10 I would actually say that this entire hearing is in a very appropriate venue. It is moot 11 and that's what we're in the Moot Court. 12 13 And one other point that I would like to 14 make is in reference to how the DMCA is being used 15 to twist things. The record industry's big cry is 16 how piracy is destroying them. In the past 5 years the record industry, according to the RIA statistics 17 18 has given away enough free physical goods to finance 19 the war in Iraq. At a minimum it's \$2.5 billion 20 dollars a year. 21 The Internet came along and gave them an 22 opportunity for free promotion, and what are they 23 doing? Exactly what I believe the Assistant 24 Treasury of Commerce -- I've got it in my notes

here, but I -- is that they're creating a pay-per

1 use society. Exactly what the original document 2 that I was referring to here was warned that you 3 don't want to happen. And they're creating a total 4 monopoly in the process. They're definitely antitrust if anybody would even care to try to 5 6 question it. 7 When I first wrote to come before you, I thought that there was a purpose and I question now 8 9 what difference this all makes. If we want to copy 10 books, if the world wants to copy books and music, 11 what are you going to do to stop us? You're going to sue each one of us individually? Good luck. 12 Right now to even make up what they give 13 14 away in free goods the record industry at the rate 15 of \$15,000, which is what they appear to be 16 settling, would have to prosecute 448 successful 17 cases a day just to break even without incurring any 18 additional court costs or attorneys fees. Not going 19 to happen. You can't stop it. 20 I think it's ridiculous that somebody 21 has to come here and argue why a library should be 22 allowed to have copied of copyrighted materials. 23 It's ludicrous. The fact that he even has to come 24 here and ask.

That's all I have to say.

1 MS. PETERS: Thank you, Mr. Ziemann. 2 Mr. Metalitz. Thank you very much. 3 MR. METALITZ: 4 I'm going to talk mostly about the 5 exemption for works protected by malfunctioning, 6 damaged or obsolete access controls which several 7 proponents, it's an existing exemption that they've 8 asked me renewed. I will mention again, as I did in 9 the first session, that of course this has to be done on a de novo basis for the burden of 10 demonstrating the need for this and complying with 11 12 the statutory criteria is on the proponents. there's not been very much evidence submitted in 13 14 this proceeding up until the time of the hearing, so 15 we're kind of playing catchup here. 16 But this really breaks down into main 17 examples that I'd like to at least briefly discuss. 18 One is the dongle situation which you've had 19 extensive testimony from Mr. Montoro from Spectrum Software and the other is the issue that Mr. Kahle 20 21 has raised, although he has another formula of a 22 potential exemption, but the issues raised by the 23 Internet Archive. 24 Let me just talk about the dongle 25 situation. Let's stipulate that dongles break

1	sometimes. They don't always work. For only work for
2	finite period of time. Then what? The question is
3	what can the user do then? I mean, there are
4	potentially four situations, I think, and I think
5	the problem that many of our organizations have with
6	the existing exemption that we hope can be rectified
7	if this exemption is recognized again, has to do
8	with confusion among those four situations.
9	In one situation, the vendor or the
10	copyright owner or the dongle manufacturer will
11	replace the dongle for free or at a minimal cost.
12	The second situation, they will replace
13	it but at a substantial cost.
14	The third situation, the vendor or the
15	copyright owners can't be found or is unresponsive
16	to a request.
17	And the fourth situation, the user
18	doesn't bother trying to find the copyright owner or
19	anybody else responsible, just goes ahead and
20	circumvents or, I suppose, potentially goes to Mr.
21	Montore's company.
22	Now, the problem is that I think as the
23	exemption now reads all of these behaviors are
24	equally sheltered by the exemption. All of them

could fall, potentially, within the exemption even  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left($ 

though I believe the Librarian only intended that the third situation be covered, the situation in which the vendor can't be found or is unresponsive.

In terms of the documentation of which situation is occurring, Mr. Montore submitted an 89 page document that I have taken a brief look at. And what I gathered from those documents is that there are many work arounds that are available in this situation. And some of them are made available by the copyright owner or with the authorization of the copyright owner. And it's not clear to me the extent to which there is a problem here or a substantial adverse impact on the availability of these works for noninfringing uses that isn't resolved by copyright owners themselves or by users seeking assistance that is granted either by the copyright owner or with the approval of the copyright owner. So I think the record is still sparse on that point.

Also, I think there's very little in the record about the applicability of this exemption to any works other than computer programs, even though the existing exemption also covers databases and other literary works. And there's nothing in the record until we get to Mr. Kahle's situation about

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access control mechanisms other than dongles.

I think the bottom line is that without further definition of this exemption, it's hard to see how the record in this proceeding would support a conclusion by the Librarian, at least at this point, that this exemption ought to be recognized for an additional 3 years.

I think part of the problem that we see with the existing exemption is a lack of definition. It depends on the three adjectives that are operative here; malfunctioning, damaged or obsolete. The first two are not defined and I think there's a real need to have some type of objective test of when either of those situation applies.

Now, obsolete, I'm going to get to that in a little more detail when I talk about Mr.

Kahle's submission, but it's defined by reference to or at least there is a reference in the final rule to the definition in Section 108(c).

I think it is probably more realistic to talk about something that's not supported or an access control technology that's not supported rather than necessarily obsolete. And I think that's the thrust of the 108(c) definition, although that definition has to do with formats and not with

access controls.

So if the problem that is demonstrated by the record is the third scenario that I posited, the one where the copyright owner or any other responsible party can't be found or isn't responsive, then it wold seem that the exemption should apply only in cases of obsolete, that is to say unsupported access controls. And that that be an additional requirement along with evidence of malfunctioning or damage as measured in some objective fashion.

Let me turn now to the Internet Archive submission, which I think raised a number of important questions. Some of these I believe were addressed by the Librarian in the ruling in 2000. That ruling said that the exemption that you recognize for malfunctioning, damaged or obsolete access controls would not cover situations such as those described by certain libraries who expressed the fear that they would be prevented by 1201(a)(1) from reformatting materials that are in obsolete formats. If the materials did not contain access control protections, but were merely in an obsolete format, 1201(a)(1) would not be implicated.

As I understand the situation with the

Internet Archive, those two sentences describe their situation. The question is are the controls that are preventing the use or the verification of the copies that Internet Archive is able to make, are those copy controls or are those access controls? And I think we raised that question in our submission, and perhaps we can find out a little bit more about that today. Because ordinarily one would expect that something that produced a copy but which was nonfunctional, would be viewed as a copy control not as an access control.

So the first question about the Internet Archive submission is really whether it's within the scope of this proceeding at all.

Then there's several different concepts of obsolescence that I found in this submission that I think we have to try to sort out. First, I mean in a sense a lot of the content that is in those packages is obsolete in a certain sense. "The 1996 College Guide" that is referenced in the testimony, I can testify as the parent of a child who was looking for colleges, that information is obsolete, particularly the tuition levels, and no one should rely on it.

But there may be other types of product

that's not obsolete, and there's certainly an important niche market in the entertainment software industry for Legacy games, games that people want to play in the same way that they played them on their Omega and their Commodore 64; they want to play them on newer platforms. So this is not necessarily a category that's without any commercial significance. That's one type of obsolescence.

And then there's the question of an obsolete media or an obsolete format. I think the testimony refers to the necessity to move content from a format before it degrades, such as CD-ROM, and from a medium before it becomes unintelligible and the example of PNG was given. That, I think, is the kind of obsoletness that is frustrating the Internet Archive.

And then the third thing that could be obsolete is the access control. But the submission from the Internet Archive said these access controls are not obsolete, nor are they malfunctioning and damaged and that's why they want to have a broader exemption.

So we turn to the proposal that they've made for literary works and audiovisual works that are protected by access controls, the original only

access controls. And I think there's a lot of
questions about whether that proposal can meet the
criteria of the statute for a particular class of
works. It's an extremely broad proposal. It starts
with two entire categories of the categories listed
in the Copyright Act, literary works and audiovisual
works. It potentially encompasses a very broad range
of access controlled technologies. And some of these
technologies may well be in use today. The fact
that an original only access control, if it is an
access control, was used on VisiCalc or on Microsoft
Basic and that's frustrating these preservation
activities, doesn't mean that an access control also
meeting that description isn't in use today on a lot
of much more current products. And I think in many
of the submissions you have from the SIAA you have
some examples of reasons why copyright owners might
use that type of access control today, such as for
controlling beta testing and personalized versions
of works and for privacy protection.

I think the final point I would like to raise about the proposal from Internet Archive is the question of whether access to these materials is available through other means that would not require circumvention of the original only access control if

it is deemed to be an access control.

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We've suggested a couple of these in our reply comments. In some cases the content can be preserved in other forms, in analog forms or through screen shots and other ways. But what really struck me as I looked at the demonstration or the presentation that Mr. Kahle made, was whether access to a lot of these materials can't actually be obtained through agreement with the copyright owner, which of course is another form of noninfringing use. Obviously, this isn't going to apply to everything, but I know the Microsoft Corporation is still in business. I believe IBM is still in business. I think Rick Prellinger, the author of the Ephemeral Film Collection I know is still in Apple is still in business. business.

And I wonder to what extent the problems that the Internet Archive is experiencing can be resolved in that fashion and thereby reduce the necessity for any exemption in order to facilitate access for noninfringing purposes to these materials. So I hope that that is an issue that perhaps we can have some further discussion about.

I'll just a word about the security and remediation issues that Ms. Simons raised. Again,

this is an issue that was before the Copyright

Office and the Librarian in 2000. And I believe the

conclusion then was that in this proceeding the

Librarian had to move with particular caution when

asked to redraw lines that Congress had already

drawn to define a permissible exception for purposes

such as encryption research and security testing. I

think that advice certainly applies as well today.

Ms. Simons read into the record again the capsule descriptions that were contained in the ACM's submission in the initial comment round. And, obviously, there's a lot of questions that could be asked about those scenarios. But nearly all of them, it would seem, are addressed either by other existing exceptions to Section 1201(a)(1) that already exist in the statute or through other means, such as consent and agreement. So we could go through those, and perhaps there is more information that could be added as to where those scenarios come from and why it's perceived that Section 1201(a)(1) presents a problem in that area.

I can't really comment on the 3 email submissions that she received in the last few days regarding concerns that some researchers have about the impact of Section 1201(a)(1) on their research.

Obviously, those concerns are deeply felt. I don't know what the legal basis for those concerns is, but we certainly take a look at those. But I think in the final analysis this is a situation that Congress considered at great length in the process of enacting the DMCA. It drew up a rather detailed exemption or two exemptions for security testing and for encryption research. And if those exemptions are not achieving the purpose for which Congress intended, because Congress clearly intended to encourage the further development of encryption research, then it may be that Congress is the forum in which that line drawing should be revisited and not this proceeding.

Thank you.

MS. PETERS: Thank you very much. For time's sake, I'll only sake a few questions at this point and give my fellow panelists a chance.

Mr. Kahle, I'm trying to understand the scope of the exemption that you're looking for and to identify exactly what the problem is. The difference between the format that may be obsolete and what you referred to as basically embedded, I guess, computer programs that you have to get around in order to actually gain access to it.

1	All the things that you showed us, and
2	the 16 works but only one of then could be used.
3	MR. KAHLE: Right.
4	MS. PETERS: Do those works all
5	basically have some embedded software that makes it
6	so that they're no longer accessible? If not,
7	what's the problem with the 15?
8	MR. KAHLE: The problem for some of these
9	materials, I don't know, take Ephemeral Films, we
10	can make a copy of the bits that reside on this
11	aging media, though there's software embedded with
12	the content that does certain checks to make sure
13	that, for instance, the CD-ROM is in the CD-ROM
14	player. And if you're running this on an emulator,
15	you can fake it out, circumvent particularly code
16	around those issues to sort of make it think that
17	everything is fine. But if you do not do that, it
18	will not play.
19	These softwares are a little bit
20	different. Let me see if I can try to answer that.
21	There's this constant migration
22	MS. PETERS: I'm trying to get at the
23	access control. Just the access control
24	MR. KAHLE: The access controls are
25	often original only access controls in this era of

1	software where it requires that you have a physical
2	floppy in a floppy drive to be able to run. It's
3	not that the bits are accessible. It's that it does
4	certain checks to make sure that you have the
5	original in your possession.
6	MS. PETERS: Okay.
7	MR. KAHLE: That's the case of some of -
8	-
9	MS. PETERS: Take the 5 1/4 floppy disk.
10	MR. KAHLE: Yes.
11	MS. PETERS: You've got it, but you
12	don't have the equipment to play it? I still don't
13	totally understand what it is in that floppy that
14	makes it nonaccessible.
15	MR. KAHLE: Okay. Sorry.
16	It's not that the floppy may not this
17	floppy, if we found an Apple II from that era and we
18	put it in, it could play.
19	MS. PETERS: Okay. Right.
20	MR. KAHLE: And that would be terrific.
21	That would be a huge step forward.
22	What we're trying to do is migrate these
23	materials onto more stable media.
24	MS. PETERS: Right.
25	MR. KAHLE: Currently that's hard

1	drives. If we were to do that, make a replica. We
2	have the original, we want to make a copy that
3	functions the same way as an Apple II running an
4	Apple Writer program, then that whole environment of
5	the emulator of the underlying Apple personal
6	computer as well as the hard drive version of the
7	bits that were on the floppy, all have to act as if
8	were the original.
9	MS. PETERS: Okay. But I'm still hung
10	up with where the access control is.
11	MR. KAHLE: The access control is when
12	the software on the floppy goes and says is this
13	floppy in the floppy drive.
14	MS. PETERS: So there's a piece of code
15	that says I don't play unless I'm in a floppy
16	player?
17	MR. KAHLE: Often. Often. In a majority
18	of the cases here, that's the case.
19	MS. PETERS: And in the others?
20	MR. KAHLE: There's a dongle that sort
21	of checks to make sure you have that.
22	MS. PETERS: Okay. A dongle.
23	MR. KAHLE: Does it have the CD. There's
24	certain things it checks certain things about the
25	drivers. There's these sort of couplings

1 MS. PETERS: Okay. Because these are 2 really all before the era when we talked about 3 technological protection measures. So these are 4 things that were done way back when, but just put in 5 -- I don't know. I don't know why they were put in. 6 But they effectively now preclude getting access to 7 them, is that what you're saying? 8 MR. KAHLE: As I understand it, these 9 measures were done by software companies, and I worked for some of them, were done so that people 10 11 were forbidden to access the materials on the disk 12 unless, for instance, you had a physical copy or you had the right set of configurations. 13 14 MS. PETERS: Okay. And the same issue 1.5 is with regard to -- not to software. We're talking 16 about software mostly. But with regard to games, 17 video games? Games are often also these 18 MR. KAHLE: 19 sort of software/hardware combinations as distinct 20 from, say, audio CDs or DVDs that have data on the 21 disks and the sort of protections and such tend to 22 be build into the players. These things are sort of 23 this mush of content and software that plays through 24 computer programs. I'm sorry, I'll try to be 25 concrete.

1 MS. PETERS: No, that's all right. I 2 still am struggling with what it is we're trying to 3 do. Let me just switch it -- because maybe other 4 people can ask what I'm trying to get at more 5 effectively. 6 Your original category was literary 7 works and audiovisual. 8 MR. KAHLE: Yes. 9 MS. PETERS: And what you talked about, however, was software and like games, which is a 10 11 much narrower category. Is your focus mostly on 12 software and games or is as broad as --The pieces here are sort of 13 MR. KAHLE: 14 a representation of a class of some of the types of 15 things we're dealing with. We think of these as 16 audiovisual materials and literature. They just 17 happen to be rendered with computers. You know, this 18 is probably the best example of the sort of 19 literature. It's a --20 MS. PETERS: It was a book. 21 MR. KAHLE: -- book. It was a book. This 22 is the computer version of it, and here's a sort of 23 screen shot of a sort of dorky, you know, early bad 24 colored graphics that they could view in those days.

But they're trying to render a book on a screen.

1	Okay. Maybe not great. But at last seminal in terms
2	of early.
3	And movies, audiovisual works as well as
4	software and games that sort of have all of these
5	components.
6	So if I could figure out some other way,
7	they seemed, at least to a layman, qualify. They're
8	just of the computer generation.
9	MS. PETERS: Okay. I'll still struggle
10	with my question.
11	MR. KAHLE: Sorry.
12	MS. PETERS: Maybe I'll come back.
13	MR. KAHLE: I apologize.
14	MS. PETERS: No. It's my issue that I
15	haven't quite figured out.
16	I'm going to let the rest of the panel
17	ask questions while I try to figure out.
18	MR. KAHLE: Right.
19	MR. CARSON: Okay. I'm having the same
20	problem the Registrar has on whether or not these
21	original only access controls are truly access
22	controls. But I'm not sure I know how to ask the
23	question any better to get an answer. Maybe it's our
24	problem, not yours in terms of our not quite getting
25	what you're saying. But I'm not entirely sure we're

1	talking about an access control and I'm wondering if
2	you can sort of make the case as to how this
3	qualifies under the statutory definition of a
4	technological measure that controls access to a
5	copyrighted work?
6	MR. KAHLE: It may be that those words
7	mean something different to a lawyer than it does a
8	layman. You know, I've been reading some of this
9	stuff and some of it's pretty anyway.
10	MR. CARSON: Whatever you were going,
11	you're absolutely right.
12	MR. KAHLE: But these materials, the
13	design and the implementation of these measures were
14	put in place to keep people from accessing these
15	underlying works if you had a copy of them on
16	another medium.
17	You can copy these things, you just
18	can't access them. You have to blow through the
19	access protections to be able to run them. You
20	might be able to save the bits on the floppy or the
21	CD-ROM exactly as it was. But you can't play them in
22	a new environment.
23	MS. PETERS: But nobody can see them and
24	nobody can hear them?
25	MR. KAHLE: Right. No researcher can

even we as librarians can't even find out whether
we did our jobs right. And I have a thorn in my side
about this because we were trying to in a different
circumstance archive websites for the Library of
Congress. And we didn't go back and look if we were
doing it right. And we blew it. And when I find
this out, we do it over and over again. If we don't
actually check our work to make sure that the
functioning real environment on a migrated version
and in versions that don't rely on the physical
media or having an Apple II; we need to move this
stuff forward and be able to access this stuff and
be able to use it and expose it to researchers or I
think we'll fail. I actually know we will fail.
MS. PETERS: Could I ask, what is it if
there's some kind of an exemption
MR. KAHLE: Yes.
MS. PETERS: what is that you will be
able to do that will in fact make it accessible?
MR. KAHLE: Okay. Good. What we're
looking to do is make a copy of the bits that are
stored on these media into a more stable
environment, hard drives currently. And then couple
with other emulation software that is written
independently or together to try to get that to

function and be able to live in the new world kind 1 2 as if it were the old world. So as if you were sitting in front of an 3 4 Apple II. We want to have a replica so that we have 5 this in the physical form, we can look at the 6 Then you can go to a modern computer and packaging. 7 go and say what would it have looked like if I had 8 this dongle and had an Atari something or other. 9 MS. PETERS: What does it take in order 10 for you to do that? In other words, you said you 11 replicated it. You got all the bits but now you can't see it and maybe you can't hear it. But how do 12 you -- what do you do to that work? What are you 13 14 circumventing? What are you getting around? 15 If we are trying to take MR. KAHLE: 16 this floppy from Lotus 123, we believe we know how 17 to actually read the old PC Jr. and make a verbatim 18 sector for sector copy onto a hard drive. Then we 19 need to emulate and have software around that 20 transcription of the floppy to emulate and fake out 21 this software to make it believe that it is still 22 inside an IBM PC Jr. 23 So, but what is it MS. PETERS: 24 circumventing? It sounds like you're adding 25 something that will make it do what it could have

Τ	done before.
2	MR. KAHLE: We are trying to make it do
3	what it did before by
4	MS. PETERS: Are you taking the bits
5	from before and doing something to them?
6	MR. KAHLE: No. We're going to try to
7	run them. And by running them in this fake
8	environment we have to specifically go out after the
9	techniques that the publishers used to try to keep
10	piracy from happening and defeat that. We have to go
11	out and find every piece and there are sorts of
12	creative things that they did in this early PC era,
13	most of which are gone now. But of jumping around -
14	- and we have to go and circumvent their intention
15	to keep us from running this off the original work.
16	MS. PETERS: I've got more about what
17	you're doing, but I'm still
18	MR. KAHLE: I'm sorry. I feel like I'm
19	being
20	MR. CARSON: The problem is we have
21	lawyers speaking to librarians/technologists. And
22	whether we can ever speak the same language
23	MR. KAHLE: I've had that problem.
24	MR. CARSON: This meeting is doomed to
25	failure.

1	MS. PETERS: He's giving him the law.
2	MR. CARSON: The law. I'm giving the
3	definition. Hold on there for a second.
4	Okay. So we have the definition here.
5	Section 1201(a).
6	DR. SIMONS: Can I make a comment while
7	he's reading.
8	MR. CARSON: Go ahead.
9	DR. SIMONS: Because it was just
10	suggested to me that perhaps what Brewster is trying
11	to do, and Brewster should correct me if this wrong,
12	is somewhat similar to trying to read what's on a
13	DVD by bypassing the CSS encoding.
14	MR. CARSON: Well, that was occurring to
15	me. Yes.
16	MS. PETERS: Right. Okay.
17	DR. SIMONS: So that was not my original
18	idea. It came from behind me.
19	MR. CARSON: Just walk me through. We've
20	got a definition in the statute of when a
21	technological measure effectively controls access to
22	a work. It says: "A technological measure
23	effectively controls to a work if the measure in the
24	ordinary course of its operation requires the
25	application of information or a process or a

1	treatment with the authority of the copyright owner
2	to gain access to the work."
3	So I gather the key question here may be
4	does this original only access control you're
5	talking about, is this something that is requiring
6	the application of information or a process or a
7	treatment to gain access to the work? And if it is,
8	try to explain to us how that's happening.
9	MS. SELVAGGIO: Can I can I
10	MR. KAHLE: Try to be my interpreter.
11	MR. CARSON: Identify yourself for the
12	record.
13	MS. SELVAGGIO: Yes. Marian Selvaggio.
14	I'm with Wilson
15	MR. CARSON: Oh, we have a lawyer.
16	Okay.
17	MS. SELVAGGIO: You have a lawyer.
18	MR. KAHLE: Help me.
19	MS. SELVAGGIO: These programs were
20	written so that you could only play then in a
21	particular place.
22	MS. PETERS: In a player. Okay.
23	MS. SELVAGGIO: What Brewster and the
24	Internet Archive are doing is writing code that
25	circumvents that access control so that you can now

1 get to it without having a player you need. That's 2 the circumvention that they're doing. 3 MR. CARSON: Okay. 4 MS. PETERS: Okay. 5 MR. CARSON: I think I get the 6 circumvention. I just want to make sure I understand 7 the technological measure that effectively controls access to the work is. 8 9 MS. SELVAGGIO: You can't play these, 10 you can't use them in the ordinary course of 11 business without the proper hardware or the proper 12 exchange of information. 13 MR. CARSON: Okay. 14 MS. SELVAGGIO: Because of these access 15 controls you cannot run these as they were meant to 16 operate unless you have the exact code or the exact 17 hardware that they're requesting. So what Brewster 18 is doing is circumventing that access control and 19 emulating it so that it thinks it has the proper 20 hardware or the proper software and then you can run 21 it as it was meant to be run in the ordinary course. 22 All right. Now you talked MR. CARSON: 23 about an exchange of information, and certainly when 24 you look in the statutory language we're talking 25 about, among other things, the application of

1 information to gain access. So just elaborate a 2 little bit more what's kind of information are we 3 typically talking about that needs to be exchanged 4 or applied in order to get access to the work? 5 As I understand it, these go MR. KAHLE: 6 in pro particular memory locations to find out are 7 they -- they try running the actual disk. If you 8 had a copy, you would go and run the actual disk and 9 try to do transactions with the original CD or 10 floppy that would be in the hard drive or go and try 11 to communicate with the dongle to go and get particular information from the dongle, information 12 that's key, and does it act correctly. 13 14 The process, does it spin a hard drive. 15 And if you didn't have -- excuse me. If you had a 16 floppy drive or if you didn't have a floppy drive or 17 a CD drive on these computers, then the communication from the program that's written on the 18 19 floppy would fail. 20 So there's the information on the 21 floppy. You copy it to a hard drive. It tries to 22 communicate back with the floppy drive or the CD 23 drive, is it there? Hello. If it comes back with 24 no or errors, then it shuts down and you're out of

luck.

1	MS. PETERS: Okay.
2	MR. CARSON: Okay.
3	MR. ZIEMANN: May I interject to this.
4	I'm also a computer programmer. And these things are
5	written to prevent a copy from working.
6	MR. KAHLE: Yes.
7	MR. CARSON: Okay.
8	MR. ZIEMANN: Specifically so that you
9	must have the original in the original machine. If
10	you make a copy of it, it's going to say no, sorry.
11	It's a copy and it's not going to work.
12	MR. KAHLE: And interestingly, just
13	it shouldn't be interesting.
14	MR. CARSON: Right.
15	MR. KAHLE: Interestingly, a lot of
16	these protections are kind of from the era of the
17	'80s and '90s. A lot of the types of protections
18	that people are doing now aren't these anymore.
19	MS. PETERS: Right.
20	MR. KAHLE: Things are changing.
21	They're doing these license key exchanges. We're
22	going to have issues with all of that as well. But
23	we're sort of sitting around with a bunch of this
24	stuff and we're starting to find that these are
25	enough of issues, that we have to start working on

things from day one. Waiting for them to be obsolete or malfunction, actually, is very scary to us.

I'm not sure how we're going to do on this task. Stanford has 19,000 titles of this stuff and they haven't started moving forward with it. But starting to be more proactive, working with the manufacturers, building those relationships but not — we find when we've tried to write and request information and approval from copyright holders, most of them can't be found even within a year or two of these things being made available. It's just practically impossible.

And we have studies of this, of even things from the 1990s, '95, '96, '97 some from Macromedia CD-ROM collection. We wrote to a bunch of the contact information and we tried to find them. And we have very few responses. And we also got a lot of responses from people saying "I'm not sure I can give you that permission," which is sort of an interesting one as well.

So unless we have sort of some library of 108 style ability to maneuver, I think we will lose a large percentage if not a majority of all of these works.

MR. CARSON: Thank you. You just answered my next question. So I got two for the price of one.

Mr. Metalitz, one of the things you said at page 18 of your reply comments, and this is with respect to the proposed exemption, actually the current exemption for technological measures that are failing because of damage or obsoleteness or malfunction. One of your criticisms is that that current exemption is not confined only to those instances in which the provider has demonstratively refused or failed to provide timely relief in the form of assistance to access the work.

Now, I'm trying to remember where you were 3 years ago when you were arguing with us about what a class of works was. And I think I remember where we were 3 years ago, and we decided what a class of works was. And I don't recall, certainly an element of what we decided, or an element of what you were arguing ought to be part of the definition of a class of works being referenced to what the copyright owner may or may not be willing to do for you. This sounds like it's getting pretty close to an exemption that looks more upon use and conduct as opposed to a class of works. Am I correct in that?

And if so, how do you reconcile that with what I think you were telling us 3 years ago and what we certainly were saying 3 years ago?

MR. METALITZ: Well, I think you

essentially in our view you essentially got it right 3 years ago in terms of the definition of particular class of works. And I would agree with you that it should not be defined in terms of what the user and the copyright owner have done. But these exemptions have to be defined in some fashion.

In 2000 you said well malfunctioning and damaged, everybody knows what that means so we're not going to define it. And obsolete you referred to Section 108(c). And Section 108(c) says that a format shall be considered obsolete -- now this is, you know, maybe responsive to Mr. Kahle's issue -- a format shall be considered obsolete if the machine or device necessary to render perceptible or work stored in that format is longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace.

That describes a situation in which -- I mean, I don't know how you would know that unless someone asked. I don't know how you would know that it's no longer available in the marketplace or can't

be found unless someone went to look for it and wasn't able to find it.

What I think was behind the exemption that was recognized, was not so much necessarily a concept of being obsolete, but a concept of being not supported. And that inevitably gets back to the question of whether there's been any effort or any attempt to try to get the copyright owner to support the access control.

So I think the solution to this problem, perhaps, is in a clear or more definite or more specific definition of the adjectives that describe the access control that under an exemption would be allowed to be circumvented. And to some extent those definitions may require an evaluation of criteria that have to do with what the copyright owner has done and what the user has done. I don't think that transgresses the principles that the Librarian laid down in 2000. I think it's a clearer definition of what is the type of access control that can be circumvented.

MR. CARSON: So if, for example, and this is a very rough draft of what you maneuver see, but if for example this time around we were satisfied that in all other respects the case had

1	been made and we were going to propose an exemption
2	to the Librarian and we came up with an exemption
3	along the lines of what we did last time, but we
4	said among the conditions it would be that the
5	access control measure is no longer supported by its
6	maker very rough draft, as I said.
7	MR. METALITZ: Yes.
8	MR. CARSON: That would satisfy the
9	concerns you were talking about, although in your
10	comment you were talking about it in terms of
11	whether the provider has refused or failed to
12	provide timely release. The unsupported sort of
13	adjective would be sufficient to deal with that
14	phenomenon, I gather, from your point of view?
15	MR. METALITZ: Yes. I could give a rough
16	answer to your rough question. And that is I think
17	it's a problem of defining what those terms mean.
18	MR. CARSON: Yes.
19	MR. METALITZ: And that definition can
20	include something about whether it's still
21	supported.
22	MR. CARSON: Yes. I get it.
23	MS. PETERS: If you go that way, would
24	that answer Mr. Kahle's problem.
25	MR. METALITZ: Ask him.

1 MS. PETERS: No, but that's the 2 question. 3 MR. KAHLE: No. If in fact this is not 4 MS. PETERS: No? 5 supported by the original manufacturer so therefore 6 there's an exemption, what more do you need? 7 MS. SELVAGGIO: Well, it depends on what you mean by not supported. If he has the right 8 9 floppy disk to run this, would that be considered 10 still be supported? You're not migrating the media, 11 you're not moving the data. It's still supported 12 because you can still put it in and run it. 13 MR. KAHLE: Let me take also a different 14 crack at it. 15 Trying to do this work is actually kind 16 of tough. I mean, trying to get this stuff to work even the first time is hard. Kind of having your 17 18 computer and all, everything sort of set up. I mean, 19 It's not like putting a DVD we had it this morning. 20 in a DVD player. All right. A lot of this stuff 21 seems to be sort of pirated around that sort of 22 world view. That's not what we're dealing with. 23 We're dealing with a lot of different 24 working pieces that we have to get all emulated to 25 work right again. It's extremely helpful if we have as much time as we can and the programmers are sort of part of the program. IF they're available, how do we go and emulate your new Atari, whatever it is, your game console with the right sets of pieces?

If we have to wait for all of the pieces

to be not supported, does that mean that it's already too late?

There's another characteristic as I understand it in this exemption that causes problems. It's when the access controls start to become obsolete but the underlying -- the access controls might be perfectly operating fine. But we've lost the rest of the media or we've lost abilities to read certain sectors of the drives -- of the media. And the whole thing starts to fade.

So the idea of putting a time thing, sort of push it off into the future and wait until it's obsolete and then whose going to care quite so much; in this digital realm especially in things that involve the interactions of lots of different computing components, I fear we will just lose a lot more. And when we start to deal with Internet style software, and we've got to start on it immediately because it's got client server pieces -- but that's not the subject today. Three years from now we'll

1 come back and we'll have a lot more to say about 2 supporting those materials. These are where we have concrete examples and we would like to start to 3 emulate and deal with Windows 98 software, Windows 4 2000 software, McIntosh software of different forms, 5 6 even those are still currently being sold by the 7 manufacturer. 8 Mr. Kasunic? MS. PETERS: MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Metalitz, on page 41 9 10 of your reply comment, and this goes to the question 11 of what kind of control are we talking about here, you said that it was less than clear whether this is 12 was an access or a copy control and said that: 13 14 technology which allows copying but which renders 15 the resulting copies less than fully functional 16 should be classified in DMCA terms as a copy control 17 subject to 1201(b) not an access control." 18 So after listening to the description 19 that we heard here, can you make our lives a lot 20 easier and tell us that that's not within the scope 21 of Section 1201 and that he's free to circumvent 22 without an exemption? 23 MR. METALITZ: Well, I'm not sure I 24 could make life easier, but I am struck by what my

colleague here said that the real purpose of these

1	was to prevent someone from making at the time,
2	was to prevent someone from making a copy
3	MR. ZIEMANN: That would work.
4	MR. METALITZ: and presumably that
5	would work. And presumably that would I may be
6	wrong about this, maybe Mr. Kahle can set me set.
7	Presumably that would mean even a copy that would
8	work in that a original floppy drive. So it isn't a
9	question of emulating the hardware. It's a question
10	of the copy not being functional.
11	In other words, if back in 1985 I had
12	made a copy of that 5 1/4 inch floppy disk and put
13	it into the same machine that I was trying to run
14	the original on, would it work or would it not work?
15	If it would not work, it seems as though it's a copy
16	control.
17	MR. ZIEMANN: On the McIntosh software
18	the first thing that was there was something that
19	you needed an extra piece of software to access and
20	it was called the bozo flag. And if you checked the
21	box and somebody copied it, it just didn't work.
22	MR. METALITZ: Even in the same machine
23	then?
24	MR. ZIEMANN: Even in the same machine.
25	MR. KAHLE: Well, than the well,

1 even, there might be copy protections, but that's as 2 I understand it not the subject. Actually it's the 3 access protections that we're having troubles with. 4 We can copy of lot of these materials. It's the access protection. So whether we're allowed 5 6 or not allowed to do the copy protections, if we 7 blow the access protections as I understand, bad 8 things happen. And I'm not exactly sure, George, how to answer your question of who they happen from, 9 10 but these guys say don't do it. So we need to blow 11 the access protections. We have to circumvent the 12 access protections to be able to do our job. Yes, there may be copy protections that 13 14 we have to deal with as well, but as I understand 15 it, that as not as much of an issue that we have to 16 deal with. MR. KASUNIC: Well, even if this was 17 18 initially intended to be a copy control, once you've 19 reproduced that and in terms of getting access to 20 that reproduction, wouldn't 1201(a)(1) apply then? 21 Of you could not get access to that reproduction of 22 the work, would there be a Section 1201(a)(1) issue? 23 MR. METALITZ: Well, don't just take my 24 word for this. His would -- what the Copyright 25 Office said 3 years ago.

MR. ZIEMANN: What do they know?

MR. METALITZ: To the extent that technological protections prevented the library from converting the format, those protections would seem to be copy controls, the act of circumvention of which is not prohibited by Section 1201.

Now, I think in the questioning that Mr. Carson had of Mr. Kahle, I think I can see -- I understand better now how this can also potentially be described as an access control by looking at that definition of access control mechanism. My concern would go toward how bounded this description is of an original -- well, it's called an original only control which, again, to me sounds like what the court said it was in 1988, a copy control. leaving that phrase aside, I guess I wonder what is the difference between this type of access control that requires checking to see that it's running in the right machine and a lot of access controls that are used today, some of the other techniques that Mr. Kahle talked about, that are used to make sure that the program is being run, perhaps, in the machine to which it was dedicated at the time of registration or to a machine within a certain network. So, for example, it's accessible by anyone

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using a computer within a particular university network but not by somebody else outside the university system.

A lot of techniques are being used now to make sure that you can't have access to a particular work unless it's done in a machine that has certain characteristics. And part of what I was hearing in the description of the controls here also fit that criteria. So I guess I am somewhat uncomfortable with describing this as an access control until I had a better understanding of how this can be distinguished, this 1980s and early '90s technology, can be distinguished from what is being used today in an access control environment.

MR. KASUNIC: Well then isn't it reasonable to understand the Internet Archive's concern since there is -- it's very unclear whether this might be or might not be an access control, then their concern is legitimate in a need for an exemption if we can't -- if the potential for violation for doing what they're doing is there?

MR. METALITZ: Well, I'm not saying that their concern is legitimate. I do think there's an argument to be made that much of what is impeding their activities is a copy control and not an access

control. But maybe I don't understand enough about how this technology works to come to any definitive conclusion on it.

It also leaves open the question of to what extent -- I mean, I hear what Mr. Kahle said that in many cases these copyright owners can't be found. But on the other hand, when he shows us the 16 greatest hits and most of them are from companies that are, you know, still actively being traded on Nasdaq and presumably are accessible, to request -well, I don't whether he's got responses from them But to see the many -- there seems to be many other ways to ensure the availability of these materials for noninfringing uses. And again, I'm assuming that his uses are noninfringing under 108 that don't require circumvention of an access control in a way that also could effect both, as he indicated, products that are still currently in the market and techniques, access control techniques that are being used for many different purposes.

MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Kahle, do you have a response to that in terms of whether it is easy to get permission or are there other ways of accomplishing your ends?

MR. KAHLE: We have found anecdotal that

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1	even if these companies exist, that they may not
2	have the original source code versions that don't
3	have the access controls as part of them such a way
4	that they would be able to donate them to a library.
5	That often if you go and show this to Lotus, they
6	go, "Wow. Cool. Great. We'd love can we have
7	one back for our library." Because back in that day
8	of this is 1982, we were in different building.
9	They don't have this stuff. The publishers aren't
10	librarians. They're out to make a buck. And they're
11	required to, based on how corporate law works. So
12	even if they're around, it's often extremely
13	difficult.
14	There's anecdotal. The requests that we
15	have sent out, and this is a study, show that very
16	few, even the emails on these or the physical
17	addresses working. So maybe they've moved. But it
18	starts to become fairly difficult.
19	So I think even if we were we were
20	just looking for permission, much less help from
21	these guys on being able to do these things.
22	I think the publishers will do
23	publishing activities, the libraries should do
24	library activities. And protection 108 helps us

stay out of their way commercially.

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MR. KASUNIC: I just have one other question, and it's changing gears a bit, in terms of the statutory exemptions in line with research and encryption for security research. And also the privacy exemption.

And, Mr. Metalitz, you've made the statement about proceeding that we did also make, and I've asked a recommendation about proceeding cautiously where there is congressional exemptions. But it seems, and correct me if I'm wrong, Professor Simons, but this adequately -- or do these congressional exemptions adequately fit computer software? For instance, in the subsection, I quess it's (g) dealing with security -- or (j), excuse me, dealing with security testing does not specifically mention computer programs. And so we'll leave that term completely out of that subsection. And there also seem to be some potential holes, anyway, in terms of privacy research. For instance, one thing that's come up in our comments is spyware, trying to get privacy information that in subsection (i) there is the requirement that there be conspicuous notice on the spyware before you can circumvent to see what it's doing. Are these statutory exemptions too narrow for the present circumstances?

1 DR. SIMONS: Thank you for asking me 2 that question. It's our view that essentially all of 3 4 the statutory exemptions that would apply to 5 computer scientists are too narrow. If you look at 6 the security exemption J, it says with the 7 authorization of the owner or operator of such a 8 computer. So that's -- so you first need the 9 authorization in order to do the security research 10 to begin with. 11 So if you happen to be using a program where you -- I mean, if you think about the impact 12 on just computer security in general, I think it's 13 really quite serious. I personally find it somewhat 14 1.5 ironic that at a time when we are so concerned about 16 security in general in this country that we have 17 legislation that is hampering security R&D, not only 18 to do the investigation to see how secure software 19 might be, but also to disseminate information when 20 you find vulnerabilities. 21 One of the people I quoted referred to 22 the fact that when this research isn't done, that 23 the pirates will prevail. 24 I understand that piracy, a term I don't

particularly like, but infringing behavior is of

concern to owners of intellectual property. But
there are many other issues that we need to be
worried about. In particular, we need to worry about
the security of the information infrastructure. And
to the extent that it's insecure, which it is
seriously insecure, and to the extent that we are
hampered from investigating some of these
insecurities and from revealing them, not only does
it make this country I mean, it makes this
country more insecure and it also ironically has a
negative impact on the very people who pushed for
this legislation to begin with because then they
will find themselves using protection mechanisms
that they may not even know are insecure because
nobody can tell them. But the bad guys will know,
right? Some of these things are really extremely
fragile.
So another way of looking at some of
these exemptions because they are so weak, what this
bill basically does is it protects weak forms of
protection. And it just seems to me that that's not
in anybody's interest.

I don't know if I answered all your questions. As far as the privacy goes, of course again if there is spyware or some other invasive

1 type of software, sometimes you can't know it's 2 there without looking. And if you're not allowed to 3 look, then you can't find out. 4 MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Metalitz, do you have 5 any --MR. METALITZ: 6 Well, I think in general 7 the issues that you raise about the scope of the existing statutory exemptions are issues that are 8 best addressed to Congress that wrote these 9 10 exemptions and, obviously, has the authority to 11 change them and in light of changing circumstances. 12 The job of this proceeding is somewhat different. And I think the need to demonstrate the 13 14 reduced availability -- or the adverse impact on the 15 availability of materials for noninfringing uses is 16 the touchstone of this proceeding which may not be 17 the same thing. 18 On 1201(i), I'm not sure that I 19 understood the question that you were raising, but 20 it does -- it actually rather closely tracks the 21 spyware concern that at least one of the submitters 22 in the initial round raised. It basically deals with 23 the undisclosed surreptitious collection of 24 identifiable information. And it allows you to

circumvent an access control that does that under

1	those circumstances.
2	DR. SIMONS: But how do you know if it
3	does it without circumventing it?
4	MR. METALITZ: How do you know if it
5	does it?
6	DR. SIMONS: How do you know that it
7	does this without circumventing it?
8	MR. METALITZ: Well, you have to have
9	some way, some evidence or some reason to believe
10	that personal identifiable information is being
11	collected.
12	DR. SIMONS: Right. But suppose you're
13	wrong?
14	MR. METALITZ: It doesn't necessarily
15	mean you have to circumvent in order to find that
16	out.
17	MR. KASUNIC: But if you're wrong,
18	you're in violation, right?
19	DR. SIMONS: Right.
20	MR. METALITZ: In other words, if you
21	think it does collect personal identifiable
22	information and it turns out that it doesn't collect
23	personally identifiable information is your act of
24	circumvention a violation? The act of circumvention
25	is really dedicated to identifying and disabling the

1	capability. So you're saying if the capability
2	doesn't exist, does that not come within the
3	category of identifying it because it's a nil situ
4	and you haven't identified it? I don't know the
5	answer to that question.
6	MS. PETERS: Charlotte?
7	MS. DOUGLASS: Yes. For Mr. Kahle. It
8	seems tome that there's a little bit of a disconnect
9	between your objectives, which is to protect things
10	for a 100,000 years and this proceeding which is
11	just for 3 years, maybe recurring, but this
12	proceeding. Because it just seems like you are
13	interested in maybe protecting things that may break
14	down, protecting things that essentially are in need
15	of archiving. I'm going a long way around. But I'm
16	having a difficult time also seeing that this is
17	really access protection.
18	What do you want from the Copyright
19	Office? I mean would you be happy if we said this is
20	a copy control and go home? I mean, it's just not
21	clear that it's access control.
22	MR. KAHLE: I'm sorry. Gosh, that's
23	tragic. You know, lay people. Okay.
24	Let me try to answer your preamble
25	before

1	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay.
2	MR. KAHLE: So why are we so concerned
3	with the next 3 years when we've got sort of a
4	longer term time frame that we're really trying to
5	deal with? The urgency comes, and this stuff's
6	rotting now. If we don't do our preservation now,
7	we don't get another chance. And I fear that, you
8	know, this stuff's already gone. So, the urgency
9	here for us in the preservation is we've got to act
10	now and please don't put it off another 3 years.
11	Because these floppies are now 20 years old. And
12	they're starting to go. And anecdotal it takes 6
13	floppies to find out that doesn't have a read error.
14	This comes out of the gaming community. So
15	anecdotal I think so that's the urgency.
16	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay.
17	MR. KAHLE: Does that help?
18	MS. DOUGLASS: Yes, it does. I was
19	looking at first effect.
20	MR. KAHLE: Okay. Then real issue that
21	a copy control or access control, what do I want
22	from the Copyright Office? If you think like

and ask some of the lawyers that advise us and these

librarians are conservative folks, and we are, go

guys, especially when the lawyers are working

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Τ	universities, they go and see endowment. Endowment
2	and they divide endowment by \$10,000 each potential
3	infringement, right. And the answer is often no.
4	We need things to be fairly
5	straightforward for us to be able to do our jobs.
6	And if there's murkiness, we're not a risk taking
7	group. But we're a little desperate at the moment
8	because we're seeing the stuff evaporate. But as a
9	group, Stanford you know so. That's the
10	what do I want from the Copyright Office?
11	I was told by our lawyers, these high
12	priced folks that are
13	MS. SELVAGGIO: This was pro bono.
14	MR. KAHLE: Yes. Another way of looking
15	at it, say thank you. Is tens of thousands of
16	dollars has been put forward by a number of
17	organizations, including these guys, to be able to
18	get here. I don't know how long we can sustain this.
19	I'm not sure how long the premier law firm in
20	Silicon Valley is going to do this stuff pro bono
21	for a library.
22	So we have to try to lighten things up a
23	little bit in terms of how hard this stuff is to do.
24	But what do we want? I'm told that even
25	if you guys don't say "Hey, that's copy protection,

you're just fine. Go nuts, go through it." That if
the first time that we think we're blowing an access
protection, and these things are designed to stop
access, we're liable. And no matter what you say.
I mean, it might help us. You know, Judge, here we
have Charlotte going and say, hey, we're kosher.
But that means we'll have to find that out in a
court of law. And just the threat of litigation on
this stuff is chilling. We just end up with people
spending a lot of time with lawyers. So what I'd
really like it to make it clear cut. And we're
attempting with this verbiage to be actually fairly
narrow. I realize that's a fighting term that you
sort of hit the ping back and say, "Oh it's broad,
it's narrow." The idea is to try to make it so it
doesn't cover DVDs and CDs and things. It's the
kind of stuff that's got software all wrapped into
it. And it's something that's kind of a nice aspect
of this, is it's so hard to do the job that we're
setting out to do, that it's not like any script
kitty is going to go off and blow access protections
and post stuff because of this DMCA exemption.
This is going to be adopted by
institutions that can employ the programmers.
Because we can't distribute, as I understand, the

1	things that we discover on how to circumvent access
2	protections. We have to employ these people within
3	our own organization and we have to then do it on
4	our own materials for in-house use of these
5	materials because of Section 108, because we can't
6	without agreement, have things available. And that's
7	a bunch of "ifs." And I think that that brings it
8	down to be, hopefully, narrow enough that you can
9	grant us if it's got a software access control that
10	we're allowed to circumvent that.
11	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. Thank you.
12	I'm sorry.
13	MR. KAHLE: That's what we want.
14	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay.
15	MR. KAHLE: Just to do our job.
16	MS. DOUGLASS: I have to make a little
17	bit clearer, however
18	MS. PETERS: Thank you.
19	MS. DOUGLASS: Oh, I'm sorry.
20	MR. ZIEMANN: There's something you may
21	not realize that takes this to the next step is that
22	in the interest of digital rights management, many
23	of the software companies are intentionally
24	attempting to make some things be obsolete. And an
25	example that I have right here is McIntosh tech

1	manual that my wife, who is a teacher, bought for
2	the purpose of keeping the computers at the school
3	running. But if you put this in a McIntosh, even
4	though it is McIntosh tech manuals that has OS/X in
5	it, it will not recognize that it even exists. But
6	if you go backwards to one previous operating
7	system, it works fine.
8	And so Apple has on its own for some
9	reason decided it doesn't want this particular CD to
10	play.
11	MS. DOUGLASS: On the new generation?
12	MR. ZIEMANN: Yes. OS/X. If I give this
13	to him and he puts it in his machine, it will not
14	see it. And I can say that without ever having
15	touched his machine.
16	MS. DOUGLASS: Well, there's an area of
17	108
18	MR. ZIEMANN: But is that copy
19	protection or is have they made new software that
20	prevents the access?
21	MS. DOUGLASS: Well, if it prevents
22	access the way it says access protection is defined
23	in 1201, then we'd have to say it's access
24	protection. But I don't think we've gotten to that
25	point yet.

1	But if I can go back just a little bit
2	to
3	MR. ZIEMANN: I just needed to make that
4	point.
5	MS. DOUGLASS: Mr. Kahle. You said
6	broad/narrow, broad/narrow, you know, potato/potato.
7	But it really does seem like we have a broad
8	category, I hate to say, if we're talking about all
9	literary works and all audiovisual works unless it's
10	paired down somewhat.
11	MR. KAHLE: That has software better
12	than software. There's a lot of materials that have
13	separate data from the software. CDs, DVDs, VCR
14	tapes. Those are not what we're talking about.
15	We're talking about this sort of it's the CD-ROM
16	generation, which I'm tragic report a major
17	manufacturer decided because of the copyright
18	vagaries, they decided to destroy their collection
19	of 10,000 CD-ROMs rather than donate it to the
20	library.
21	The stuff because it's not clear enough,
22	that's not 1201 issue, as I understand it. It is
23	we've got to make it easier. And you can help
24	greatly, but it's just for this complicated
25	multipiece computer dongles, game players, joy

1	stick, running over the Internet; all these sorts of
2	odd ball now becoming fairly massive cultural items,
3	those aspects of our cultural heritage are in
4	danger. And if there's someway of restricting it -
5	- that's what we're trying to do.
6	MS. DOUGLASS: I understand.
7	I think I have a question of Mr
8	well, Ms. Simons. With 2 Ms?
9	DR. SIMONS: One.
10	MS. DOUGLASS: Oh, okay. I'm sorry.
11	Okay. You note substantial negative impacts on
12	basic research, and you give a number of examples.
13	Are those actual examples or are they hypothetical
14	examples? And if they're hypothetical, do you have
15	any information about the likelihood of those
16	actually occurring?
17	DR. SIMONS: Well, the three quotes I
18	read to you were actual.
19	MS. DOUGLASS: The last the ones that
20	you read to us today?
21	DR. SIMONS: Yes.
22	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. I was thinking of
23	the ones in your statement.
24	DR. SIMONS: Those are hypothetical.
25	But they were mainly to illustrate the kinds of

the kinds of scenarios where you would like for people to be able to do something which they are prohibited from doing under the DMCA.

MS. DOUGLASS: I see. Thank you.

And I think I have one question for your, Mr. Metalitz. Actually, this question might have been answered, but you can just say asked and answered.

You say that this exemption if it was proved that -- I'm now talking about malfunctioning and dongles. Should be conditioned on meeting objective verifiable criteria. How can we do this? This is what Congress had in mind when it specified a class of works? In other words, how can we write all that in and we're really needing to talk about Congress says give us a class of works.

MR. METALITZ: I think you can do it consistent with the guidelines that you laid out in 2000, which dealt with a class of works but also made an effort to describe a certain type of access control that was being circumvented. My concern is that that description is too open ended. That, for example, it doesn't address the question of who determines whether is -- or by what criteria one determines that something is malfunctioning or

1	damaged. And then on the obsolete question, which				
2	may perhaps be more accurately unsupported, that				
3	also you had a cross reference in there to				
4	Section 108, but to me that indicates that you felt				
5	it was acceptable to limit the types of access				
6	controls that could be circumvented by reference to				
7	whether they were available in the marketplace.				
8	So, I guess my suggestion here I think				
9	is compatible with what you decided in 2000 and				
10	would simply provide greater clarity, greater				
11	definition if you determined that based on the				
12	evidence in this proceeding				
13	MS. DOUGLASS: Right.				
14	MR. METALITZ: that an exemption is				
15	necessary.				
16	MS. DOUGLASS: Thank you, Mr. Metalitz.				
17	MS. PETERS: Steve?				
18	MR. TEPP: Thank you.				
19	Dr. Simons, you had mentioned earlier				
20	your assertion or your belief that none of the				
21	exemptions to Section 1201 are sufficient to do what				
22	you and others in your organization want to do. I				
23	want to focus specifically on encryption research,				
24	and that 1201(g). And ask you if you can give us				
25	some specifics about what it is you want to do that				

you can't do under 1201(g)?

DR. SIMONS: All right. Well, just as a general philosophical comment, we were -- we got involved with the DMCA was being debated in Congress, but later in the show. By the time we found out about it, we were told that it was basically written in stone. Found out about it and got upset about the fact that there were no encryption research at all, and started -- and that's how we found out and started pushing for that. And we also talked about security, and I think we may have had something to do with the fact that there's a security exemption in there.

I should add that we don't lobby. We were raising the technical issues. We weren't saying how people should vote on the legislation.

But as a philosophical view of this as a computer scientist, I was watching this whole process as various carve outs were being discussed by Congress. And it made me quite uncomfortable because -- I mean, I started taking computer science in 1970. Things have changed a lot since my first programming course. And to try to make -- to try to say -- everything is illegal except for this and this and this means that there is probably going to

be other things that come along which you weren't thinking about when you said except for this, except for this. And that's, in fact, what has happened.

I truly believe that Congress did not intend to pass a law which would jeopardize computer security R&D in this country, but that's in fact what they have done.

Now, getting back to the encryption area. One of the problems here -- well, backtracking a little bit before I answer your question directly. Computer science and computing is still a new field. And there are a lot of people who are working in it in various levels. Some of them don't have credentials. Some of them are young kids who don't have credentials. Some of them who have barely graduated from high school, let alone -- so they have no credentials. But some of these kids are really sharp and they really understand these things. And you can imagine that in some cases they might break some sort of encryption scheme.

Now, someone that doesn't even have a college degree certainly doesn't qualify under these definitions. Because, as I understand it -- let's see, where is it? They talk about the person who does this and my understanding is that in general

it's supposed to someone who is an encryption person doing encryption research. I'm looking, trying to see if I can find this in real time.

So when Ed Felton, for example, was threatened under the DMCA, I mean he's pretty close — I mean, he's actually not an encryption researcher, he's a security guy. But you could say stuff — but he knows some encryption stuff. I mean, the very fact that somebody whose a Princeton professor was threatened has an incredibly chilling impact. And so then you go on down the line to this kid somewhere who maybe broke some weak encryption scheme and is he or she going to be considered an encryption researcher? I don't think so.

I mean, that's one of the concerns is that by saying what's -- by saying everything is disallowed except for such and such, and such you leave out a lot. And when you're talking about technology, in particular, you leave out a lot. And in fact, even when you're trying to define the technology I think you get into trouble.

Just going back to the beginning where - to 1201 where you they talk about effectively
circumventing, what does "effective" mean? I had a
lot of trouble with that phrase "effectively

1 circumventing." To me it doesn't take into account 2 whatsoever how strong something is, how good something is, how hard it is to break. I don't know, 3 4 for example, if somebody had an encryption scheme that was what I call a "cereal box" encryption 5 6 scheme where you replace one letter by another. Do 7 you remember? I don't know if you remember those. 8 I'm old enough to remember those. 9 Decoder ring. MR. KAHLE: Now, one of the 10 Yes. DR. SIMONS: 11 reasons that this was a challenge to kids is that it 12 was pretty easy to break, right? Now, if somebody produced a document which was protected by such a 13 14 scheme and somebody else showed the key, is that in 15 violation of the DMCA? I honestly don't know. 16 And I think when you get to that level 17 of uncertainty, it has an incredibly chilling effect. 18 19 Now, I know it's not up to you to change 20 the way this law was written, so I'm really just 21 sort of ranking, I suppose, about the kinds of issues that we've been confronted with. And to the 22 23 extent that you could help us by broadening these 24 exceptions or making them as all encompassing as

possible, that would be very useful.

1	I mean, I still think there's a			
2	fundamental flaw. Instead of saying we want to			
3	outlaw infringing behavior, we're saying we are			
4	outlawing technologies except. And when you get to			
5	those excepts when you're dealing with technologies,			
6	you run into trouble.			
7	I'm not sure if I've answered your			
8	question.			
9	MR. TEPP: Well, you have and you've			
10	actually provided a good seque to my next question.			
11	DR. SIMONS: Okay. Good.			
12	MR. TEPP: Because I think what you said			
13	is fair, that some of your concerns appear to go			
14	beyond the scope of what this rulemaking is.			
15	DR. SIMONS: I understand, yes.			
16	MR. TEPP: And certainly have respect			
17	for your views, and they're important issues, but in			
18	trying to focus on exactly what			
19	DR. SIMONS: Of course.			
20	MR. TEPP: Congress has instructed us			
21	to do, when I heard your three examples that you			
22	described in your opening statement they were all			
23	concerned with distributing the results of research,			
24	sending out papers, giving lectures, that sort of			
25	thing. That struck me as not something that falls			

within the act of circumvention, 1201(a)(1), which is what this rulemaking is about, but more likely into 1201(a)(2). And I wanted to give you the chance to tell me I'm wrong. And if so, why. Or if not, tell me exactly what it is within 1201(a)(1) that this rulemaking is about that you're asking of us and why.

DR. SIMONS: Well, people said they're not doing research anymore in these areas? That's 1201(a)(1). The doing of the research is 1201(1)(1). Now, it's true that I think most scientists like to have their work known and acknowledged, and even praised when possible. And so -- and there's definitely a lot of ego in what people do and that's why they do want to publish. But the fact is that the actual work is not being done. And as a result, the systems and all the software that should be being tested is not being tested.

I mean, you can imagine for example a scenario in which somebody did the 1201(a)(1) type of work and discovered some sort of major flaw.

Now, the dissemination of that information might be illegal under another part of the DMCA. But the fact that there's a flaw, saying that there's a flaw

not be illegal, right? I mean to simply say that there is a flaw without explaining what it is should be, as I understand it, legal. So if -- you know, to the extent that we all want to make our computer infrastructure, the whole information infrastructure more secure and to the extent that we want to encourage people to testings for vulnerabilities and to expose problems and to warn people of problems, then I think that it is relevant.

I mean, I also would like to see more broadening of the exemptions. But even being able to warn people that there are problems, I think would fall into this. And I think in the case of the people who wrote me, that their frustration comes — is related to that. Because as scientists they assume, of course, it's not sufficient to someone, you've got to prove it. But there's this middle step of warning which is also not available to us now.

Is that answering --

MR. TEPP: Well, it's another step towards what I'm looking for. What you're describing is a set of people who are fairly well known in the field, so that's not a problem at least for this part of the discussion. And they find

1	something. Oh, my gosh, there's something terribly			
2	wrong. And I don't disagree with your analysis that			
3	they could say I found a flaw. When they say what it			
4	is, that's a different question.			
5	DR. SIMONS: So.			
6	MR. TEPP: So they say, you know, the			
7	hypothetical is a well-known researcher does the			
8	research, finds the flaw, announces that they found			
9	a flaw. The proprietor of the software involved is			
10	informed. He says oh my gosh, thank you so much.			
11	And the flaw is fixed.			
12	DR. SIMONS: Yes.			
13	MR. TEPP: That sounds like it probably			
14	could fall into a 1201(g) situation. Well, it seems			
15	like that could. DO you think			
16	DR. SIMONS: Well, (g) is encryption,			
17	right? I mean, there are all kinds of other flaws			
18	that have nothing to do with encryption.			
19	MR. TEPP: Okay. So that is what			
20	what are you asking us for? That's what I'm trying			
21	to get to.			
22	DR. SIMONS: What am I asking you for?			
23	Well, this is where I could use I would like to			
24	have you.			
25	I quess what I'm saving is that we need			

whatever help you can provide us to make it easier for us to do our jobs, to make it easier for the computer security and encryption communities to do what they had been doing before the DMCA was passed. To make sure that people -- that researchers at UC Berkeley, for example, don't have to spend more time talking to lawyers than doing the actual research.

I don't know how you can do that. I was hoping that I would come and show you the problems and you would tell me how you could do it. But that's, I'm sure, not appropriate.

As an example, Sun -- just to give you an example of what I think is a good kind of situation.

Sun Microsystems has a policy where if people find flaws in their software, they give them \$100 or something. And they encourage. And they figure that that makes their software more secure. That's a very enlightened position and it means that people can go and do reverse engineering of various aspects of Sun software and not have to worry about being dragged into court. But other companies don't necessarily have that approach. And as a result, I think, sometimes their software is less secure because they don't get this positive input from the

community. By the way, many of whom are not computer scientists with a capital C capital S.

So I don't know to what extent you have the ability to even go back to Congress and make suggestions to them as to things that could be changed or should be changed. But we have a real problem.

I'll just tell you a little anecdotal story. I was on the Hill last year with a couple of people from -- the two people who are in our office, the USACM office. And we went into a cafeteria in the House for a snack. And the tables were occupied so we asked this woman if we could sit next to her, and she said yes.

And we started talking. She was there to lobby for some sort of medical thing. But we were talking. It turned out she was involved with the committees that were doing the negotiations on the DMCA, like I think between the House and Senate, you know, when they were doing the negotiations. And I suddenly had this insight. I said "Did they delay the implementation of the anticircumvention and anti-dissemination provisions until 2000 because of the Y2K problem?" And she said yes.

I didn't get her name. I'm kicking

1	myself. I did have witnesses, but that was what she			
2	said. That they knew about Y2K. And either the			
3	people who knew about it thought that this was a			
4	unique problem that would never reoccur, or they			
5	didn't care.			
6	I'd like to think that they thought it			
7	was unique, but we as computer scientists know that			
8	it's far from unique and that these kinds of			
9	problems are constantly reoccurring. And to the			
10	extent that you cannot do some of the sorts of			
11	reverse engineering and circumvention that was done			
12	to solve the Y2K problem because of the DMCA, we are			
13	at greater risk.			
14	And probably didn't answer your			
4 -				
15	question. I'm sorry.			
16	question. I'm sorry.  MR. TEPP: Well, we're not computer			
16	MR. TEPP: Well, we're not computer			
16 17	MR. TEPP: Well, we're not computer scientists even with a small C and small S. And so			
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16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. TEPP: Well, we're not computer scientists even with a small C and small S. And so given that there is a burden that has to be met in order to demonstrate a need for any new exception that we're being asked to recommend to the Librarian, it makes our job nearly impossible if the proponents of the exceptions can't articulate an			

1	MR. KAHLE: Would it be acceptable if				
2	the ACM were to submit within one week potential				
3	3 days 2 days.				
4	MR. CARSON: It's too late, folks.				
5	We're way past the point of proposing exemptions.				
6	But you've got one in writing. It's in front of us.				
7	DR. SIMONS: I beg your pardon?				
8	MR. CARSON: You've proposed an				
9	exemption to us in writing. It is in front of us.				
10	DR. SIMONS: Yes.				
11	MS. PETERS: We need to actually end				
12	this panel. We're way past.				
13	We have to be out of this room at 5:00.				
14	That's a given. So we're going to take a 45 minute				
15	break and we'll start again at 2:15. Thank you.				
16	(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m. the meeting was				
17	adjourned until 2:15 p.m.)				
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					

## A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N

2:20 p.m.

MS. PETERS: The panel is here, and since all the witnesses are here, let's start. This afternoon we're going to be focusing on sound recordings and musical works that are on copyprotected CD's. And the witnesses are from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Gwen Hinze, and Ren Bucholz, and from IP Justice, Robin Gross. And then the other side, Steve Marks from the Recording Industry Association of America, and Mark Belinsky, Macrovision.

So let's start with EFF, however you want to divide it up between you.

MS. HINZE: On behalf of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing in support of the exemption the EFF has proposed.

My name is Gwen Hinze, I am a staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation and I'm here today assisted by Ren Bucholz, our staff activist.

EFF has requested an exemption for sound recordings released on audio CD's that are protected

by technological protection measures that malfunction, so as to prevent access on certain playback devices.

The proposed exemption would allow consumers to play music that they have legitimately acquired without fear of legal liability under Section 1201. The exemption is effectively identical in scope to the second exemption that was granted by the Librarian in 2000 for literary works that are subject to access control measures that prevent access due to malfunction, or damage or obsolescence.

The idiosyncratic and varying nature of the reported malfunctions of various copy-protected CD's, working on some PC's and not other operating systems, suggests that these copy control technological protection measures were intended to prevent unauthorized reproduction but were not designed to prevent playback of music.

However, irrespective of the intent of these measures, the practical effect of these malfunctioning copy protection controls has been to prevent consumers from accessing protected music.

The inability to access or play the music is due to a technological protection measure

1	failing to work in the way that it was intended to
2	work.
3	MS. DOUGLASS: I must ask that you try
4	to speak up a little. I can see people are moving
5	forward in the back.
6	MS. HINZE: Thank you, thank you. EFF
7	is seeking a narrow exemption that would permit
8	consumers to take the steps necessary to play music
9	that they have legitimately purchased on the
10	consumer playback devices they own. This is clearly
11	a non-infringing use. Playback is a private
12	performance and does not implicate any of the
13	exclusive rights granted to copyright owners under
14	Section 106 of the Copyright statute.
15	The proposed exemption that we are
16	seeking is narrow. It is limited to restoring
17	playability and would not authorize copying of
18	affected music.
19	I'd like to spend the bulk of my opening
20	statement addressing some of the points that are
21	being made in opposition to our exemption by,
22	amongst other people, the Joint Commenters,
23	represented this afternoon by Mr. Marks.
24	In the Joint Reply Comments filed with
25	the Copyright Office, the Recording Industry

Association of America, and the various other commenters, have opposed this exemption on three main grounds.

First, they have argued that the proposed exemption is outside the scope of this rulemaking process because the copy protection technology at issue is not a technological protection measure that effectively controls access to a protected work under Title 17 for the purposes of Section 1201(a)(1) and as per the discussion this morning, 1201(a)(3)(B)of the copyright statute.

in the comments filed in December 2002, based on the information that we had that is publicly available about the nature and the operation of these measures it does not appear that they require application of information, a process, or a treatment with the authority of a copyright owner to play when they play.

And when they don't play, it doesn't appear to be a matter of a failure to apply a particular process information or treatment in order to make that malfunction correct. The blocking of access here is due to the malfunctioning copy protection controls, and it appears to be

unintentional.

However, as demonstrated by the legal debate over the status of the content scramble system in relation to DVD's over the last five years, a technological protection measure can control both access to, and use or copying of a protected work.

There is uncertainty within the legal community as to whether malfunctioning copy control technological protection measures that inadvertently prevent playback of CD content should be characterized as effective access control measures for the purposes of Section 1201(a)(3)(B). The legal uncertainty here is exacerbated by the lack of public information on exactly how these technologies work.

In the meantime, however, consumers are, if they find that they have purchased copy protection CD's that do not play in their playback devices, are left in a legal no-man's-land. Whether or not a malfunctioning copy protection measure is deemed to fall within the technical definition of "effectively controlling access" in Section 1201(a)(3)(B), the end result is exactly the same for consumers.

1 Where the copy protection technology 2 malfunctions, it often blocks access completely and consumers are simply unable to play music that they 3 4 have lawfully acquired. 5 However, given the doubt that surrounds 6 the scope of the prohibition in Section 1201(a)(1), 7 consumers can't be sure whether they're breaking the 8 law and potentially putting themselves at risk of 9 significant legal liability legally if they try to circumvent the malfunctioning copy protection 10 11 technology to make the CD play. 12 If the Register were to clarify in its rulemaking that malfunctioning copy controls are not 13 14 access controls for the purposes of Section 1201, 15 then EFF agrees that the proposed exemption would 16 not be required. 17 However, in the absence of a clear 18 statement about the scope of Section 1201, or an 19 exemption, there's no guidance for consumers or 20 predictability as to what behavior is lawful when 21 they're trying to make a very common non-infringing 22 use of music they've purchased. 23 There is, in addition, a flow-on effect, 24 a consequent chilling effect on manufacturers and

software vendors who might otherwise develop devices

or software drivers, for current drives, and current CD ROM and DVD players that would be capable of playing these non-redbook audio CD's. For instance, in the absence of a clear statement or a clear exemption, Apple may be less inclined to release a software update that would permit Macintosh (Mac.) users, a particularly affected group, to play these types of disks on their computer CD ROM drives.

The second main argument that our opponents have made is that EFF has not met its burden of proof on these issues. It hasn't met the burden of showing harm amounting to a substantial adverse impact. In particular, the Joint Commenters complain that we have not provided evidence of the number of copy-protected CD's currently in circulation in the United States, and evidence as to the frequency of actual failures of these disks on particular types of devices. I have several comments in response.

First, it is not clear at all what is necessary to meet the standard of proof of substantial adverse impact for this category.

However, EFF does not agree with the joint commenters' assertion that this requires us to provide exhaustive figures for the number of copy-

1 protected CD's released in the United States and the 2 failure rate of that technology in particular 3 devices. 4 If the Copyright Register and the 5 Librarian were to endorse that standard as the 6 standard for substantial adverse impact, we believe 7 it would raise serious issues about the equity of this proceeding and the ability of consumers to 8 9 participate meaningfully in this process. It would 10 certainly threaten to undermine Congress' intent to create a fail-safe mechanism for consumers non-11 12 infringing uses. The reason I say this is for these 13 14 reasons: First of all, consumers' experience of 15 identifying a copy-protected CD is much like playing a game of battleship. 16 17 Since copy-protected CD's are often not 18 labeled, consumers do not know whether any CD they 19 purchase is copy-protected or not until they insert 20 it into their computer CD ROM drive or their car CD 21 MP3 player, or their DVD player, and then experience 22 a malfunction. 23 In this case, in this present exemption, 24 the only parties in a position to obtain 25 comprehensive information as to the number of copyprotected CD's that have been released in the United States are those opposing the exemption, including the RIAA and its member record labels.

However, they have chosen not to disclose that information in response to the information that EFF has provided even though it could presumably be used to prove that the exemption is unwarranted, if the number of copy-protected CD's actually in circulation is de minimis, as they have suggested.

It's also difficult to provide information as to the frequency and type of malfunction of these copy protection measures on particular types of devices. As the 48 consumer comments that were filed with the Copyright Office in this proceeding illustrate, the range of failures that people experience vary dramatically. In some cases, people are able to play one particular song for a small segment, or not play anything at all. In some cases, people experience a complete operating system crash. It happened to my colleague and has been reported to be the case in a number of the comments filed in this proceeding.

Given the variation amongst the different types of responses, and the fact that it

189 1 seems to be a matter of operating system by operating system, drive by drive, it's a very 2 difficult thing to predict or to qualitatively 3 4 assess what the frequency or type of failure is. 5 More importantly, EFF considers that the 6 information that's currently on the record is 7 sufficient to establish current substantial adverse 8 impact. 9 At a qualitative level, there is a 10 substantial adverse impact on the consumer. 11 Consumers use is non-infringing use of lawfully 12 acquired material when copy protection technology malfunctions, and they are entirely prevented from 13 14 playing back something they've lawfully acquired. 15 The nature of the harm experienced here is absolute 16 if there is no playback. It's not merely an 17 inconvenience. The customer receives nothing, no 18 benefit for their bargain. 19 Qualitatively speaking, evidence on the 20 record indicates that a number of copy-protected 21 CD's have currently been released in the United 22

EFF identified titles of four copyprotected CD's that had been verified as copyprotected in our December 2002 comments. However, based on news reports and consumers' experiences,

23

24

the actual number of affected titles may be much higher.

News reports indicate that covert trials of unlabeled copy-protected CD's have been taking place in the United States since 2001. My colleague, Ren, is currently showing a slide with excerpts from these news reports.

In July 2001, rovision reportedly made a test release in the United States, including one title that had sold almost 100,000 units. This followed a report in May 2001, which quoted Mark Tokayer, the CEO of Macrovision partner, TTR Audio, as stating that Macrovision and a major or several major record labels had released copy-protected CD's in California. In February 2002, technology company Midbas, which is now owned by Macrovision, announced that it had released 10 million CD's in the United States and Europe. And last month, Macrovision announced its technology had been used on over 100 million CD's worldwide, including in the United States.

The record industry has officially acknowledged the existence of two copy-protected CD's in the U.S. market. Yet we know from firsthand experience that this is incomplete. One of EFF's

staffers purchased a CD by the group The Donnas, only to discover that it was copy-protected.

This disk has not been acknowledged by

Atlantic Records as being copy-protected, but if you look very, very closely, you can see a tiny, tiny, tiny logo down at the bottom here, which appears to be a copy protection logo. It's on the actual packaging, not on the disk itself.

The disk itself actually says that it will play on various computer formats, including Mac. OS players. In point of fact, it wasn't able to be played at all on the Mac. OS drive in question, which is why this EFF staffer worked out that it was copy-protected and found the logo.

This seems to match the experience of hundreds of consumers in online fora who have identified what appear to be copy-protected CD's that have experienced and identified these as being CD's who are not capable of playing on various devices.

It's fair to assume that these experiences and those of the 48 consumer commenters who filed comments in this proceeding indicate that the number of copy-protected CD's in the U.S. market may actually be much higher than has been officially

acknowledged by the record industry, and that the number of these disks will increase in the next three years.

The increasing copy volumes-- increasing volumes of copy-protected releases will have a substantial and adverse impact on consumers' ability to make non-infringing uses of their works within the next three years.

First, record label and technology company statements indicate that there are a significant number of copy-protected CD's that will be released in the United States this year.

Second, because of the move towards more modern, multi-format disk players as primary playback devices, such as DVD's/MP3's/CDR's.

Combined and X-Box game consoles. Combined multi-format playback devices of these types have much more vulnerability to the current copy protection technologies because the technologies appear to work by exploiting differences between audio CD players and these types of multi-format players as discussed in the report that is cited in EFF's December 2002 comments, a research paper by Princeton researcher, John Alexander Halderman. And as I said, the comments point out there has been a distinct move by

1 consumers to adopt multi-format playback devices 2 such as combined DVD and MP3/CD players. reported last year that sales of standalone regular 3 4 CD players were down 48.1% last year. 5 Ren is showing slides with excerpts from 6 news reports about the expected influx of millions 7 of copy-protected CD's into the U.S. market in coming months. 8 9 In late March 2003, news reports 10 indicated that the BMG subsidiary, Arista Records, 11 would be releasing SunnComm copy-protected CD's in 12 the United States later this year. In November 2002 the L.A. Times reported 13 14 EMI Recorded Music Vice President, David Munns, as 15 saying that the 2002 holiday season would be, as you 16 can see, would be the last holiday season without 17 widespread use of copy protection technology on new 18 releases. 19 And technology company SunnComm has 20 stated that it has already installed anti-copying 21 gear in a Bertlesmann subsidiary, North Carolina CD 22 manufacturing plant, and that a sizable proportion 23 of this subsidiary's releases will be copy-protected 24 by the end of 2003.

The third main argument made by our

1 opponents is that this exemption is premised on an 2 incorrect assumption that consumers are entitled to 3 play copy-protected music on any device capable of 4 using CD's as a data storage format. 5 On page 19 of the joint comments, our 6 opponents have argued that "neither the Copyright 7 Act nor the DMCA was ever intended to require or to 8 confer upon uses a right of complete compatibility amongst all devices in our media." That was a quote 9 10 from those comments. 11 They then claim/that the existence of 12 playback devices that can play copy-protected music 13 removes any need for this exemption. I'd like to 14 make several comments in response to that. 15 First, I'd like to emphasize that the 16 nature of the exemption sought here is for noninfringing use of lawfully -- of playing lawfully 17 18 acquired sound recordings. Private performance is 19 not one of the rights given to copyright holders 20 under Section 106 of the Copyright Act. 21 Our opponent's argument about 22 compatibility proceeds on the assumption that 23 copyright owners are entitled to control playback of 24 a copyrighted work an or user's playback device.

However, there's nothing in the

legislative history of the DMCA that indicates that Congress intended to grant additional rights to copyright owners beyond those listed in Section 106.

EFF would submit that any opposition to this exemption, which is premised incorrectly on copyright owners. Claim to control rights beyond those listed in Section 106, should be treated with caution.

The Second, contrary to our opponent's claim, what is sought here is not a right of complete compatibility for all devices in all media. Instead, the requested exemption would allow consumers to make a non-infringing use of media they've lawfully acquired on devices they currently own and that they would reasonably expect would be able to play that media based on 15 years' experience — of over 15 years' experience of the audio CD format. After all, what we're talking about here is consumers putting CD's into devices that have previously played CD's, not putting them into toasters.

It's certainly true that Congress did not intend to mandate manufacturers to design devices to detect and respond to technological protection measures that were implemented by

copyright owners. That's reflected in § 1201(c)(3).

However, nothing in the Congressional Record indicates that Congress intended to grant copyright owners the right to control consumers' non-infringing private performance of lawfully acquired content on devices they already own. The existence of some players that can play these disks is not a sufficient reason for deciding to grant this exemption.

Consumers seeking to make non-infringing uses of works they've lawfully acquired should not be put to the expense of having to purchase an additional player to play protected music. And as I previously noted, the stock of players which can actually play these types of disks is diminishing as consumers are moving towards more modern multiformat players, DVD's/MP3's/CD's players; X-Box game consoles.

Therefore the existence of alternative players that consumers can currently purchase, but may not be able to easily acquire in three years' time, as these devices are phased out, doesn't protect consumers' ability to make non-infringing uses of these works within the next three-year

period.

Finally, in considering the balance of harms involved in granting this exception, I'd like to emphasize that the exemption does not increase the risk of widespread copyright infringement.

First, the exemption is limited to noninfringing playback of protected music. Second, as
Section 1201(a)(1)(D) makes clear, any exemption
that is granted by the Librarian of Congress extends
only to non-infringing behavior. The exemption
would allow consumers to take steps to restore
playability, but would not authorize otherwise
infringing reproduction. If any consumer were to
step beyond the bounds of the exemption, and, for
instance, make an unauthorized reproduction on
distribution of a work on a protected music CD,
copyright owners would continue to have the right to
bring an action for infringement, and would continue
to have the full set of rights currently available
to them under Copyright law.

Finally, I'd just like to address one point that was made in the comments of Mr. Metalitz this morning, when he provided his summary of the factors that the Copyright Office had to take into account. He suggested that in the context of the

Copyright Office's mission, the Copyright Office had to consider the availability for use of works in the class, as identified, and he made a statement to the effect that we have a digital cornucopia of it, if you look at the situation in 2003 as compared to the situation in 2000.

We have a rich variety, more works, more different types of works available. And that this is primarily due to the use of technological protection measures backed by the legal sanctions of Section 1201.

I'd just like to comment on that in relation to this particular class of CD's and note that -- sound recordings, and note that that's just not true with music. Music has been around in many formats for many years, and the availability of music does not actually have anything to do with the technological protection measures that have only started to be used on what look like CD's in the last two years.

In fact, the music format that we know as the CD has been around in existence for over 15 years. And so, to the extent that the Copyright

Office wants to take into account the consideration about the user facilitation or the availability or

1 facilitation of any particular technological 2 protection measures, I would urge the Copyright Office to take into account that that is not 3 4 actually accurate, or not an appropriate factor for 5 consideration in respect of this class of works. 6 Thank you. 7 MS. PETERS: Miss Gross? 8 MS. GROSS: Good afternoon. IP Justice 9 welcomes this opportunity to testify to the US 10 copyright on this about the adverse impacts users 11 are experiencing in their ability to enjoy CD's and other sound recordings in non-infringing ways. 12 cause of this adverse impact is the technological 13 14 restriction measures currently being applied, with 15 increasing regularity, to CD's by the record 16 industry. 17 The magnitude of this harm warrants the 18 declaration by the U.S. Copyright Office that the 19 exemptions proposed by IP Justice in its submitted 20 comments. Before speaking to the substantive 21 reasons for our proposed exemptions, IP Justice 22 wishes to highlight four important procedural issues

First, the Librarians' responsibility in this rule-making is to users and not copyright

in relation to this rulemaking.

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owners. In the first rulemaking in 2000, the Librarian gave undue deference to the interests of copyright owners. By doing so, the Librarian duplicated Congress's deference to the interest of copyright owners when Congress first enacted the anti-circumvention measures in 1998.

The role of the Copyright Office in this proceeding is not to determine that technological restrictions benefit the public, but to look for ways in which the public is harmed by them, and act to preserve the public's rights under traditional copyright.

Congress introduced the anticircumvention measures to encourage copyright owners
to make their works available digitally. Or in the
words of the last rulemaking, "The measures are
designed to be use facilitating." The
responsibility of the Librarian in this rulemaking
is not to repeat Congress's analysis, but to protect
users and ensure access, not availability of
protected works such as CD's.

Second, the structure of this rulemaking, as interpreted by the Librarian, effectively precludes it from achieving its purpose.

The Librarian insists that exemptions be defined

according to class of work. Adequate protection of users' rights requires that exemptions be drafted with reference to the type of user and circumstances of use.

at home, they're not infringing the copyright owners' public performance right. But when they play the CD in a discotheque, they might be. As scholars and civil libertarians have noted, architecture is policy and the structure of this proceeding makes it extremely difficult to obtain consumer protections.

Third, the Librarian has set an impossibly high evidentiary standard, given the nature of the harm it is supposed to protect against. The Librarian requires evidence of substantial harm or likelihood of harm but without any guidance as to how to meet these thresholds.

The adverse effects experienced by users are likely, of their very nature, to be individual, and personal, difficult to measure and quantify.

This does not detract from the existence of such harm. It does mean that the Librarian should accept, as sufficient evidence, news reports and principal analysis of likely harm which take into

account the interaction of the anti-circumvention measures with the limitations and exceptions for users, under traditional copyright principles.

Fourth, IP Justice urges the Copyright

Office to be mindful in conducting this second

rulemaking of two important facts. Firstly, the

first rulemaking was conducted when the prohibition

on access circumvention had not yet taken effect.

Three years later, the trend of digital lock-up is

more apparent. Thus, the extent of the impact on

users must be greater because the anti-circumvention

measures are broader than copyright.

The second important factor is that the impact of any exemption will necessarily be limited. This is something which the Librarian failed to take in account in the first rulemaking. Acts of circumvention and access controls are, by their nature, inherently non-commercial and personal. Anyone who seeks to take advantage of an exempted act of access circumvention, must be highly, technically, literate.

Even where exemptions to the general ban are granted, a person still cannot acquire a circumvention device or service from a third party nor make it available to someone else because to do

1 so would infringe the anti-trafficking prohibitions 2 of Section 1201. This means that only a limited 3 number of people are likely to be able to avail 4 themselves of any exemptions. Thus the impact on 5 the copyright owner of any exemption will be 6 substantially limited. 7 Turning now to our substantive comments in support of our proposed exemptions for copy-8 9 protected CD and other sound recordings, IP Justice would like to make two comments. 10 11 First, CD copy protection often serves 12 functionally also, as access restriction technology. The technology restricts the ability of users to 13 14 play a CD in certain types of technology, for 15 example, a PC. This is a clear interference with 16 access but CD owners are forbidden from bypassing 17 the access control technology. 18 Users are unable to simply enjoy a CD in 19 the privacy of their own home, office, or car, on 20 the platform of their choosing. Instead, the 21 copyright owner dictates the user's personal 22 experience of music, something well beyond the ambit 23 of Section 106 in the copyright act. 24 The focus on Section 106 is on public

uses of music and intellectual property.

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That which

falls outside of the public sphere, the private enjoyment of music, should likewise fall outside the reach of the copyright owner's control. CD copy protection permits copyright owners to usurp the user's private performance right through the use of these technological access controls that double as use in copy controls.

The DMCA distinguishes between circumventing access controls and circumventing copy controls. It allows circumvention of copy controls in order to engage in fair use.

In passing the DMCA, Congress clearly intended the public to continue to enjoy their right to circumvent copy controls on sound recordings for lawful purposes.

So while in theory, consumers continue to enjoy their right to circumvent copy controls to make fair use or to engage in other lawful uses of sound recordings, the law still forbids bypassing access technology. And since it's not possible to bypass the copy controls without also bypassing access controls with these dual use technologies, consumers are prevented from exercising the right to bypass the copy controls on sound recordings in order to make the lawful use of their music.

1	Secondly, CD copy protection chills
2	innovative personal uses of music. Digital
3	technology empowers people to access their music
4	collection in unprecedented new ways without being a
5	pirate. Purchasers of CD's can space shift or play
6	shift their music from one device to another, for
7	example, to their MP3 player, to go jogging or their
8	home or their car office.
9	CD copy protection technology prevents
10	this from occurring. It treats all users as
11	copyright infringers. The trend of legitimate music
12	purchasers being unable to access copy-protected
13	CD's is well established and will only continue.
14	Surely, the hundreds of comments
15	supplied by individuals complaining of this
16	surreptitious practice during these proceedings
17	established this substantial harm.
18	IP Justice urges the Copyright Office,
19	mindful of the limitations of this rulemaking and
20	its duty to users, to declare proposed exemptions,
21	enabling the lawful enjoyment of music and restoring
22	consumer freedoms. Thank you.
23	MS. PETERS: Thank you. Mr. Marks?
24	MR. MARKS: Good afternoon. My name is
25	Steven Marks and I'm senior vice president of

Business and Legal Affairs for the Recording 1 2 Industry Association of America. Thank you for the opportunity today to present the views of the RIAA 3 4 concerning the exemptions that have been proposed by 5 EFF, Public Knowledge, and IP Justice. 6 The proponents case for these exemptions 7 boils down to complaints of a few people that appear 8 to stem from technical incompatibilities, not access controls, relating to a very few number of sound 9 10 recordings. These complaints do not support the 11 exemption that they request. The proponents 12 themselves admit that their complaints are not based 13 14 on technical protection measures that are access 15 controls, thereby taking their claims outside the 16 scope of this proceeding. 17 The proponents have failed to present sufficient evidence to support an exemption, even 18 19 under the most lenient of evidentiary burdens, let 20 alone the extraordinary circumstances that are 21 required here. And the proposed exemption is 22 overbroad.

> But before addressing these in detail, let me first say a few words about the use of technical protection measures by record companies.

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1 Record companies are focused on 2 providing access to their music in as many ways as 3 possible. They are in the business of selling 4 music, regardless of platform or delivery channel, 5 and are making music available in more formats than 6 ever before. Record companies would like to do 7 this in a way that is not susceptible to easy 8 copying and widespread distribution of further 9 copies.

In light of the piracy that has devastated the industry in recent years, through cutbacks in artist rosters, lay-offs, retail store closings, some would say that CD copy controls are necessary to ensure that the industry continue to invest in new artists and continue to bring music to consumers. This is consistent with Congressional intent of the DMCA, to encourage copyright owners to continue to invest in creative works.

Record companies understand, however, that success depends upon their ability to make consumers happy and to distribute recordings widely. They realize that locking up content is not a solution.

CD copy protection technology is evolving quickly and one can only speculate how

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1 market forces and technological developments will 2 affect the actual application of technical 3 protection measures to CD's. 4 The register of the Librarian should 5 not, on the basis of this speculation, grant an 6 exemption that would deter innovation and thwart 7 efforts to control piracy, but should instead allow the marketplace to work for the coming triennial 8 9 period. 10 Let me go through the individual reasons 11 why the -- substantively, why the exemptions should 12 be denied. The first is that the proponents simply failed to state a claim for an exemption. 13 14 complaint, EFF's complaint, for example, is about 15 the purported malfunction of copy controls, not 16 access controls. 17 Indeed, EFF states that it does not 18 believe that the technology that is the subject of 19 the proposed exemption, quote, "effectively controls 20 access to a work." Having denied an element of the 21 case it is required to prove, EFF's claim should be 22 rejected. 23 EFF proposes an exemption for copy-24 protected CD's that malfunction to prevent access, 25 but the malfunction of a copy control does not

convert it to an access control. Moreover, EFF has presented no evidence that the copy control indeed malfunctioned.

IP Justice has requested an exemption

for copying to different platforms or different devices. Aside from the fact that there is no right of access on all devices, as I will explain a little bit later, this proposed exemption is again about copying, not access, and therefore is outside the scope of the proceeding.

The proponents have also failed to identify the technologies with particularity, and to establish that they have had or are likely to have substantial adverse effects on use of a properly defined class of works. Instead, they have asked for an exceptionally broad exemption, covering an entire category of works identified in Section 102A of the copyright act. They have also improperly included a broad swath of diverse technical protection measures.

The Librarian should resist this invitation to extrapolate alleged problems with some technologies to all current and future technologies.

The proponent's exemption is also misguided in that it is predicated on the assumption

that users, or consumers, have an unqualified right to access works on any device of their choosing.

The Copyright Office has found that no such right exists, and that diminimus or isolated problems or mere inconveniences do not justify an exemption.

There is nothing in the DMCA or the fair use doctrine that's intended to ensure access to every work in every format.

Ensuring access on every device is simply not the purpose of this rulemaking, either. The ability to make non-infringing uses, even if not in the preferred or optimal format, is sufficient to satisfy the statutory factor of the availability for use of copyrighted works.

Let me take a minute to talk about the evidence itself, of adverse effect, that has been presented by the proponents. They have failed both to meet their burden that today there is an adverse impact or that there is likely to be one in the future. Focusing on the present, there have been 125,000 albums released in the last three years. 125,000, and only nine have been released in the U.S. that have technical protection measures.

Seven of those were by Universal Music Group, all of them were prominently labeled. There

1 were toll free customer help telephone numbers and 2 web sites. And the complaints of those CD's, according to Universal, were from less than one 3 4 tenth of one percent of the CD's that were sold. 5 This is generally consistent with complaints about CD's that are released that have no technical 6 protection measures. 7 8 So that's seven of the nine. Another one was by Music City Records. 9 The tracks on that 10 CD were made available for downloading. 11 And then the final one was by a company 12 called Metropolis. There the CD was imported from Germany, was not a U.S. release. It was an import 13 14 from Germany. And subsequently, Metropolis made a 15 U.S. release without the technical protection 16 measures. 17 The reply comments identify 45 titles in those comments. Of these 45, 28 were not released 18 19 in the U.S. with copy or access controls. 20 not even CD's. Five were foreign releases. 21 were two vague for us to gather evidence to 22 determine which category they might fall in, and 23 only three of them contained any kind of technical 24 protection measure.

The complaints appear to simply be the

result of technical incompatibilities. Despite the sophistication of CD technology, not every disk will play in every machine. That may be regrettable, but it's certainly not the basis for an exemption pursuant to this proceeding.

The proponent's have not alleged the problems complained of were even commonplace for those CD's. As mentioned on some of the ones that were sold by Universal, the complaints were less than one tenth of one percent. The incompatibilities or the defects could be from defects in manufacturing, which are clearly not the basis of an exemption. And there's generally no evidence that's been presented that the problems with any of these CD's is any greater than on CD's generally, without any such technical protection measures.

The proponent's have also failed to establish that there is likely to be a substantial adverse effect on non-infringing uses. An exemption based on anticipated adverse impact can be only in extraordinary circumstances, where the evidence supporting the exemptions highly specific, strong, and persuasive.

They have failed to establish that

1 adverse impacts are more likely than not. Speculation, conjecture about new releases, are 2 simply inefficient. 3 4 For example, EFF stated that no record 5 company had renounced technical protection measures. 6 They have presented quotes today, but it is 7 speculation that any of the technologies that may be 8 used -- and we don't know what technologies will be used -- how those technologies will work at all. 9 10 And again, those were based on copy controls, not 11 access controls, all of the statements. 12 Finally, the speculative allegations of harm are vastly outweighed by the harm that would 13 14 result from the exemption. The recording industry 15 has been devastated by piracy, which has and will 16 increasingly have an adverse effect on the industry 17 and diminish the ability of the industry to develop 18 new artists and produce new creative works. 19 An exemption of the extraordinary 20 breadth sought by the proponents could forestall the 21 development of technical protection measures for 22 music, and preclude use of technology to fight 23 piracy. 24 As the office has recognized, exemptions 25 are to be made only in exceptional cases.

believe the proponents here have failed to meet that burden.

There were a couple of things that were mentioned additionally this morning that I'd like to respond to. Just picking up with some of the comments of IP Justice first.

There is nothing, so far as we can tell, that places a burden on the Librarian to seek out and favor consumers in this proceeding. This proceeding was set up as a fail-safe and the language from the manager's report and other language specifically says that exemption should be found only in extraordinary circumstances.

And therefore, the burdens that exist from the last proceeding, you know, should exist, and we would say are the right interpretation and are not a matter of favoring one side over the other, but merely applying the letter of the law.

I think the only other thing I would say on the substantive comments that were raised with regard to copy controls is again, that the statements about interference are purely speculative at this point. There have only been nine releases in the U.S. to date, to the extent that other releases will be made in the future with some

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1	technical protection measures, mainly copy controls,
2	which again, are not the subject of this proceeding.
3	It's simply theoretical, at this point,
4	to say that those copy controls somehow prevent
5	access, even assuming that that would be a proper
6	jurisdiction for this proceeding. There simply has
7	been no showing that more likely than not, that
8	these types of non-infringement uses will exist.
9	I think I'll leave the rest of the
10	comments for (indistinguishable).
11	MS. PETERS: Okay, thank you. Mr.
12	Belinsky?
13	MR. BELINSKY: Thank you. Good
14	afternoon. My name is Mark Belinsky and I'm the
15	senior vice president of the music technology
16	division of Macrovision Corporation. I'd like to
17	thank you and the Copyright Office for the
18	opportunity to be here today, and I'd also like to
19	express my appreciation from Macrovision as a
20	company, being able to provide input to these
21	rulemaking proceedings, both today as well as
22	tomorrow as well, where our president, Bill Krepick,
23	will be present.
24	From our perspective as a supplier of
25	copy protection and digital rights management

1	technology to the content industries: that is; film
2	entertainment, software, and music for more than 20
3	years; we think that more than anything else, these
4	hearings and indeed, the DMCA itself, are about
5	creating and maintaining a balance between the
6	interests of content creators and the users or
7	consumers of that content.
8	This is admittedly not a lawyer's
9	perspective, but more of a practical perspective,
10	having been an honest middleman between content
11	providers and consumers for more than 20 years.
12	As we enter the 21st century, to us, it
13	becomes very clear that the economic vitality of the
14	U.S., our country, is heavily dependent on
15	knowledge, information, and information technology
16	industries.
17	According to a recent study that I think
18	was quoted in one of the comments submitted for
19	these hearings, the copyright industries alone in
20	the U.S. generated \$535 billion of GDP and that
21	excludes many other IP centric industries.
22	And when you look at the percentage of
23	our citizenry that earns their living by creating,
24	manufacturing, or distributing knowledge and

information products and services, and also when you

consider the investments required to create and
distribute that knowledge and information, you can
quickly come to the conclusion that the content
creators' ability to get paid for their creative
works is not only important but, indeed, fundamental
to their very existence. And by implication, we
think fundamental to maintaining the high standard
of living that we currently enjoy here in the U.S.
as compared to many other countries.

Turning a bit more specifically to the topic of music copy protection and DRM, I think it's by now common knowledge, even to ordinary consumers, that recording artists and the music industry are suffering greatly from unauthorized reproduction and sharing of copyrighted music files.

I can't help but recall Johnny Cash's
September 1997 testimony to the U.S. Congress when
he and I both gave testimony for the Commerce
Committee's DMCA hearings, about how he was already
personally experiencing this phenomenon, and that
was more than five years ago.

I also think it's quite interesting to note that consumers today accept that when they buy "Shrek" or "Sweet Home Alabama" on DVD, or when they buy Madden Football from Electronic Arts, they don't

have the ability to make copies for their friends.

We believe that the same assumption should apply to the latest music releases from Eminem, Avril Levine, or Madonna. Whether you measure the music industry's problem based on the overall declining music industry revenues, the thousands of jobs lost at record companies earlier this year, the bankruptcies of several music retailers, the decline in an average top selling album from 20 million units to 10 million units, or upon the number of music tracks available on file sharing services, like Rockster and Morpheus, it's pretty clear that the balance I described just a few moments ago has shifted to the point where content creators are not able, at least in the music industry, to reap the benefits of their creative works.

In fact, in the court of public opinion, it could be argued that many consumers believe copyrighted music is free for the asking or free for the taking. And from our perspective, this is precisely the kind of meltdown scenario that justifies policy initiatives, where government establishes rules of engagement so an industry can continue to provide valuable products and services

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to consumers, not to mention provide employment to hundreds of thousands of people in the process.

Juxtaposing the importance of the content industries to the U.S. economy, with the growth and development of the Internet as a distribution medium, we think it becomes even more important to keep copyright laws strong, and to take a narrow view and a very cautious view on granting exemptions.

As has been pointed out in some of the submissions leading up to this hearing, the music industry has, over the past couple of years, begun deploying technological prevention measures in connection with certain of their sound recordings released on CD's, generally known as copy-protected CD's.

The objective of these deployments, including the CD's that are protected using Macrovision's technology, has been to inhibit the unauthorized copying and file sharing of music files, which has become almost commonplace over the past several months, while at the same time maintaining consumers' ability to listen to music on their CD players and personal computers.

Up to this point, the general approach

has been to provide two versions of each music track on each CD, one of which plays on hi-fi's, car stereos, and other garden variety CD players, and the other of which plays on personal computers.

Within the past few weeks, just within the past few weeks, Macrovision has announced a partnership with Microsoft which will enable the music industry to configure the second of these versions, the second session track, in music industry terminology, to allow consumers not only to listen to the music on their PC, but to rip the music to their computer's hard disk several times, and then to burn CD's and/or export the music to portable devices made by companies like Sonic Blue, Creative Labs, Compag, Thompson, and others. of these very devices that one of the other folks just described as you might use to go jogging. expect to see the first of these expanded capabilities CD's in the market in the fall of this year.

Because of our long history providing commercially viable transparent copy protection and DRM technologies to content toners, we at Macrovision believe we have a rather unique perspective on how technological prevention measures

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can be used to create healthy ecosystems that serve, over the long term, the legitimate interests of creators and consumers alike.

In reflecting on the 20 years we've been in the business, in particular supplying the film entertainment industry with copy protection, and the ten-plus years we've been providing technological protection measures to the software industry, we believe quite strongly that the music industry is deploying technologies from Macrovision, but from others as well, which will over time recreate the balance between the interests of content creators and consumers.

In so doing, we believe that this will ensure that great music continues to be available to consumers and that great musicians and their marketing, distribution, and delivery partners are rewarded for their creative works and/or financial investments.

We also believe, in the context of these rulemaking proceedings, that decisions about exemptions to the prohibitions against circumvention should be made taking into account the big picture and with a long-term perspective.

As is the case we think in domains

outside (indistinguishable) property and copyright protection, the policy path of least resistance in the short term rarely provides the best long term solution. And if we can agree that we're ultimately talking in a small part maybe, about the economic vitality of the whole U.S. economy, I think we can and will see our way clear to making, or perhaps avoiding, exemption decisions which ensure that the music industry can thrive over the coming decades, however it morphs, to the benefit of not only the industry, but the consumers as well. During the Q and A session, I look forward to answering any questions you might have that I can address, and thanks again for the opportunity to be a part of these hearings. Thank you. I'll start by MS. PETERS: asking two questions and then passing it on. are for EFF. Just want to make sure that I -- what you're saying. Are you saying that if, in fact, you buy a CD, and it doesn't play on a particular device, then you are taking the position that that is malfunction of an access control? MS. HINZE: Actually, our position is a little bit more nuanced. We're taking the position

that this is actually a malfunctioning copy control,

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1 but it's an access issue. But we have actually 2 stated in our comments that we don't -- we have taken the position that, in terms of the technical 3 4 definition of effectively controlling access--5 MS. PETERS: You say it isn't? 6 MS. HINZE: Right. We do understand what that definition says, and we're not taking the 7 position that these protection measures satisfy that 8 9 definition. 10 But what we are saying is that the net 11 effect, from the point of view of a consumer, is 12 that this is an access issue. A consumer has purchased -- lawfully purchased media, and is trying 13 14 to play it and merely play it on a device that has 15 previously played this type of CD, and is making a 16 non-infringing use of the work. We think that is an 17 access issue, first and foremost, not a copy control 18 issue. 19 My second point is that there is some 20 legal uncertainty in the legal community about 21 whether or not something that controls incidentally, 22 controls access, even if its primary purpose was 23 intended to be a copy control, actually falls within 24 the prohibition in 1201(a)(1). So to the extent

there's uncertainty, there's a chilling effect, and

1 the chilling effect is quite large on consumers. 2 Consumers are the people who have 3 purchased the CD's and who want to make a lawful, 4 non-infringing use of their works, but they're not sure because of the scope of -- they're not sure 5 6 whether the scope of 1201(a)(1) will prevent them 7 from taking any measures to restore playability. 8 Let me just -- let me ask MS. PETERS: you, Ms. Gross. Do you agree with what she just 9 10 said? 11 MS. GROSS: Yes. 12 So that is your position MS. PETERS: 13 too? 14 MS. GROSS: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. 15 was writing something down. Could you please ask me 16 what it is I'm supposed to be agreeing or 17 disagreeing with? 18 MS. PETERS: What I really was, which I 19 didn't pick up all the nuances, what I had said, 20 which I've just been told is not accurate, and I was 21 checking out to see if you agreed it was not 22 accurate or you had a different position, was that 23 when -- was it true that whenever someone bought a 24 CD that basically had a copy control on it but was 25 put in a certain playback device such that it

1 wouldn't play, that that was considered a 2 malfunctioning access control? MS. GROSS: I think it's even broader 3 than that. 4 I think it's designed not to play in 5 particular devices. There was a report last 6 September on CNN about a Celine Dion CD that is 7 designed to crash your computer if you try to play 8 So if you want to call that a malfunction, 9 that's fine, but I think it is designed to malfunction in that case. 10 11 MS. PETERS: But it was really whether 12 or not it was an access control. It's absolutely an access 13 MS. GROSS: 14 control. It is an access control that may double as 15 a copy protection, but it does both goals. It has 16 both functions of denying access and denying 17 copying. So you could talk about it as either one. 18 MS. PETERS: Now, let me go back to EFF. 19 Based on what you said, what extent does labeling --20 Mr. Marks basically pointed out that seven, seven 21 Universal copy-protected CD's that were limited with 22 regard to where they could be played. 23 extent dos the label respond to your concern for 24 consumers? 25 MS. HINZE: The first thing I'd like to

say is that if the experience that EFF has had in using or trying to use some of the labeled copyprotected CD's is anything to go by, it is direct evidence. We have tried this on a number of different systems the labeling isn't, in fact, accurate. It's certainly -- for instance, if I take the example of The Madonna CD here, it's a very small logo. I'd be happy to pass this around for the Copyright Office panel to have a closer look. But it doesn't actually indicate the presence of copy protection. I It's a little logo. It doesn't actually say, "copy-protected."

So, for instance, from the point of view of a consumer who purchases one of these, unless you actually know that that symbol means "copy-protected", you're going to be in the position, as a consumer, of having bought this, and having opened the packaging from Tower or wherever you've bought it, and not knowing that that's a copy-protected CD. So I would say that labeling is part of -- obviously part of the issue here, but the effectiveness of the labeling and what the labeling says is obviously an important point.

My second point on, I guess on a more fundamental level, is that I actually don't think

1	that, by itself, labeling will address the nature of
2	the harm that EFF is attempting to cover by
3	requesting the exemption we've sought.
4	Even if something is labeled as copy-
5	protected, and even if the labeling were accurate,
6	which I think it hasn't been to date, then there's
7	still a situation where a consumer cannot actually
8	play something that they have lawfully purchased.
9	And
10	MS. PETERS: But if the labeling were
11	clear, that it wouldn't work on their playback
12	device?
13	MS. HINZE: I think then it might
14	we'd have to look at that a little more closely. I
15	think that if that were the case, you know that a
16	specific statement about what things that people can
17	play it on, and what things they can't play it on,
18	then to the extent that consumers would not be put
19	on notice, that part of the harm would be dealt
20	with.
21	I guess the other part of the harm on a
22	more metaphysical level that wouldn't be dealt with,
23	is if there if there's no other format for a
24	consumer to access that particular work on.
25	MS. PETERS: I agree with that. Let's

1	go back to you, Mr. Marks, and labeling. Universal
2	put out seven. You said they were labels. They got
3	less than one tenth of one percent with regard to
4	having any complaints or issues. Is what's on that
5	record what the label is that the label that's
6	used by Universal?
7	MR. MARKS: Well, I don't believe that's
8	a U.S. release.
9	MS. PETERS: Oh.
10	MR. MARKS: Our understanding from
11	Warner is that the Madonna CD was not released in
12	the U.S. with copy protection. It's a foreign
13	release.
14	MR. BUCHOLZ: It was purchased in the
15	East Village of New York City.
16	MR. MARKS: Well, (indistinguishable)
17	you know, could have been imported.
18	MR. BUCHOLZ: Absolutely.
19	MR. MARKS: That doesn't mean it's a
20	U.S. release. So
21	MS. PETERS: Well, maybe you could tell
22	us.
23	MR. MARKS: I'm not familiar with that
24	particular label.
25	MS. PETERS: Well, but you could tell

1	us, do you know what the label is that's on the
2	Universal releases?
3	MR. MARKS: I can try and see if I have
4	the Universal one. I think that different countries
5	use different labels.
6	MS. PETERS: You don't have to even
7	that. Just what's the general gist of what people
8	say when
9	MR. MARKS: Here is one that's a
10	Universal release that's pretty prominent. Let's
11	see that. That's the size of it.
12	MS. PETERS: Okay.
13	MR. MARKS: Okay? It says,
14	"This CD is protected against
15	unauthorized copying. It is designed to play in
16	standard audio CD players and in computers running a
17	Windows operating system. However, playback
18	problems may be experienced. If you experience
19	playback problems, return this disk for a refund."
20	And there's no standard for labeling.
21	MS. PETERS: But there are I mean,
22	there are two bills that are pending before Congress
23	that would deal with labeling.
24	MR. MARKS: Right. And I think the
25	labeling is not the issue here. I mean the issue

1	here, again, is access controls and
2	MS. PETERS: I agree; I agree. My
3	let me go back over to this from
4	(indistinguishable). Is your position that a
5	consumer basically has a right to buy a CD and play
6	it on any device?
7	MS. GROSS: Yes, that is my position,
8	that if they buy a CD, they do have a right to
9	access that CD on whatever device they choose. That
10	is a different statement from saying copyright
11	holders must ensure access. That copyright holders
12	must make sure that they can provide for entrap-
13	ability.
14	MS. PETERS: Where do they get this
15	right?
16	MS. GROSS: Because they have purchased
17	it. They own it. It is their property. It's
18	pretty elementary. When you buy something, it is
19	yours to do with as you wish as long as you don't
20	violate the other provisions of the copyright.
21	MS. PETERS: But here, you're actually
22	making a copy. Right? In order
23	MS. GROSS: What do you mean?
24	MS. PETERS: If you buy it in one format
25	and it doesn't play on what you want, in order to

1	play it, don't you have to make a copy?
2	MS.GROSS: I'm not sure that you would
3	have to. You would put it in your homemade CD
4	player and I don't know that it would make a copy.
5	It might just play it.
6	MS. PETERS: (Indistinguishable) where
7	you thought the consumer had a right to do anything
8	to make it play?
9	MS. GROSS: I assume
10	MS. PETERS: Like with regard to videos,
11	if it's in a PAL format or CCAM format, you really
12	do have to make another copy. But maybe over here
13	they don't. Right.
14	MS. GROSS: But even if they did make
15	even if they did have to make that copy in order to
16	make that, in order to play it, they're still within
17	their rights. I mean we have a right to make a
18	personal use copy of something if we need to in
19	order to access that material.
20	MS. PETERS: Where does this come from?
21	MS. GROSS: Fair use. Personal use.
22	MS. PETERS: Great. So that's your
23	interpretation?
24	MS. GROSS: That is my interpretation,
25	absolutely

1	MS. PETERS: Yes?
2	MS. HINZE: I'd like to just make a
3	comment if I may.
4	MS. PETERS: Sure.
5	MS. HINZE: Two things. One, I'd like
6	to answer one particular way that you might be able
7	to, for instance, restore the playability of one of
8	these CD's. In EFF's comments, in our detailed
9	comments we submitted in December, we attached a
10	paper by, as I said, Princeton researcher John
11	Alexander Halderman. That's a quite a technical
12	paper from a computer scientist, and he actually has
13	conducted a series of tests on three different types
14	of copy-protected CD's.
15	He talks about two mechanisms that might
16	be used in order he actually did some of this
17	work as part of the task of researching on what
18	particular drives and what particular operating
19	systems, Windows 95 or Windows 98 Windows 2000
20	MS. PETERS: Um-hmm.
21	MS. HINZE: and what particular CD ROM
22	drive things would fail. In order to make some of
23	the multi-session disks actually function, he did
24	some testing with two with one particular type of
25	mechanism. He put masking tape, as I understand it,

1 to cover the second session on the disk so that the 2 CD player was able to read the table of contents on 3 the second session and play the material. 4 Again, the paper is actually quite 5 informative about the nature of this technology 6 based on that information was available. 7 one of the things that comes out of the paper is 8 that how copy protection works on any given CD player or any playback device is specific to each 9 10 particular playback device. So, in response to earlier question 11 about labeling, I guess I would like to point out 12 that it would be extremely difficult, based on my 13 14 understanding of what is in that paper from a 15 technical point of view, to actually be able to 16 specify on what devices something will not play. So while you say this -- this instance, 17 this is instructive, but The Donnas CD includes a 18 19 statement that this will actually play on Mac. O/S -20 The Mac. operating system and on Windows players. 21 The reason it was discovered to be copy-protected 22 was because it didn't play on the Mac. player. 23 So to the extent that labeling may go 24 some of the way to addressing consumer awareness of

the particular issue, there are technical limits

1 that set limitations about what a label can actually 2 say to put consumers fully on notice of the harm 3 that they are about to experience. 4 MS. PETERS: Okay. I actually went to 5 labeling because one of the comments suggested 6 narrowing the category, if in fact, it would not be 7 -- you couldn't circumvent, if, in fact, there was a clear statement with regard to what it would and 8 9 wouldn't play on. That's what I based it. 10 apologize. I will read this. It was not attached 11 to my copy. The other thing I'd like to 12 MS. HINZE: do is point out in terms of another popular way of, 13 14 as I understand it, that people have been restoring 15 the playability of these disks where they don't play, is by using a felt tip marker. A felt tip 16 17 marker and masking tape --18 MS. PETERS: Yes, yes. They work well. 19 MS. HINZE: Apparently, they work quite 20 well and they wouldn't, of course, violate the --21 MR. BUCHOLZ: The tools provision. 22 The tools provision in MS. HINZE: 23 1201(a)(2). So there are ways available to 24 consumers to restore playability such that 25 circumvention would not necessarily -- such that

1 consumers could do that without violating one of the 2 other provisions in the DMCA. MS. GROSS: Could I just follow up 3 4 quickly, also with another indication that consumers 5 have a right to listen to the CD that they 6 purchased, which is very clear in the copyright act 7 that the control over the performance by the copyright holders is with respect to the public 8 9 performance. 10 The private performance, when I'm at 11 home, and I want to play it on whatever device that I choose, that is explicitly outside of their 12 control. It is not a public performance. 13 14 private performance. It is reserved for the 15 individual. 16 MS. PETERS: Yes. MR. MARKS: Could I make a few comments? 17 18 MS. PETERS: Yes. 19 Picking up with the last MR. MARKS: 20 one, I think there's a fundamental difference 21 between what is actionable as an infringement and 22 what is a right of the consumer. And as our 23 comments that we filed cited several legal opinions, 24 saying clearly that the law is not that there is a

right of a consumer to play on whatever device they

want. I can't buy a CD, for example, and put it into a cassette player. I mean, that's akin --

It's really the same issue. I think that -- you know, that one thing that is dangerous, and I think also inappropriate, is to talk generally about copy protection as though it is all the same.

It is not. There are different technologies that have been used to date, there are going to be different technologies that will be used in the future. And that, I think, is one of the infirmities of the proposal on, from the EFF, and IP Justice, is that there -- it does not specify any particular technology that is an access control.

Even setting aside the, "it's a copy control, not an access control," even assuming we could get by that issue, it just broadly sedates all CD copy control, and that is what is so potentially harmful going forward of the exemption, because far from the chilling effect that was cited by EFF and IP Justice, the chilling effect will indeed be on the ability of record labels and technology companies to provide for what they deem to be appropriate and workable copy protection in the future, so that they can make available, you know,

	works on a going forward basis and, you know,
2	fulfill the intent of Congress passing DMCA to
3	continue to make music available.
4	MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you.
5	MR. CARSON: Mr. Marks, let's go back to
6	the first comment you made about there being no
7	consumer right to play a CD, for example, on any
8	device they want to. Let's look at it another way.
9	Let's say there is a CD that has an
10	access control on it that prevents you from playing
11	it on a personal computer, just for example. Let's
12	say Ms. Gross takes it and try to figures out how to
13	make it play on her personal computer, even though
14	the intent of the copyright owner was that it
15	shouldn't play on that personal computer. When she
16	does that, is she engaging in an act of
17	infringement?
18	MR. MARKS: I think it is a she's
19	circumventing under 1201(a). MR. CARSON:
20	Okay. Yeah, I think that's probably true but that
21	wasn't the question. Is she engaging in an act of
22	infringement?
23	MR. MARKS: Is she engaging in an act of
24	infringement by accessing? I think that the I
25	think it's a 1201 issue, and probably not an

1	infringement issue.
2	MR. CARSON: She's making a non-
3	infringing use of the work itself?
4	MR. MARKS: Right.
5	MR. CARSON: Okay.
6	MR. MARKS: Because it's an access, not
7	a copy or a distribution or something.
8	MR. CARSON: Right. So in that case, the
9	technological measure that restricts her access to
10	the work, is in fact adversely affecting her ability
11	to make an non-infringing use of the work, is that
12	correct?
13	MR. MARKS: It may I don't know
14	whether it's an adverse impact.
15	MR. CARSON: She can't do it. she can't
16	make the non-infringing use.
17	MR. MARKS: She may be able to make a
18	non-infringing use by getting the music in another
19	form.
20	MR. CARSON: But with respect to the
21	particular non-infringing use she is trying to make,
22	what your accepting is a non-infringing use, she has
23	been adversely affected in her ability to do that by
24	virtue of the prohibition on circumvention.
25	MR. MARKS: I'm just I'm not sure

1	I don't think that that's the test.
2	MR. CARSON: Maybe it isn't. I'm just
3	asking the question and we'll figure what it means
4	later on. I just want to know.
5	MR. MARKS: You know, I'm it's a
6	hypothetical, I'm not sure, as I just haven't
7	thought about it in those terms because I don't
8	think that's the test that governs out
9	(indistinguishable).
10	MR. CARSON: Okay, we'll think about it
11	and you can get back to us on that one. You know,
12	one thing I'm not entirely clear on. Is it your
13	testimony that in some cases record companies are,
14	in fact, marketing CD's with the intent that those
15	CD's cannot be played on certain kinds of devices
16	that consumers do use to play CD's on?
17	MR. MARKS: I'm sorry, could you just
18	repeat?
19	MR. CARSON: Yeah. Is it your
20	understanding that record companies at the moment,
21	are, in fact, marketing some CD's with the intent
22	that those CD's cannot be played on certain devices
23	that consumers do use to play CD's?
24	MR. MARKS: Not my understanding. They
25	I think that from the label, for example, that I

1	just read, it said it may not play. I don't know
2	whether that's the equivalent of an intent that it
3	not play. I do think that, in the future, there may
4	be so-called hybrid disks that have different
5	sessions. One session is playable on one type of
6	device, and another session is playable on another
7	type of device.
8	MR. CARSON: Is it that you truly don't
9	know whether that's the intent, or is it that, in
10	fact, it's not the intent, but it may be an
11	unintended side effect. Do you know the answer to
12	that, or is it just you don't know?
13	MR. MARKS: That what's the unintended
14	side effect?
15	MR. CARSON: That it can't play on
16	certain devices.
17	MR. MARKS: It well, you know, again,
18	it's I'm not sure unintended side effect as a
19	result of a problem with the well that's being used
20	is a problem with the machine that's being used, not
21	necessarily a problem with the copy control. Again,
22	this is copy control, not access control, but
23	this is copy control, not access control, but  MR. CARSON: Um-hmm.

1 malfunction of the copy control, even setting aside 2 the copy control access control issue. Yet there 3 isn't any proof that that's the case, that there is 4 a malfunction. And that's what makes this very different from the dongle exemption last time 5 6 around. I mean not only was that specifically an 7 access control, but it was specifically a 8 malfunction. 9 Here, there's no evidence at all that 10 it's a malfunction. It may just be of that 11 technical protection measure. It may just be a technical incompatibility between, you 12 know, the well in that machine, or the 13 14 operating system on that machine and the 15 disk. 16 MR. CARSON: Okay. So I gather you can't 17 say whether any record companies are actually marketing CD's that they intend not be played on 18 19 certain devices. You just don't know the answer to 20 that? 21 MR. MARKS: I don't know the answer to 22 that right now. 23 MR. CARSON: Okay. And that 24 (indistinguishable) the information you can get back

to us?

1	MR. MARKS: Yeah.
2	MR. CARSON: Okay, I think I've got my
3	two questions, at least some of (indistinguishable).
4	MS. HINZE: Might I just
5	MS. PETERS: Did you want
6	MR. CARSON: Oh, I'm sorry, someone
7	wanted to respond to that, yeah.
8	MS. HINZE: I wouldn't mind responding
9	to that now before we go onto other areas.
10	MS. PETERS: Yeah. Sure.
11	MS. HINZE: What I've just
12	heard is a statement that seems a little
13	inconsistent. On the one hand, I've heard that a
14	problem with playback I've heard a disconnect
15	between intent and malfunction, and what I would
16	like to say is it seems to us, as untrained
17	technologists but based on views of the trained
18	technologist who wrote the paper that I have cited
19	in our comments, that these malfunctions were
20	unintended.
21	And in any event, they are malfunctions
22	purely because what is happening at the time when a
23	disk is not playing, in many cases, for instance, in
24	the case of a multi-session CD what is happening is
25	that there are two formats of content on a disk.

One is a protected format, and one's an unprotected format. And the error, if you were to put it in those terms, that the user, consumer, experiences when something doesn't play is a substitution error.

There has been a problem with substituting cleanly the material that was intended to be -- apparently intended to be, substituted in place of the unprotected material. That looks like I can't think of any other reason a malfunction. why, for instance, it would be the case that you would see a disk that plays on one type of device, meaning a Windows 2000 machine, and a similar type of computer running a Windows 98 operating system, would experience a malfunction. To the extent that there's that much variation between the nature of the errors that have been experienced, on a drive by drive basis, and an operating system by operating system basis -- common sense would seem to dictate that it is not the intent of the copyright owner, in that particular situation, to prevent the music from playing in some format. And what is happening is a malfunction of the technology.

Now I'm not technologically enough aware to know particularly where in the chain of playback or table of contents areas or just whether it's an

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error being introduced into the sub-channel data with -- channel pay. I think that's -- that little detail is something that the Copyright Office might be able to glean from reading the paper that I've referenced.

And I would also draw the Copyright
Office's attention to the table that's annexed to
that, which gives a listing of the types of
particular drives and the particular operating
systems that the tests were done on. And it becomes
apparent when you look at that, the unintended
nature of the malfunctioning, and the reason that's
malfunctioning because it's a very inconsistent
pattern of non-display of material or non-playback
of material.

MR. MARKS: I think my point was just that the malfunction -- you can't make the leap that it is the technology that is malfunctioning, that the technical protection measure that is malfunctioning. It could be due to an incompatibility. And you know, so that was really just my point.

You know, the question is whether is there a malfunction in the TPM? Not clear that there is. There is no evidence that there is. It

may be. It may be functioning entirely properly as an entire different reason that there is playback difficulty. I mean this is one of the -- this also gets back to the point of, you know, the danger of talking generally when there are different technologies out there. Some of the technologies that may have been addressed in an article may no longer be used. They may have been used on one disk. Out of 125,000 that were released, there were only nine. It may have been used one time on one of those nine disks and may never be used again.

Clearly, you know, that nine out of 125,000 or that use of that one technology, you know, can't rise to the level of an exemption under the, you know, in this proceeding. And in terms of the future, it's speculative as to what technologies will be used and how those technologies actually work. And therefore, there's simply no way for the burden of it's more likely than not for an adverse impact to result. There's just simply no way for that to be met.

MS. HINZE: I'd also be happy to address that now but I appreciate that this is the prerogative for the Copyright Office to direct questions.

1 MR. CARSON: We've got time here. 2 MS. PETERS: We've got time, yes. 3 MS. HINZE: I've heard so far that --4 proof that sounds to me like we have a clear 5 statement of agreement on the grounds that there are 6 copy-protected CD's that are currently in existence 7 The first time, I might add, in the United States. 8 I've now heard that there are, in fact, nine titles 9 that have been released in the United States, so I'm 10 happy to have some quantification at long last. 11 think the relevant point from the point of view of assessing the nature of the harm here is twofold. 12 First, it's not just the fact that there 13 14 are nine titles that have copy protection, it's the 15 number of the titles, the number of units of those 16 titles, that are in distribution that would give a 17 better sense of the qualitative -- I'm sorry -- the 18 quantitative harm that may be experienced by 19 consumers. 20 I'd also like to point out that to the 21 extent that there are copy-protected CD's in the 22 United States that are not U.S. releases, whatever that means, such as The Donnas CD. And I've also 23 24 got a CD that I, myself, came across that has copy

protection on it. Yes, it's labeled, but it doesn't

play, and it's not a Universal release. To the extent that there are a number of other non-U.S. released copy-protected CD's out there, I would hesitate to limit myself to believing that the only number of copy-protected CD's in the United States are "X" number of units times nine titles. If my experience is anything to go by, and I think it's direct, firsthand experience, the number of copy-protected CD's currently in the United States is actually larger than I think we're getting a glimpse of this afternoon.

The second thing I'd like to point out in terms of an assessment of harm is the nature of the harm for the consumer. The consumer has lawfully acquired this particular packaging, and this particular plastic disk, and has a normative of expectation that they're going to be able to play something that they have played on a CD player, their car/MP3/CD player before, that they previously played it on a DVD player, none of which have any capability for reproducing. So there's no sense in which the consumer is at risk of copying in the — the case varies — if she was intending to get a benefit by trying to make a copy. All they're attempting to do, when they're trying to play this

1 type of material, is play it. And they have a good 2 normative expectation for expecting that this will actually play in their devices. 3 4 What we're asking for is a limited 5 exemption for playback, and it's quite an 6 appropriate thing for consumers to expect that they 7 will be able to play this type of plastic disk, 8 whether it's a CD in a Redbook audio format or not, 9 for the purposes of audio standards. They have a 10 reasonable expectation that they ought be able to 11 play it based on their 20 years of using CD's. It's not the case where a consumer is 12 13 putting a CD into a toaster or a cassette player. 14 The actual, real, situation is someone putting 15 something into a device where they can reasonably 16 expect that there will be playback. I have a couple of quick 17 MR. MARKS: 18 ones. On the quantitative issue, you know, the only 19 thing that I can give you quantitatively was what 20 Universal told us about some of the nine releases, 21 and that was less than one tenth of one percent in

complaints, so I would say that there really is no quantitative evidence.

And the evidence that was presented in terms of all these other disks above the nine, you

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1	know, again, there were 45 that were referenced in
2	the replies, and only three of the 45 had any kind
3	of technical protection measure. And then finally,
4	just to get back to the very first point, which I
5	think is still the most important point, and that is
6	these are copy controls, not access controls and
7	therefore, outside the scope of this proceeding.
8	MR. CARSON: Isn't it good enough for
9	you? He's saying the copy control, not access
10	control.
11	MS. HINZE: Well
12	MR. CARSON: Does he have to say
13	anything more.
14	MR. MARKS: No, what I'm saying is that
15	the allegation is
16	MS. GROSS: (Indistinguishable) for
17	trying to access it, so that sounds like an access
18	control issue.
19	MR. MARKS: The technical no, you
20	just I thought before, in response to the
21	question, I've got it in my notes it's an
22	access issue. We would agree it's not a access
23	technical protection measure. I'm not here to say
24	that any particular technology is a copy control
25	versus something else. All I'm saying is that the

1	proponents have said themselves that they're copy
2	controls, and that's
3	MS. GROSS: In addition to being access
4	control. We're saying they're both.
5	MS. HINZE: I think there is actually a
6	difference.
7	MS. PETERS: There's a difference of
8	opinion; right.
9	MR. CARSON: There is a difference,
10	right. It means different things to different
11	people.
12	MS. HINZE: But I guess I would like to
13	ask if the RIAA would be prepared to make a
14	statement to the effect that these, for all intents
15	and purposes, will be considered copy protection,
16	not access measures and only copy protection
17	technological protection measures, and if we perhaps
18	were to get a statement from the RIAA, if they would
19	be happy to let us know that they won't take legal
20	action against consumers for a violation of
21	1201(a)(1).
22	Then, you know, I think as I said in my
23	opening statement and as was made clear in EFF's
24	submission, we would be prepared to be happy, to go
25	home at that point.

1	The point from the consumer point of
2	view is that it's not so clear cut. And to the
3	extent there's a chilling effect on consumers, what
4	are consumers supposed to do? They've bought a CD.
5	They're not sure what they can do with it. They've
6	bought the CD but they can't play it. Are they
7	breaking 1201(a)(1)if they try to nature it
8	playable?
9	MR. MARKS: I'm sure they could play it
10	in their audio CD player. There's no question about
11	that.
12	MS. HINZE: And what about
13	MR. MARKS: As much as I would love to
14	give you that assurance, I just can't. And the
15	reason for that is that we don't you know, we're
16	not here to evaluate certain technologies, and most
17	certain technologies is, you know, is addressed as
18	part of the exemptions.
19	MS. PETERS: She's just leaped on) the
20	fact that you said copy.
21	MR. CARSON: (Indistinguishable)
22	go ahead.
23	MR. BELINSKY: Yeah, thanks. I'd just
24	like to add something on the general notion of
25	formats. And that is that I think we're starting to

enter a period where there will be -- forget copy protection and access controls just for a second.

There will be multiple formats that physically look exactly like the CD that you saw over there. There's already the super audio CD, there's the DVD audio, there's going to be DVD 9, there's DVD blue laser. In the electronic world, there's the WMA format from Microsoft, there's MP3, Apple's new service uses AAC.

And I think that, juxtaposed with the broader availability and broader capabilities for consumers to get access to copyrighted works, I think over the next -- from where we sit, technologists perspective -- over the next three to five years, there will be a multiplicity of data and content formats that will, just as more content is coming available, it will, I think, render the notion that any physical item that is five inches in diameter can be plugged into any particular player.

That notion is not going hold true for the next three to five years, I think. And that, to me, is just what you see when you go into a period of rapid technological innovation, is you have a format differences and file size differences, etcetera, and then eventually things shake out again

1	in the next period of stability, like we've just
2	been through a period of stability in the CD format,
3	let's say, for the last 15 years, where a CD is a CD
4	is a CD. Now things are starting to morph again,
5	and that is ultimately to consumers' benefit, but
6	there's some thrashing that goes along, goes around
7	in the interim period.
8	MR. CARSON: Let's pause here on that
9	then. Are you talking purely about an abundance of
10	new and different, and sometimes incompatible
11	formats?
12	MR. BELINSKY: Yes.
13	MR. CARSON: Or in connection with that,
14	will there sometimes be technological protection
15	measures to allow some of those that will prevent
16	something that is a new format, for example, from
17	being accessed on the standard CD player?
18	MR. BELINSKY: My comment was solely
19	related to the fact that new formats are going to
20	proliferate.
21	MR. CARSON: So you're not you're not
22	foreseeing that on top of that, there will be any
23	kind of access controls that make it impossible or
24	difficult to play the new format on an old player?
25	MR. BELINSKY: Not necessarily, no. I

1 mean, from where we sit, we don't make those 2 decisions. So you know, it's --MR. CARSON: You're not part of the 3 4 process (indistinguishable). 5 MR. BELINSKY: (Indistinguishable) 6 decides, what business rules, policies, etcetera. 7 MR. MARKS: And I would just go back to one of the first statements I made, which is that 8 9 record companies want to sell music and they don't 10 want to lock up their content, they want to provide 11 Otherwise, they don't have a business access. 12 because there are certain consumer expectations and you want to sell something that the consumer's going 13 14 to be happy with. 15 Okay, what about Steve? MS. PETERS: 16 Thank you. MR. TEPP: Mr. Belinsky, you 17 mentioned in your opening statement, the second session, and we've had a little discussion of that 18 19 previous panel discussing related issues back in 20 Washington. I'm still a little confused as to what 21 functionality the second section gives consumers. 22 So, can you help me out by telling me what can a 23 consumer do with the second section that they can't 24 do with the first section? 25 MR. BELINSKY: Okay. The second section

is in a format and has extra information as part of it that essentially allows the consumer to play the music on a PC. So when you put a CD into a personal computer and you listen to the music, you're listening to the music from the quote, unquote, second section files.

MR. TEPP: Yeah.

MR. BELINSKY: So it's, it's what gives a copy-protected CD the ability to play music on a personal computer. It's just that it's another aspect of the overall technology used to produce a copy-protected CD that inhibits copying and file sharing and by the same token, allows the consumer to listen to the music on personal computers as compared to garden variety CD players, like stereo systems, boom boxes, you know, CD Walkman's, that sort of thing.

MR. TEPP: Thank you. So let me jump back to this side and say, do you -- Mr. Belinsky says even when the first section is protected, you've got the second section, you can play on your PC. Does that solve your problem or do you have some disagreement with the way he's described the reality?

MS. HINZE: What I understand is

1 actually happening when people are experiencing playback errors is that substitution is not actually 2 3 taking place. So for whatever reason, whether you call 4 5 it a technical incompatibility or a malfunctioning 6 copy protection, technological protection measure --7 I'll leave that issue to one side -- the point is 8 that substitution is not actually happening. 9 That may have been the intent of the 10 designers of the copy protection technology, but 11 where it doesn't playback, what is happening is that for whatever reason, consumers are not actually 12 getting access to that second session. 13 14 exemption that EFF has sought would allow consumers 15 to do that, whether it be by -- for instance, I 16 don't want to speculate as to how consumers might be able to do -- but for instance, consumers might be 17 able to do exactly that and get access to the second 18 19 session where the particular copy protection 20 technology fails on their particular consumer 21 playback device by, for instance, using a felt tip 22 marker or some other way of restoring the 23 playability. 24 MR. MARKS: Mr. Tepp?

MR. TEPP: Please.

1	MR. MARKS: The thing that may help
2	clear up the confusion on this is that, I think what
3	Mr. Belinsky is talking about in terms of disks that
4	may have two sections may not be the same thing as
5	David holding up those audio disks that may only
6	have one section on them. So they're two different
7	products, potentially, that I think is causing some
8	of the confusion.
9	MR. TEPP: Okay. All right. Thank you
10	both. That does clear it up for me.
11	MS. HINZE: Just to clarify, my comments were
12	respective of a multi-section disk, and when I as
13	I said, that consumers may be able to access to
14	first section on that disk, the one that they would
15	not otherwise not be able to see for reasons of
16	malfunction. I was actually specifically
17	addressing, as I understand it, the type of
18	Macrovision copy protection technology that involves
19	multi-section format, apparently CD's.
20	MR. TEPP: Okay, thank you. So let me
21	come back to this side for a minute, and it sounds
22	like, from the description you've given at least
23	with regard to the dual section disks that there is
24	an intent to let consumers play the music on any
25	device they choose.

MR. BELINSKY: Absolutely.

MR. TEPP: Within reason, not toasters.

If that's the case, what harm would there be in

letting them deal with some sort of technical issues

that arise (indistinguishable) those qualified as

1201(a)(1) violations we can't seem to get agreement

on today, but what harm arises to your industry if

there's an exemption that makes it clear they're

allowed to do what it sounds like you were willing

to let them do in the first place?

MR. BELINSKY: I think, from our perspective, looking across multiple content industries and being a technology supplier, it opens up the door for folks to do that on a large scale and then content becomes available on the Internet at no charge. And it has the long term result of damaging, if not decimating, not only the music industry, but the movie industry, the software industry, the pharmaceuticals industry.

If an ecosystem can't be created, and I think to create it requires some assistance, particularly in today's technological age, from government, then you could end up doing substantial damage to every creator's ability to profit from their creation and then the investment cycle falls

apart and you don't get nearly as good a music video, prescription drugs, semi-conductors, as you're currently getting today, or you attenuate the progression of those developments. That's what's -- that would be our perspective.

MR. MARKS: I think the harm is also that what we're talking about and the nature of the question by itself is something hypothetical, something in the future, something that's speculative. There's been no evidence presented that there's been anything more than the diminimus problems with certain technologies, and the proposed exemption is for something much broader that would encompass all technologies that have so-called copy protection, technical protection measures.

And I think the harm to the industry is that by doing that, you are stifling the ability potentially to use appropriate technical protection measures, technical protection measures that Congress, you know, envisioned, and encouraged, as result of the DMCA. Because it's -- we're not talking about a -- you know, any specific technology here that is actually causing harm, it just doesn't exist in this record, and therefore, you know, having an exemption that covered all potential

1	technologies is problematic and harmful, and that
2	would interfere with the ability to actually
3	institute certain types of technical protection
4	measures because we don't know today how they will
5	work.
6	MR. TEPP: Okay, did you have one last
7	question? I'm sorry, go ahead.
8	MS. HINZE: I thought it might be
9	appropriate to respond while we're on this topic. I
10	wanted to make two points.
11	First, the first one is to address the
12	statement that we've sought a really broad
13	exemption, and that it would cover a whole range of
14	technologies. Actually, our exemption is quite
15	narrow. On that I want to point out a couple of
16	features.
17	Our exemption only covers copy-protected
18	CD's that malfunction and prevent access. To the
19	extent that they work and they work now, or in the
20	future, whatever the technologies are, then they
21	would not be caught by the scope of our exemption.
22	Our exemption, as I said, will only catch things
23	that are malfunctioning. So I would actually
24	characterize it as a narrow, not a broad exemption.
25	Secondly, I'd point out that the

statement that we have not provided any information about the technologies at issue is perhaps a little bit of a mischaracterization of the comments that EFF filed in December.

EFF listed the four types of copy
protection that we are aware about from publicly
available information that is currently being used,
Macrovision's Catus Shield technology SunnComm and
TTR's Safe Audio. We've also mentioned Sony's Key 2
Audio system. We have made best endeavors to obtain
information about each of those technologies. The
Cactus Shield technology in the case of media as
with Macrovision, SunnComm's Media Clog, and as I
said, the Sony Key 2 Audio system.

There is very little available information about that, as I'm sure Mr. Belinsky could point out, a number of these technologies are subject to trade secret protection, and it is difficult, from a consumer point of view, to actually get a clear statement about how the technologies work or any technical data that might be available. Consumers have to rely on testing along the lines of that done by Mr. Halderman in the paper I've referenced.

Finally, I'd just like to make one point

while we're on the topic, since it's received so much comment so far. And that is this: The particular copy protection measures that are being used at the moment are, if we are to take the words of the record executives and the technology companies, they are designed to keep honest people honest. They are designed to stop casual copying. They have no impact as far as anyone can tell on large scale commercial copying.

able to obtain the content of one copy-protected CD and put it on a P2P Network, for instance, this exemption will have no impact on that. That is already currently happening, and the fact that consumers might have the ability to restore playability to, on disks they currently have purchased which don't have playability, that is a completely separate scenario from what is currently happening and the impact that it would likely have on the existing world of P2P technology and networks.

MS. PETERS: Could I note that this side of the table is wanting to say something or is it just facial expression?

MR. MARKS: Well, I -- I'm just not sure

what malfunction means in this context. I mean, you 1 2 know, again, the scope of this proceeding is access 3 controls that, you know, have a substantial impact on what are different uses. 4 5 And you know, not withstanding the 6 assertion of IP Justice, it certainly sounds and 7 reads, when you read the documents, like what they 8 are talking about are copy controls, not access controls. And again, there's no evidence that's 9 been presented at all that even those are 10 11 malfunctioning. So it's just a very different situation 12 even if you could get over that first hurdle, then 13 14 the dongle exemption from last time. 15 I think we understand your MS. PETERS: 16 different positions. 17 MR. TEPP: Well, let me just sort of 18 pick up a point Ms. Hinze just made and ask you to 19 respond if you care to, and that's my last question. 20 Has there been any correlation between 21 the level of piracy of unprotected CD's and 22 protected CD's? Because Mr. Belinsky made the 23 argument that lay people use an exemption for this 24 purpose is going to facilitate pier to pier, or

piracy re-appear. Pier networks and all sorts of

problems, Ms. Hinze says, "No, actually that's not the case." We have some basis for historical analysis. Do you have any information?

MR. BELINSKY: Only from the video industry industry and the reason only from the video industry is we've done tri-annual consumer copying studies for the last 15 years on a nationwide basis, across the U.S., 1008 households generalize (indistinguishable) the U.S. population in general, etcetera, statistically.

And what we've found over the last 15 years, given that copy protection appeared at the dawn of the VHS format, in about 1985, is that each successive study showed lower and lower consumer copying attempts and lower and lower rates of piracy. And/or -- yeah, piracy and unauthorized sharing of video.

And what we attribute that to is kind of a conditioning effect over a number of years on the part of consumers that it isn't okay to buy one copy of The Lion King at Blockbuster video and make 14 copies for your neighbors. In the music industry, it's just way too soon to tell. Copy protection in any scale has only been with us probably for the past year to maybe 18 months.

And the vast majority of music CD's still are not copy-protected, despite our success in achieving 100 million CD's, the total annual production of music CD's is way north of a billion, almost two billion on a worldwide basis.

So, unfortunately, there isn't the data set to really have any data that would suggest what's happening right now. The only data we have is that if you do take the long view, over time, you end up with a balance between consumers getting great content at great prices, and creators being paid for their investment in their creative works, so unfortunately, nothing to report on the music industry in particular right now.

MR. MARKS: I would agree with that. I think that -- I certainly am not aware of any information. I think it's precisely because you really only have nine disks that have been in the market for you know, a certain period of time. It's very hard to draw any conclusions. I haven't heard any specific data or any conclusions from there. The 100 million that Mr. Belinsky was referencing is a worldwide, not a U.S. number you know, in terms of music.

MR. BELINSKY: That's virtually all

1	outside of the U.S.
2	MR. MARKS: Yeah, that sounds right.
3	MR. BELINSKY: And up to this point.
4	MR. TEPP: Okay, thank you.
5	MS. DOUGLASS: Ms. Hinze, it seems like
6	you've been talking about a number of frustrations
7	and I need to (indistinguishable) when people put
8	their CD's into the CD player and it doesn't work.
9	I'm trying to get to the adverse effect not
10	necessarily substantial adverse effect, I'm trying
11	to get to adverse effect, you know.
12	From what I hear, is there are only nine
13	titles, like in number of multiplied by however many
14	there are, of, in the industry, of that nine titles.
15	But it seems like everyone wants to see, hear a
16	little bit more in terms of adverse effect.
17	For example, your reply number 59 says
18	that, "He had problems" "a problem trying to play
19	his CD in a particular" maybe it was a PC. It
20	was a PC, and he said, "Well, it took me a lot of
21	time, but I eventually downloaded a program and
22	indeed I was able to play it."
23	So that concept in my mind at first
24	effect (indistinguishable) or are we saying this is
0.5	

just an inconvenience? It took him a long time, but

1 he did finally get it. So, you know, you gave four 2 titles that had some problems but I'm not too sure if it adds up to adverse effect in my mind. 3 4 MS. HINZE: So what I understand you to 5 be asking is, a statement about what the harm is, 6 and whether it may or may not rise to a substantial 7 adverse? 8 MS. DOUGLASS: Yes, yes. 9 Right. I think there are MS. HINZE: 10 various aspects of that question. I think there is some genuine disagreement amongst maybe this side of 11 the room and that side of the room about the number 12 of copy-protected CD's that currently exist in the 13 14 United States, whether they be U.S. releases or 15 otherwise, so I think that EFF's position would be 16 that there are a number of copy-protected CD's in Statement one; that's the 17 the United States. 18 current position. 19 Statement two; in the future, there will 20 be -- if we can go by the indications of the record 21 industry executives' statements and by technology 22 company statements, there will be, as early as this 23 year, on Arista and BMG releases, there will be copy 24 protection. Then the question is, is it likely to

malfunction?

Well, that's an interesting question.

It seems to be that there are -- you are looking at reply comments that have been filed by consumers in, 48 consumers in this particular proceeding. You have the experience that has been documented elsewhere, people on the Internet who have

complained about problems with playback.

The nature of the harm is qualitatively significant. If you were one of the people for whom the particular CD you have purchased does not play, it doesn't play. So it's an -- it might be an all or a nothing thing, but I think part of the problem in assessing the nature and the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of the harm here, is that the harm varies. And from my point of view, the harm varies because it's an unintended malfunctioning.

But the point is, it's still a malfunctioning, and where it malfunctions to the extent that someone can't play music that they've purchased, they get nothing. They've paid for their particular disk, and they have an expectation that something that they have previously been able to play CD's on will play the CD and yet they receive nothing.

So I would say for the people who are

1 within the scope of that class, that's a fairly 2 fundamental harm. They've experienced no benefit 3 from the bargain they've made to purchase the CD. 4 MS. DOUGLASS: Within the scope of that class? 5 6 MS. HINZE: Within the scope. 7 We're 49, but there's MS. DOUGLASS: another one besides the -- at least one more in 8 9 addition to the 48. But on one side I see, you 10 know, 49 problems, and on the other side I hear one 11 tenth of one percent. So, you know, how do I reconcile those? 12 MS. HINZE: Right I'd like to make two 13 14 apparently inconsistent statements, but let me say 15 this. The number of comments that have been filed 16 by consumers with the Copyright Office in this 17 proceeding is evidence, Direct evidence, of harm to consumers' non-infringing uses. I think that's 18 The fact that there are 48 or 49 comments is 19 20 not necessarily indicative of the level of harm 21 that's out there. 22 So in terms of a comparison, on one side 23 of the table we have our belief that there are a 24 number of these CD's in existence in the United 25 On the other side of the table, you're

comparing a statement from an industry perspective, with an industry representative who has the ability to get an industry-wide feedback on the number of complaints they've received.

I guess on this side of the table, as much as I would like to be the spokesperson or as much as any of us here would like to be the spokesperson for the entire American consumer populace, we're not.

And in terms of the feedback that

consumers have given to the Copyright Office in

support of the exemption we're seeking here, I guess

I would like to point out part of the reason we

suspect why the Copyright Office received comments

when it did was because EFF asked people on its

mailing list if they had experienced these problems

to write to the Copyright Office.

We are an organization that has a paid membership of about 9,000 people, and our mailing list actually goes to about 30,000 people. That's a small part of the American population. I would hasten to say that a larger proportion of people probably don't even know that this proceeding is taking place, and that the level of harm that is experienced out there in the population is probably

1	far greater than the number of comments you've
2	received, with respect.
3	So, in terms of apples and oranges, I
4	think it would be fair to say that the consumer
5	experience is not necessarily should not be
6	regarded based on, just on the information that's
7	been submitted to the Copyright Office in terms of a
8	numerical number of comments.
9	MS. DOUGLASS: I'll grant you that.
10	Thank you.
11	MS. GROSS: Can I just follow up on
12	that?
13	MS. DOUGLASS: Mr. Belinsky wants to
14	say something, too. Can
15	MS. GROSS: Okay. I just wanted to say
16	that you know, it's an interesting argument about is
17	it nine titles? Is it more than nine titles?
18	What's the exact number of comments received in the
19	harm?
20	It seems to me that this is should
21	really be a principled argument, a principled
22	analysis. That it is the principle of the idea that
23	when you buy a CD, you have the right to play it. I
24	mean, you know, what gives me the right to throw
25	this book in the air? Why own it?

The same things with the CD, what gives

me the right to listen to the CD? I own it, that's

the right, so it's the principle. It's not the

number of titles that are released, it's the legal

principle here.

MS. DOUGLASS: Mr. Belinsky?

MR. BELINSKY: I just wanted to add one observation, again from our perspective as being in the copy protection business for quite a number of years. There is the notion of the frustrated copier effect that we've seen over and over again in video and in entertainment software, where the existence of copy protection on a video cassette or a DVD, or a CD ROM game brings consumers, quote unquote, complaints, that are consumer complaints arise by virtue of the consumer not being able to make a -- an extra copy, when heretofore, before the existence of copy protection, he could.

So from the perspective of assuming there's a goal to try and measure how many complaints or how many situations are arising, I think that we would suggest you need to be somewhat careful when you look at the total volume of input that you're getting because our experience, not so much in music again, because it's so new from a

1	timeline perspective, but in video and in games, a
2	substantial number of the "returns" that came back
3	to Blockbuster video or the video game store were
4	from consumers who were upset that they could not
5	make a copy, not that they could not play their
6	video or run their computer games. So just another
7	data point from the historical perspective.
8	MS. DOUGLASS: So you're saying that
9	consumers are mad and they just sent to the
10	Copyright Office all these problems they were having
11	because they didn't really agree with copy
12	protection in the first place?
13	MR. BELINSKY: I'm not suggesting what
14	the consumers who talked, who communicated with the
15	Copyright Office were saying, but I am saying that
16	we have very direct evidence over the years that
17	consumers have come back to retail stores and said
18	"This product doesn't work." When indeed, what it
19	turned out was, they couldn't make a copy and they
20	were upset about that.
21	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay.
22	MR. BELINSKY: Because they thought that
23	it was their right to make a copy.
24	MS. DOUGLASS: So this product doesn't
25	work then translated into

1	MR. BELINSKY: Because of copy
2	protection.
3	MS. DOUGLASS: this product doesn't
4	work like it did before, or like I expected it to
5	work.
6	MR. BELINSKY: Yeah, exactly. Yeah, and
7	before I could make extra copies, and now I can't,
8	so it must not work right anymore.
9	MS. DOUGLASS: I see, okay. I just
10	think I have one Oh, I'm sorry.
11	MR. MARKS: I would just like to make a
12	couple of comments. I do think, though that what
13	you can take away from the 48 comments is that from
14	the 48, only three of them addressed CD's that had
15	been released in the U.S. that had some kind of
16	technological protection measure.
17	So I don't know whether the other
18	reasons are attributable to some of the things Mr.
19	Belinsky said, but the only record evidence here is
20	essentially that 48. And there's only three of the
21	45 titles that were discussed there that that are
22	actually U.S. released and are recordings that have
23	technological protection measures. And you know,
24	aside from that, I think whatever you might
25	speculate about how many people might complain or

might not, I mean, this is a proceeding that has to go by the record evidence and (indistinguishable) the evidence that we can present is the .08 percent. You know, the evidence that's been presented by the proponents is 48 complaints that detailed 45 CD's, only three of which you know, fit within the scope of this proceeding.

The second point that the EFF made that

I wanted to respond to about how there will be more.

There may be more, but we don't know what technology is going to be used, and we don't know and shouldn't presume that things won't be able to be played back.

It is entirely speculative in that regard.

Third point, somebody buys something.

The conclusion that they get nothing, not clear that that's really the case. A number of things could be returned. Universal had help lines, web sites that held so that people eventually could have a place of —— I don't think we can draw the conclusion that just 'cause you bought something and on your first try or second try it didn't work, that you ended up with zero value for the money that you spent.

And finally, with regard to Ms. Gross' comment about you know, let's look at the principle, I think the principle she enunciated is just wrong,

Τ	as a matter of law. And you know, that that legal
2	forwarding is cited in there, our papers, I don't
3	know (indistinguishable).
4	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay, just one
5	clarification. The three titles were that you
6	mentioned. Is it possible that some of those that
7	were copy-protected; is it possible that some of
8	those could have been non-U.S. copy-protected?
9	MR. MARKS: There were five foreign
10	releases that I found. So it's possible that some
11	of them had taken the logical protection
12	(indistinguishable) that weren't released in the
13	U.S.
14	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. Thank you. Okay?
15	MS. PETERS: Now you brought with your
16	long list of questions.
17	MR. KASUNIC: I have so many, I may be
18	putting some of these in writing later, but let's
19	just start with first, Mr. Marks. You mentioned
20	that it's not clear whether the technological
21	protection measures are malfunctioning, or whether
22	this is some other kind of technical problem. Isn't
23	it are most prior to copy-protected CD's,
24	understanding the technology right, or essential
25	Redbook CD's, most that were put on the market for

	audio	emphasis.
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MR. MARKS: (Indistinguishable)

MR. KASUNIC: Okay, so if it -- wouldn't it be one way to make determinations if a Redbook CD worked on these devices, and a -- any kind of copyprotected CD did not work on the device, wouldn't it be pretty safe to assume that the problem was a result of the technological protection measure rather than the consumer's technology, or operating system, there was some kind of glitch in the way the media, the technological protection measure put on the media work?

MR. MARKS: I'm not sure that that is a safe assumption, because, based on the number of complaints that we know about, it was essentially the same number that you would get from the release of standard Redbook audio.

So, you know, there's no clear indication that the technical protection measure was the result of the problems anymore than it could've been a manufacturing defect or something else, because there was not -- it was consistent with what you normally have in terms of a disk that may not be able to play for any variety of reasons.

MR. KASUNIC: But then, isn't there an

1	important difference in this situation that these
2	are protected by law in terms of making any there
3	was full of the problems that people may have had
4	with the Redbook audio, they couldn't make them
5	work. And they wouldn't have any violation of the
6	law.
7	MR. MARKS: I'm not sure I understand
8	the question.
9	MR. KASUNIC: Well, the traditional
10	Redbook CD's didn't have any technological
11	protection they used on them, so if there was some
12	kind of a malfunction on them, people could do
13	whatever they needed to do to get them to play on
14	their particular operating system. If they needed
15	to tweak it in some way in order to get it to play,
16	they could do that, right, without violating Section
17	1201,
18	because there weren't any technological
19	protection measures on the Redbook CD's prior
20	to these nine that are on the market.
21	MR. MARKS: Well, if I I guess what I
22	was saying is that they may be able to do that here
23	because it they may not be able to make them
24	play, they may not have to circumvent an access

control.

1	MR. KASUNIC: Okay, well then let's go
2	to that. Now, I you mentioned that Congress
3	envisioned use of technological protection measures
4	on copyrighted works to enable and facilitate these
5	being distributed. But didn't Congress also
6	envision and encourage use of technological
7	protection measures that had that making a
8	distinction between what type of technological
9	protection measure was being used? Didn't Congress
10	envision that you would know if it was a copy
11	protection measure or an access protection measure?
12	And it seems to me here, the way we're talking about
13	this, no one's willing take a position on what is
14	actually out there.
15	So, it's virtually a situation of hide
16	the ball. No one knows what kind of technological
17	protection measure is on any given works anymore.
18	MR. MARKS: We don't believe it's our
19	burden of proof to come in and prove that something
20	was an access control or was a copy control, it was
21	something else. That burden of proof lies with the
22	proponents, so we're not saying hide the ball, we're
23	just simply responding according to the burdens and
24	prima facie cases that have been set forth by the
25	Librarian in these types of proceedings.
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MR. KASUNIC: Wait, but this isn't a court of law where the burden of proof is the same. We have to look in terms of, in the broad sense of whether an exemption should be issued, and that exemption would be technologically neutral and would apply to all kind of technological protection measures on the particular class of work.

So if it is unclear, then there seems like there may be some sense of potential harm here. Do you know for particular technologies -- we have some particular types of technologies that were in the market, maybe we (indistinguishable) then if there's another question about the future, but when we're talking about the (indistinguishable) as a data shield, for instance, or a media code version 1, or a Sunny's Key to Audio, or in any one of those, can you tell me whether it's a copy protection or a access protection measure?

MR. MARKS: You know, Mr. Belinsky may be in a better position than I am because I just am not a technology person and don't know the specifics of those technologies. I think the point is that when you're proposing an exemption, you do have a burden there, and whether this is a court of law or not, it's a prima facie case that has to be made

1 out, and that -- included in that is to demonstrate 2 that there is an access control and that access 3 control is problematic for some reason, or causing a 4 malfunction for (indistinguishable) rely on the 5 download type exemption or something 6 (indistinguishable). 7 Well, let's assume they've MR. KASUNIC: satisfied me, and I think that they've passed the 8 burden in terms of showing that this is an access 9 10 Is there anything that you can offer on 11 the other side that when I'm balancing now, that will lead me to believe otherwise? 12 13 MR. MARKS: Sitting here, I try, I 14 I would say, however, that even if you 15 assume that, they have not proven a case that 16 there's adverse impact. It is a diminimus impact. 17 125,000 disks, only nine of which that have been --18 that includes (indistinguishable) technological 19 protection measure, even if you assume it's access. 20 There's no proof that its been, that 21 there's a malfunction in the access protection 22 There's just no record even on that. 23 there's certainly no substantial adverse impact

under the tests that have been set forth in the

evidence that's been presented.

24

1	MR. KASUNIC: Well, that leads me to my
2	next question. Which is we have a situation
3	where there's we have at least 48 established
4	48 or so, established complaints of problems
5	identified problems with CD's currently, so, in
6	terms of actual harm of something, where people
7	aren't getting what they want, at least, there is
8	some record?
9	MR. MARKS: Again, that could be just a
10	manufacturing defect. The fact that somebody comes
11	in and files something and says, "I've had trouble
12	playing this disk," may have nothing to do with
13	there's no nexus.
14	MR. KASUNIC: Well, there are certain
15	CD's, at least, where there seem to have been
16	recurring problems on them, so in terms of proof,
17	(indistinguishable) disk, not all of them, anyway,
18	are just random problems, but there are recurring
19	problems that appear to be recurring in some of
20	those comments.
21	MR. MARKS: I'm not sure what of the
22	three actually occur or not.
23	MR. KASUNIC: But beyond that, isn't
24	safe to assume that although this is obviously for a
25	legitimate purpose, (indistinguishable) controlling

1 massive unauthorized file trading, that these are 2 being put into the market, won't these protection 3 efforts invariably continue to cause problems on 4 many legacy systems and devices that are out there? 5 There's an extraordinary number of 6 systems and devices that it's going to be very 7 difficult to have full compatibility with down the road when there are many different kind of possible 8 protection systems that will be tried. 9 Isn't it 10 likely that more problems are going to occur, and 11 that at least some of those will be related to a causally related to the technological protection? 12 MR. MARKS: You mean with these 13 14 particular disks? 15 MR. KASUNIC: No, I'm talking about into 16 the future. No, I don't think you can 17 MR. MARKS: 18 draw that conclusion, because it's entirely 19 speculative to conclude that the technology, if that 20 were used, on these nine disks, are ever going to be 21 used again. 22 No, I'm not saying on MR. KASUNIC: 23 those nine disks, I'm saying any kind of technology 24 that will be used in the future. Isn't it going to 25 be likely that there are going to be some problems

with the many types of legacy systems out there, that you're not going to have full compatibility with everything?

MR. MARKS: I don't believe you can conclude that. I think it depends on the technology that will be used. And we just don't know what that technology is today because there are different companies, like Mr. Belinsky's company that are trying to you know, market very good technologies, and different content owners will make different decisions about what technologies to use.

MR. KASUNIC: Okay. My last question for you. What harm would an exemption cause in this situation if it was just for an individual being able to create interoperability or compatibility with their device?

Given the limitation of that, the possibility that this may occur anyway, whether there's an exemption or not, people taking this, what harm of letting people just be able to play what they have purchased on a device that where there is a reasonable relationship -- we're not talking about playing this on the toaster, but we are talking about playing it on with the reasonable consumer expectation of playing it on some kind of a

CD player?

MR. MARKS: Well, I think that, for the most part, those consumers are able to do that. Of the nine, some had been re-released in unprotected form. Probably all of the rest are available on new types of services, like the new Apple service and downloading format, and could be downloaded and played on that very device that they're trying to play the disk on. So I don't think that there's any harm on the other side.

I think the harm to our side in the very broad exemption that's been proposed, is that by broadly exempting all CD -- so-called CD copyprotected disks that have access problems, you are interfering with the ability to develop the new technologies that will be used in the future. Which is directly contrary to Congressional intent and directly harmful to the industry's ability to market and to you know, defeat piracy.

MR. KASUNIC: If I could just ask one question, (indistinguishable) don't feel left out, that of the EFF and IP Justice. Isn't it likely that the market will correct the situation?

It's accepted that these malfunctions or whatever they are, were not necessarily planned, but

1	are just the early action with the many types of
2	systems out there, and legacy systems existing.
3	Isn't it likely that the recording industry will try
4	to you know, continue to accommodate and make this
5	less, make any problems that are occurring less
6	likely into the future?
7	And wouldn't a market solution to this
8	be preferable to just giving individuals who have
9	the ability to do so, the ability to circumvent?
10	MS. HINZE: I think that's a good
11	question. As I said, I EFF's position is that we
12	believe that this is an unintended consequence, so
13	it's a fair question to ask whether or not we might
14	expect to see this ameliorated. I have two
15	responses. One is even if it was unintended, the
16	existing situation is one where consumers can't play
17	things on devices that presumably they were intended
18	to be able to play them on. For instance, the case
19	of multi-session CD's.
20	So even if it wasn't intended, there's
21	currently a problem. Whether or not a market, the
22	market may be able to address that in the future is,
23	I think it's difficult for me to speculate on
24	that.

Obviously, if it's the intent of

copyright owners to, as they say, to have their work available in as many different formats and as many different devices as possible, you would expect to see that. But the situation that we currently see is that, even if it weren't intended, there's already a significant impact on consumers. There will continue to be a significant impact on consumers for the legacy devices.

Even if I am to speculate and look into the future and say, "Perhaps the copy protection technologies will in the future somehow improve their compatibility with a whole range of different devices, and magically those problems will go away," there will continue to be a set of disks that are in circulation and there will continue to be a set of playback devices that will potentially have issues with those disks. That's not going to go away.

I guess I would also like to address the burden here. I've been told that EFF is wrong to speculate, has speculated in the future that there will be harm. What seems likely is that there will be a large volume of copy-protected CD's being released in the United States shortly. That much is clear. It seems likely there will be a significant time lag before any changes exist to the copy

protection technology that's currently being released. It's clear that the current technology, the current group of copy-protection technologies have problems, and that they were unintended.

I can't see that the market in the short term is going to be able to address the current problems, and to the extent that the market is able to address the problem going into the future, our exemption would only apply where there is a malfunction. So in terms of that, on the balance of harm and burdens here, well, I would say that the consumers are the ones here who are currently bearing the burden of harm. They have purchased something that they can't use on a device they expect to be able to play it back on.

The exemption we're proposing would allow them to play it back, only to the extent that it malfunctions. To the extent that the market is able to ameliorate these problems in the future and improve some of the compatibility issues, even if that's technically possible, our exemption would then not cover the situations where a device can play back the purchased CD. So there is no harm in granting the exemption from that point of view.

From the copyright owner's point of view, there will

not be any significant loss from the point of view of having the exemption granted.

MR. MARKS: I don't think there's any basis to conclude that any copy-protected CD's that are going to be released in the market in the near future are going to be based on the same technology. I just don't know how that statement could be made. You know, Mr. Belinsky may have some information on what kind of partnerships and deals his company has done, but without seeing business plans about what's being done, I just don't know how that statement can be made. There's just no way, there's no evidence for it.

MS. HINZE: For the sake of clarifying the record, I don't believe I said that I understood what the technologies in the future would be, or that they would be based on the current technologies. I was making a statement about the current impact, and the statement -- my statement about the future actually addressed the scope of our exemption and whether or not it would apply in the event that technologies were to improve and increase compatibility.

I would just like to add that the -- again, refer to the paper that EFF included in the

comments we submitted in December, which makes it clear that the nature of the malfunctioning here is quite complex. It's difficult to get a clear picture of that, exactly what formats will fail on exactly which devices.

As I said, it appears to be that these technologies currently exploit differences between the way the stand alone audio CD players work, and multi-format players work. And to the extent that we've seen multi-format players over take stand alone CD players, it's more likely than not within the next three years, there will be increasing problems, because the playback errors — that type of problem from the point of view of the devices will increase as people switch to these more modern players. So, in terms of these speculations about future harm, I think that should be taken into account.

MR. MARKS: I think (indistinguishable) actually be the exact opposite, which is that you will see that .08 percent number go down as the technology is improved. And along with you know, the clear incentives for the content owners to be providing a consumer friendly experience for their buyers.

1	MR. CARSON: Now that we have a consensus
2	
3	MS. PETERS: You guys make it so easy
4	for us. I think David has some concluding
5	questions.
6	MR. CARSON: Okay. Let me start with,
7	I'm sorry. Is it Miss Hinz or Hinze?
8	MS. HINZE: I answer to both.
9	MR. CARSON: Preference? I would like to
10	accommodate you. You stated earlier, and it's in
11	your written comment as well, that assuming that
12	what we're dealing with here is a malfunctioning
13	copy control, there is uncertainty in the legal
14	community as to whether that constitutes
15	(indistinguishable) that controls access,
16	copyrighted works, correct?
17	MS. HINZE: Um-hmm.
18	MR. CARSON: And I know that in your
19	written comment you cited one article by Mr.
20	Halderman. I haven't looked at it yet, I apologize,
21	I will. But I mean, first of all, beyond that
22	article, any other sources for that statement that
23	there's uncertainty in the legal community?
24	MS. HINZE: I can't point to a specific
25	legal available source, but I've had numerous

1	conversations with people who are well versed in the
2	history of Section 1201, and people who've been
3	involved in the debate about the interpretation of
4	the content scramble systems for digital versatile
5	disks and its joint nature as a emerged, copy and
6	access control. I think it's
7	MR. CARSON: This isn't a question of
8	merged copy and access control, you're not even
9	(indistinguishable) as that.
10	MS. HINZE: Sorry?
11	MR. CARSON: You're not even
12	(indistinguishable) this is a case of merged copy
13	and access control
14	MS. HINZE: No
15	MR. CARSON: You're saying this is a copy
16	control that inadvertently blocks access.
17	MS. HINZE: That's correct. I would
18	like to, I guess, make two points. One is in terms
19	of our understanding of how to characterize this
20	technology. We are partly handicapped by the fact
21	that there is no information out there.
22	As far as we can tell, there is no
23	application of a process, information or a treatment
24	with the authority of a copyright owner for us to
25	fall within for a copy protection technology that

1 malfunctions to fall within the definition in 2 1201(a)(1)(3)(B) of a technology protection measure that effectively controls access. 3 4 So in terms of a strict legal analysis, 5 I think part of the reason why there is uncertainty 6 is that people don't feel comfortable that they have 7 enough information to know how this technology is 8 There is very little publicly available operating. 9 information about exactly what is happening. Belinsky and Mr. Marks have pointed out, there are a 10 11 number of different technologies. There has been some work done on each of those but it's like, by no 12 means comprehensive. 13 And as far as we can tell, our position 14 15 is that it doesn't appear to fall within the definition, as I said, of "effectively controlling 16 access" because there doesn't seem to be an 17 application of a process, information on treatment. 18 19 But that is based on our limited understanding of 20 what information there is available publicly. 21 I guess, Mr. Marks, the MR. CARSON: 22 point I -- well, it's your burden whether you have 23 the information or not. 24 Well, and it --MS. HINZE: 25 MR. MARKS: Well, the only thing else I

1	would point out is that there my understanding is
2	there are patent applications so those would
3	presumably be, you know, a good source of
4	information as to how the technology works.
5	MS. HINZE: When the patent issues.
6	MR MARKS: in this department.
7	What was that?
8	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent
9	issues.
10	MR. MARKS: When.
11	MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did
12	talk about the burden of proof and we'll go with
13	I think we're in agreement at least somewhere along
14	the road you're talking about that we've already
15	said the burden is on the proponent of the exemption
16	but let's explore how far that goes.
17	If we're going to talk about burdens of
18	proofs and presumptions, Lord knows it's been a long
19	time since I've studied that but
20	(indistinguishable).
21	It's been awhile since I've even had to
22	apply the Rules of Evidence but I'm going to
23	give it a shot here. Isn't there a Rule of
24	Evidence that when evidence on a particular
25	issue is within the control of one of the

1	parties, even if that party doesn't initially
2	have the burden, the finder of fact is
3	entitled to infer, from that party's failure
4	to come forward with any information
5	whatsoever when that information is totally
6	in that party's control, that if that
7	information were out it might be adverse to
8	the party who has control of it?
9	MR. MARKS: I'm not sure we're in
10	control. We didn't we're not the technology
11	companies.
12	MR. CARSON: But you are the people who
13	are putting the stuff out.
14	MR. MARKS: That's right but
15	MR. CARSON: You don't know what they do
16	with it. You just tell them to protect it and they
17	protect it and you're happy?
18	MR. MARKS: Well, I you know, I don't
19	know the answer to your my I don't want to
20	tell you what grade I got in evidence so that would
21	help me explain why I can't answer that. But the
22	short answer is I don't recall the evidentiary
23	standards but, you know, the truth is I honestly
24	don't know to what extent we even have that
25	information about how the specific technology works

1 anyway. But I don't know what else to say on that. 2 MR. CARSON: Okay. One final question 3 to the people on that side of the table, whether 4 we're talking about a copy protection -- well, let's 5 assume for the moment, because it really was 6 inspired by the EFF testimony. 7 Let's assume for the moment we're talking about a copy protection that just is 8 9 screwing up and restricting access unintentionally. Based upon the experience you're 10 Let's assume that. 11 familiar with, what would one have to do in order to be able to make one of those CD's that has the 12 malfunctioning copy protection work on the 13 14 particular player that you want to play it on but 15 you can't play it on? 16 This comes not from personal MS. HINZE: 17 experience like I said, I'm a lawyer. However, I 18 would hate to be at risk of violating 1201(a)(1) 19 since I've not actually heard a clear statement from 20 the other side of the room that they wouldn't sue 21 consumers for attempting to circumvent what may 22 ostensibly be a copy protection measure. 23 just said, it's not personal experience. 24 But however, my understanding is that it

works fairly well to use a felt tip marker to mark

1	around the end of the table of contents. Partly
2	this is an issue about correct data being put into
3	the table of contents is my understanding on the
4	technological side of how this works. Remember you
5	have when we have a CD which has copy protection
6	and it's a multi-session CD for instance, on many of
7	these, it is visible that there is a second session.
8	MR. BUCHOLZ: There's a thin line
9	between demarcating the two sessions, the first
10	and second session.
11	MR. CARSON: Can't see it from here but
12	we'll take your word for it.
13	MR. BUCHOLZ: Sure. We can show you
14	after the
15	MS. HINZE: We'll be happy to show you
16	that. But basically, it's clear where the second
17	session starts. And apparently, it is possible to
18	use a felt tip marker to mark out the table of
19	contents on the section that isn't showing. And
20	what that does is it basically prevents the error
21	from being introduced into the CD reader when it's
22	trying to read the table of contents. So it will
23	see the second session which Well, it will see
24	the first it will see the session that it can't
25	currently play. That's one way of doing it.

1	Essentially the same remedy happens if you use
2	masking tape to to again to obscure the session
3	that won't play.
4	MR. CARSON: All right. this is the
5	rather celebrate case we all read about a few months
6	ago, I guess, about how you can get by this with a
7	felt tip marker. Am I correct?
8	MS. HINZE: Right, right.
9	MR. CARSON: Is it safe to assume in
10	light of that experience, that we're probably not
11	going to be seeing that particular technology in the
12	marketplace again given now everyone knows how easy
13	it is to get around it?
14	MS. HINZE: I think that would be a
15	question for Mr. Belinsky rather than me.
16	MR. CARSON: Okay, fine. Let's
17	embarrass him.
18	MR. BELINSKI: Oh, this is crazy. I
19	believe that the disk you have and certainly the
20	Magic Marker approach worked in one version of
21	Sony's key to audio technology. I can tell you for
22	sure that that doesn't work with our technology.
23	It's not a very effective technology for that to be
24	the circumvention method.
25	And I can't speak to what Sony's doing

1	today but I can speak to the fact that that's
2	absolutely not a generalize-able approach that would
3	render our copy protection approach, our copy
4	protection technology inapplicable. So I think that
5	is one example that it was highly celebrated in the
6	press, as you pointed out, and I don't know of any
7	labels, any music companies, not even Sony that
8	continued with that technology.
9	MR. CARSON: Is there any reason to
LO	believe that Sony would continue to market that
11	particular technology given the publicity as to how
12	easy it is to get past it?
13	MS. HINZE: Well, again, I obviously
14	can't speak for the
15	MR. CARSON: Let's use common sense here
16	for a moment.
17	MS. HINZE: Then common sense would say
18	no to that. I mean I would
19	MR. CARSON: So should we conclude that
20	it's likely that it's likely that's going to be
21	happening in the next three years?
22	MS. HINZE: The the
23	MR. CARSON: That particular
24	technology's going to be deployed?
25	MS. HINZE: You know, I obviously can't

speak on behalf of the technology companies. Common sense would suggest that that particular technology will presumably morph into something a little bit more secure.

However, I think the general principle is that there will be -- there will be copyprotected CD's in the future and the technologies will have -- it will be -- there will be a possibility that, for instance, there will be tools available. Obviously, this proceeding can't actually address tools and I'm aware of the limitations of what a the Copyright Office can do in this hearing process.

The existence of tools that may be available to assist consumers to circumvent should an exemption be granted and presumably needed, based on the interpretation of 1201(a)(1). It's quite possible that in the future software -- that software companies may, for instance, have incentive for improving the software players of CD ROMs, may have the incentive for also producing more compatible drivers for their players. There's a range of different way that this problem might be a meliorated.

It's difficult for me to speculate about

what the tools, that people might use to use them, because as everyone is aware, that the existence of tools or the manufacturing and trafficking in tools, unless they don't fit the three conditions, would violate 1201(a)(2). So the fact that I'm having trouble speculating about how this might work in practice, I don't think actually says anything about arguing about whether or not the exemption should be granted.

MR. CARSON: Okay. Let me come

(indistinguishable) may because the point of my
question really had nothing to do with felt tip

markers. It had to do with whether the prohibition
on circumventing technological measure that control
access is likely to be preventing people from
engaging in non-infringing uses over the next three
years.

And part and parcel of that analysis, seems to me, has to be you're making the case to us that in order to be able to play those CD's on the player you want to play them on, you need to circumvent an access control and there's a way to circumvent an access control that will let you do that.

If there isn't, then there's no point in

1	talking about this. So what I'm really trying to
2	get at is do you have any information that, by
3	circumventing a technological measure that controls
4	access, you will be able to play those copy-
5	protected CD's on players that, at the moment, can't
6	play them?
7	MS. HINZE: Do I have any evidence at
8	all, essentially, is that?
9	MR. CARSON: Do you have any information
10	on I don't care about tools. A method, a way.
11	Is this a futile if we gave you this exemption,
12	would it be a totally futile act because
13	circumventing an access control wouldn't do you any
14	good?
15	MS. HINZE: Right. I think I understand
16	the nature of the question. As I understand it,
17	there is software that currently is available that
18	allows people to that would allow people to make
19	use of this exemption.
20	MR. CARSON: It may or may not violate
21	the 1201(a)(2) is what you're saying I gather.
22	MS. HINZE: I appreciate that but from
23	the point of view of answering your question
24	MR. CARSON: No, no. What I'm really
25	trying to get at is

1	MS. HINZE: Can I cite you examples of
2	software that doesn't violate 1201(a)(2)?
3	MR. CARSON: No, no. I don't even care
4	about that necessarily but let's assume let's put
5	that aside for the moment. The software you're
6	talking about, the way it works is by circumventing
7	an access control or circumventing some kind of
8	technological protection measure?
9	MS. HINZE: I'm not sure. I guess, one,
10	that would depend on whether or not this is an
11	access measure, which we appear not to have any
12	agreement about. But two, I'm not personally aware.
13	I just understand that there are tools that
14	MR. CARSON: Okay. Well, let's ask it
15	another way then. Since the whole premise of your
16	case here is that a malfunctioning copy control or a
17	hyperactive copy control is also serving to block
18	access, whether intended or not, is the way do we
19	know, do you know that the way to make that CD play
20	on a particular device is to overcome the copy
21	control? To circumvent the copy control? Is that
22	the solution or is it not?
23	MS. HINZE: Yeah. I think it's a
24	technology by technology thing. As I understand it
25	there are distinct differences between the ways that

the three main -- four main technology copy 1 2 protection technologies work and I'm not sure that I know the answer across each of the four of those. 3 So you're not sure whether 4 MR. CARSON: 5 we can do you any good, in other words; is that 6 right or --7 I think that -- I think -- I MS. HINZE: quess my understanding of this is that people would 8 9 have an incentive for creating tools that wouldn't violate 1201(a)(2) but could be used for exactly 10 11 this purpose, if they were not, the overhanging 12 threat of a secondary circumvention liability. To 13 the extent that tools currently existing can be used for the current technologies that's largely because 14 15 the tools have been found by people who have 16 arduously looked into this. 17 People are less inclined at the moment, 18 to arduously look into this because they worry about 19 violating an access protection measure and therefore 20 violating 1201(a)(1). If there were an exemption 21 granted, I think that the flow-on effect would be 22 that you would actually see the generation of tools 23 that don't violate 1201(a)(2), that might actually 24 serve to accommodate some of these purposes.

MR. MARKS:

Well, then the tools that

1	exist today, do they address the copy controls or
2	the access controls? I mean I think that that's a
3	key part of Mr. Carson's question as well as I
4	think that
5	MR. CARSON: Well, not necessarily
6	because one of the premises is that you can't tell
7	the different between a copy control and an access
8	control or rather that a copy control is acting as
9	an access control. To buy her case we've got to
10	assume that the copy control is also operating as an
11	access control whether intended as such or not.
12	Right?
13	MS. HINZE: I'd have to think a little
14	harder about that. I mean I think that's
15	essentially what we're saying but I'm not sure about
16	the second part of your question. I would have to
17	think about whether you have to for instance,
18	there might logically be a space where you could
19	if an exemption were granted you could come up with
20	some sort of software that might, for instance,
21	allow you to potentially circumvent the access part
22	but not the copy part.
23	I don't know if that's a the reason
24	I'm looking puzzled is I'm not sure,
25	technologically, if that's possible. I don't know

1	the extent to which they merged as a concept and
2	whether it might be possible to have some mechanism
3	for circumventing one without the other. I think
4	that would be something that would be worked out by
5	people who have a better sense of how these four
6	individual or however many different types of copy
7	protection technologies actually work. I think it's
8	difficult to speculate in the general, in the
9	abstract here.
10	MR. CARSON: Okay. Mr. Bucholz, did you
11	have anything else to say?
12	MR. BUCHOLZ: No, no. I'm fine. Thank
13	you.
14	MS. PETERS: Mr. Belinsky, shed any
15	light on this?
16	MR. BELINSKY: A couple of things.
17	First of all, we're experts at the technology and
18	we're not as expert at mapping the pieces of the
19	technology to the specific definitions in the law so
20	I don't want to go onto thin ice legally and say
21	something that may or may not be correct.
22	But as I do understand the provisions
23	with respect to copy control system having
24	information applied to it to the presence or absence
25	of which controls whether a copy can be made or not,

the technology that we're bringing to market now, in particular, with the second section capability that I described certainly includes that feature or that attribute, where there's information required to, for example, to move the music from the CD to the hard disk so you can play it on the computer without the CD present.

There's information required to be present to validate that you're moving it from an original disk to the post-concussion. There's also information required to be present when you want to move it off the computer to a portable device to go jogging with your music. So as I understand the interaction between the technology and the provisions of the law, that would qualify as the technological protection. I mean -- sorry -- as a copy control measure.

But it's also the aspect of in the context of the two sections taken together, the information is added to the first section so that the personal computer doesn't see it. And that's where I go onto complete thin ice legally as to is that an access control measure as relates to just the first section or is it because the two sections together is really what, from our perspective,

constitutes the copy-protected CD.

Is that just additional information -and we do add additional information to the first
section, the s0-called red book -- as part of the
overall copy protection and technology. That could
also look like just another example where extra
information is added in so I'm really not capable of
parsing it in any more level of detail than that to
shed any light on is it copy control, is it access
control.

My guess is, depending on which prism you looked at it through, you know, and if you wanted to make very detailed arguments you might be able to sustain both arguments at any one point would be my guess, depending on how narrowly you looked at it and whether you looked at the two sections together or just the first section or just the second section. It's just hard for me to say, not being -- not being a legal scholar. That's the best light I can shed on how the technology actually works.

MS. PETERS: Maybe after we read some of the papers we may have some more questions.

MR. CARSON: Good chance.

MS. PETERS: Good chance. Okay. This

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1	was a long session but thank you very much, all of
2	you. We appreciate your being here and helping us
3	try to figure out how we're going to handle all the
4	exemptions that have been requested. So I think
5	you'll hear from us and we'll be back tomorrow
6	morning at 9:00 o'clock, right? Right.
7	(Whereupon, the hearing in the above-
8	entitled matter was adjourned at 4:50 p.m.)
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